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INTRODUCTION 
The mutual fund market timing and late trading scandals initiated by New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in 2003 led to settlements from industry participants 
totaling over $4.25 billion.2 However, Spitzer’s actions were controversial and undercut 
the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which had been given 
pervasive regulatory authority over mutual funds by the Investment Company Act of 
1940.3 The SEC had also been embarrassed by earlier Spitzer prosecutions and by a spate 
of scandals at Enron and elsewhere. Spitzer’s actions against the mutual funds made the 
SEC look even more ineffective.  
In order to restore its tarnished image, the SEC imposed more regulations on the 
mutual funds, including a requirement that they increase the number of outside directors 
on their boards. The actions taken by the SEC were highly politicized, and critics noted 
that such a requirement would not have prevented the mutual fund scandals and had no 
empirical support for providing better performance results. The SEC’ corporate 
 
1 Professor of Law, Florida International University School of Law at Miami.  
2 Susanne Craig & Tom Lauricella, “How Merrill, Defying Warnings, Let 3 Brokers Ignite a Scandal,” 
March 27, 2006, at A1. 
3 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.
2governance rules were  struck down twice by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
adding further embarrassment to the SEC.4
The complex regulatory scheme created for mutual funds under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, including requirements for outside directors,5 proved ineffective 
in preventing the scandals revealed by Spitzer, as did the SEC’s intrusive regulations 
under that statute. That failure has raised the issue of whether an alternate regulatory 
structure for mutual funds would be more effective.6 Are mutual fund investors 
shareholders who need the protection of a board of directors and attending fiduciary 
duties or are they consumers who can base their investment decision based on price and 
normal disclosures given in consumer transactions?7
This article will examine the late trading scandals, the SEC’s response and 
provide a comparative analysis of alternate mechanisms for regulating collective 
investments. The article first traces the growth, development and regulation of mutual 
funds and their regulation. This includes a description of the early history of investment 
companies, the development of the open-end mutual fund in the 1920s, the problems 
encountered by investment companies in that era and the regulation that followed under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940. The article next describes the late trading and 
market timing scandals and the SEC’s response, as well as the role of hedge funds in 
those scandals. Alternative regulatory schemes for collective investments are then 
 
4 See nns. --, infra and accompanying text. 
5 See nns. --, infra and accompanying text. 
6 The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy (“AEI”) and Brooking Institute are conducting a joint 
policy initiative on this issue. http://www.aei-brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=220. AEI has also 
conducted a number of conferences on alternative regulations of mutual funds that are co-moderated by  
Peter Wallison, AEI Resident Fellow and Robert Litan a Brookings Institute fellow. This paper is based in 
part on a presentation by the author at one of those conferences. 
7 See Paula Tkac, “Tinker, Tailor, Mutual Fund Adviser,” Wall St. J., April 12, 2006, at A14 (concluding 
that mutual funds are simply consumer transactions).   
3examined, including commodity pools, common trusts, collective investment funds for 
pensions, endowments and insurance company reserves. Some other alternative 
regulatory and market schemes are also considered, including unitary investment funds, 
unit investment trust and trust indentures. The article concludes that the SEC’s intrusive 
regulation and its focus on increasing the number of outside directors as the method for 
ameliorating conflicts of interest has not proved effective. Alternative mechanisms, even 
those that do not have a board of directors, would serve equally as well.   
 I  
MUTUAL FUND REGULATION 
 
Background and History 
Mutual funds are “open-end” investment companies that continually offer and 
redeem their own shares. Instead of a secondary trading market, owners of mutual funds 
purchase and sell their ownership interests from and to the mutual fund.8 Those purchases 
and redemptions are based on the net asset value (NAV”) of the fund’s shares as 
calculated at the end of the day on which the redemption or purchase order is received.9
8 Because of this unique arrangement, “private trading in mutual fund shares is virtually nonexistent.” 
United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 549 (1973) (footnote omitted). “These features - continuous and 
unlimited distribution and compulsory redemption – are . . . ‘unique characteristic[s]’ of this form of 
investment.” United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422  U.S. 694, 698 (1975) 
(citation omitted). 
9 Quoting from an SEC study, the Supreme Court has noted that: 
Mutual fund shares are not traded on exchanges or generally in the over-the-counter market, as are 
other securities, but are sold by the fund through a principal underwriter, and redeemed by the 
fund, at prices which are related to ‘net asset value.’ The net asset value per share is normally 
computed twice daily by taking the market value at the time of all portfolio securities, adding the 
value of other assets and subtracting liabilities, and dividing the result by the number of shares 
outstanding. Shares of most funds are sold for a price equal to their net asset value plus a sales 
charge or commission, commonly referred to as the ‘sales load,’ and usually ranging from 7.5 to 
8.5 percent of the amount paid, or 8.1 to 9.3 percent of the amount invested. A few funds, 
however, known as ‘no-load’ funds, offer their shares for sale at net asset value without a sales 
charge. Shares of most funds are redeemed or repurchased by the funds at their net asset value, 
although a few funds charge a small redemption fee. The result of this pricing system, it is 
apparent, is that the entire cost of selling fund shares is generally borne exclusively by the 
purchaser of new shares and not by the fund itself. In this respect the offering of mutual fund 
4That open-end arrangement contrasts with the “closed-end” investment company that 
operates like any other corporation in the distribution and sale of its securities. Investors 
in closed-end companies buy and sell shares in those companies through a secondary 
market after the initial distribution of the shares.10 The open-end mutual fund is actually a 
somewhat late arrival on the investment scene, having been preceded by the investment 
trust and its successor, the closed end investment company, by at least a century.11 
“The investment company concept dates to Europe in the late 1700s, according to 
K. Geert Rouwenhorst in The Origins of Mutual Funds, when ‘a Dutch merchant and 
broker … invited subscriptions from investors to form a trust … to provide an 
opportunity to diversify for small investors with limited means.’”12 The Societe Generale 
de Belgique, a Belgium trust originally created in 1822 by King William of the 
Netherlands, was another collective investment enterprise that initially invested in foreign 
government loans and later in commercial businesses.13 A decade or so later, the Societe 
Generale Pour Favoriser l’Industrie Nationale Des Pays-Bas, initially a Belgian firm, 
 
shares differs from, say, the offering of new shares by a closed-end investment company or an 
additional offering ‘at the market’ of shares of an exchange-listed security, where at least a portion 
of the selling cost is borne by the company selling the shares. 
United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 548 (1973) (citation omitted).  
10 As noted by the Supreme Court: 
‘a mutual fund is an investment company, which, typically, is continuously engaged in the 
issuance of its shares and stands ready at any time to redeem the securities as to which it is the 
issuer; a closed-end investment company typically does not issue shares after its initial 
organization except at infrequent intervals and does not stand ready to redeem its shares. Because 
open-end investment companies will redeem their shares, they must constantly issue securities to 
prevent shrinkage of assets. In contrast, the capital structure of a closed-end company is similar to 
that of other corporations; if its shareholders wish to sell, they must do so in the marketplace. 
Without any obligation to redeem, closed-end companies need not continuously seek new capital.’ 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, 450 U.S. 46, 51 
(1981) (footnotes and citation omitted). 
11 I Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From Christopher Columbus to the 
Robber Barons (1492-1900)  290-291 (2002).   
12 Investment Company Institute, 2005 Mutual Fund Fact Book, A Guide to Trends and Statistics in the 
Mutual Fund Industry Appendix B (2005), available at ICI.org. 
13 E.C. Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 12 
(1937); Theodore J. Grayson, Investment Trusts: Their Origin, Development, and Operation 11 (1928).  
5converted loans to defaulting businesses into stocks of those firms and later sold the stock 
into the public market. That enterprise formed another investment trust with the 
Rothschilds in 1836 called the Societe Des S Capitalistes Reunis Dans un But de 
Mutualite Industrielle, which held shares in various companies.14 
The Societe Generale de Credit Mobilier was organized in France in 1852 to 
supply new enterprises with banking facilities. It invested in railroad projects in France 
and in joint stock companies. Among those receiving financing from the Credit Mobilier 
was the business in dynamite founded by Alfred Nobel.15 The Credit Mobilier, which 
effectively operated as a closed end investment company was not without controversy. 
Critics charged that it was actually a giant stock-jobber that was manipulating the market 
for the companies in which it invested.16 
The creation of the modern closed-end investment companies became popular in 
London in the 1860s. They operated as limited liability companies upon the enactment of 
the English Companies Act in 1862. Their number included the London Financial 
Association and the International Financial Society. Those investment companies sought 
to pool small investors’ funds and provide for expert management, but both companies 
failed.17 The Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, which was formed in London in 
the 1860s, was a global trust that purchased securities in several foreign countries. It 
 
14 Rondo Cameron, France and the Economic Development of Europe 1800-1914 147-148 (1961). 
15 George W. Edwards, The Evolution of Finance Capitalism, 51-52 (1938).     
16 “Money Affairs on the Continent,” N.Y. Times, October 3, 1837, at 2. The French Credit Mobilier 
became a model for the Credit Mobilier railroad construction company that caused so much scandal in the 
United States over the building of the Union Pacific Railroad. The American entity was used to loot the 
Union Pacific and its officers bribed numerous politicians in order to protect the company’s interests. 
Representatives Oak Ames of Massachusetts and James Brook of New York were expelled from Congress 
for accepting those bribes and an impeachment motion was even entered against Vice President Schuyler 
Colfax. See I Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From Christopher Columbus to 
the Robber Barons (1492-1900)  290-291 (2002). 
17 E.C. Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 13-15 
(1937); Theodore J. Grayson, Investment Trusts: Their Origin, Development, and Operation 1-2 (1928). 
6promised to redeem a portion of its shares through an annual drawing. That arrangement 
was held to be an illegal lottery.18 That investment company did earn about eight percent 
from securities it purchased and paid out six percent in dividends.19 
Investment trust companies were formed in London in the 1870s as a medium for 
the purchase of American corporate securities. The American Trust Company in London 
was one such enterprise.20 The Submarine Cables Trust was another, but it invested in 
only the securities of telegraph companies.21 Robert Fleming, the grandfather of the 
creator of the James Bond novels, was said to be founder of the Scottish investment trusts 
that were popular in the 1870s. Fleming’s Scottish American Investment Trust was 
managed by a board of advisors and invested funds for about 500 clients.22 By 1886, 
there were twelve investment trusts that were trading on the London Stock Exchange.23 
They experienced heavy losses during the Baring Panic in 1890.24 Subsequent 
investigations revealed some questionable practices by those investment trusts, including 
schemes in which the depreciated securities in their portfolios were sold to new trusts and 
sold to the public at inflated values.25 
American Investment Companies 
Although the model for the closed-end investment company is the English 
investment trust, there were some collective investment schemes in America that 
 
18 Charles Raw, Bruce Page and Godfrey Hodgson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Rich? The Full Story of 
Bernard Cornfeld and IOS 33 (1971).    
19 Typically, an English investment trust would set aside one half percent of the first £500,000 of capital 
and one quarter percent above that amount for expenses. This included payments to directors. E.C. 
Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 14 (1937). 
20 Delores Greenberg, Financiers and Railroads 1869-1889 42 (1980). 
21 E.C. Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 14 
(1937).  
22Charles Raw, Bruce Page and Godfrey Hodgson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Rich? The Full Story of 
Bernard Cornfeld and IOS 28 (1971); Diana B. Henriques, Fidelity’s World 51 (1995).    
23 Theodore J. Grayson, Investment Trusts: Their Origin, Development, and Operation 14 (1928). 
24 Id. at 16-17. 
25 Lawrence M. Speaker, The Investment Trust 13 (1924). 
7predated those ventures.26 The Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company 
(“MHLIC”) was originally chartered in 1818 as an insurance company. It soon began to 
operate “somewhat similar to a trust company, but the funds deposited were commingled 
rather than kept as separate trusts, and it was, therefore more like a modern investment 
trust.”27 MHLIC used its trust powers to invest money for annuities.28 MHLIC also for a 
fee accepted investments in excess of $500 from subscribers. MHLIC agreed to repay the 
deposit and any gains, less any loss by debt or investment, usually at the death of the 
investor.29 Other nineteenth century investment trusts in America included the United 
States Mortgage Company that was organized in New York in 187130 and the New York 
Stock Trust that was formed in 1890.31 The Boston Personal Property Trust that was 
formed in 1893 was a collective investment fund that was invested in a diversified group 
of securities. In fact, it was a tontine scheme that was to terminate twenty years after the 
 
26 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 358 (2002). 
27 Herman E. Krooss & Martin R. Blyn, A History of Financial Intermediaries 58 (1971). 
28 Supporters of then Secretary of State Daniel Webster purchased an annuity for $37,000 from MHLIC 
that provided Webster with an annual income of $1,000. Robert V. Remini, Daniel Webster, The Man and 
His Times 601 (1997). This slush fund raised some ethical questions, and “someone remarked that the 
proposition was ‘indelicate’ and he wondered how Mr. Webster would take it? ‘How will he take it?’ 
snorted [Harrison Gray] Otis. ‘Why, quarterly, to be sure!’” Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones, A 
Sailor’s Biography 359 (1959).  
29 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. 
Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 42 (1939). MHLIC managed a portion of the funds that had been placed 
by Benjamin Franklin into his “Franklin Fund.” Franklin wanted those funds to be invested and 
accumulated for 100 years, distributed in part and the remainder accumulated again for another 100 years. 
MHLIC was eventually able to distribute some $800,000 from the investments made from the $16,000 that 
MHLIC had been given to invest for the Franklin Fund. Herman E. Krooss & Martin R. Blyn, A History of 
Financial Intermediaries 59 (1971). 
30 Lawrence Chamberlain & William W. Hay, Investment and Speculation, Studies of Modern Movements 
and Basic Principles 106-107 (1931). 
31 E.C. Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 24 
(1937). 
8death of the last survivor. The trustees were paid five percent of the gross income of the 
trust plus other fees.32 
The investment trust business grew little until the market run up in the 1920s. 
Investment companies were then promoted as a way for small investors to diversify their 
security holdings. It was said that this investment medium provided investors with “the 
opportunity of investing small amounts in a large number of securities, diversified 
according to undertaking, geographical location, and type of security.”33 The investment 
companies offered expertise in the management of the investors’ funds.34 “During the 
1920’s the type of investment company which was almost exclusively organized was the 
closed-end management investment company.”35 Funds were raised by those entities 
through common and preferred stock offerings and bond issues. .  
The American investment trusts in the 1920s differed from their from the British 
investment trusts by the fact that the latter took long-term positions in securities and did 
not actively trade their portfolios.36 In contrast, the American investment trusts of the 
1920s “were founded in speculative desire and dedicated to capital appreciation rather 
than investment return.”37 Recognizing that the investment trusts were often speculative 
enterprises, the Investment Bankers Association successfully advocated that the term 
“investment company” should be substituted for “investment trust,” the latter term 
 
32 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. 
Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 45 (1939). 
33 Theodore J. Grayson, Investment Trusts: Their Origin, Development, and Operation 7 (1928). 
34 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. 
Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 108-109 (1939). 
35 S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940). 
36 “British Trusts Note Our Plan, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1929, at 8. 
37 S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1934).  
9connoting a more conservative investment approach.38 Otherwise, regulatory efforts to 
deal with the speculative operations of investment companies were fitful at best. New 
York authorities warned that the investment trusts were being used to defraud investors. 
Nevertheless, an effort to adopt legislation in 1927 to regulate the investment trusts failed 
in that state. Although California, New Jersey and other states did adopt some 
regulations, they had no effect on the burgeoning number of investment companies.39 
The investment companies sold their shares to the public as a means to diversify 
their investments, but the investment trusts frequently acquired “concentrated holdings in 
particular industries, thereby subjecting the investor to the very risk he was seeking to 
avoid.”40 Many of the investment companies gave shareholders only a general description 
of their investment strategies. Preceding Eliot Spitzer by decades, a New York deputy 
attorney general charged that investment companies were “merely blind pools engaging 
in speculation.”41 They were viewed as blind pools because shareholders did not know 
what stocks management were selecting for investment.42 There were other abuses that 
were revealed after the Stock Market Crash of 1929. Sponsors of investment trusts 
retained warrants that allowed them to profit from the investment trust with no risk.43 The 
investment trusts were used as a place to dump securities underwritten by their sponsors 
for investment banking clients.44 The investment trusts often raised funds through bond 
 
38 E.C. Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 34 
(1937).  
39 Id. at 31. 
40 Id. at 348. 
41 Id. at 30. 
42 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. 
Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 107 (1939). 
43 E.C. Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 34 
(1937). 
44 Diana B. Henriques, Fidelity’s World 59 (1995).    
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sales, which gave them leverage that was magnified by buying stocks on margin.45 Self-
dealing was common and investment companies often changed their trading strategies 
without informing their shareholders.46 
A “veritable epidemic of investment trusts afflicted the Nation” before the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929.47 By 1924, over $75 million had been invested in investment 
companies, up from less than $15 million in the prior year.48 In 1925, investment trusts 
holdings doubled to $150 million.49 Some 140 investment companies were formed 
between 1921 and 1926.50 A new investment trust was being created every other day in 
1928.51 “[B]y 1929 they were being created at the rate of almost one a day.”52 The assets 
of the investments trusts rose to over $1 billion in 1928. Another $2.1 billion was added 
in 1929.53 Between those two years, the number of investment company shareholders 
increased from 55,000 to over 500,000.54 Almost all of these enterprises were closed-end 
investment companies The open-end mutual funds, which dominate the market today, 
were not created until 1924.55 “None of them, however, achieved great importance in the 
 
45 William K. Klingman, 1929: The Year of the Great Crash 62 (1989). 
46 S. Rep. No. 1755, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1940). 
47 S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1934). 
48 S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 334 (1934). 
49 E.C. Harwood & Robert L. Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 30 
(1937).  
50 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. 
Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 64 (1939). 
51 Alex Groner, American Business & Industry 286 (1972). 
52 S. Rep. No. 1755, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940). 
53 Diana B. Henriques, Fidelity’s World 58 (1995). The NYSE had proclaimed in 1924 that its members 
should avoid being involved with investment trust that did not protect investors. E.C. Harwood & Robert L. 
Blair, Investment Trusts and Funds From the Investor’s Point of View 29 (1937). Nevertheless, the NYSE 
began listing investment trusts in 1929. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, H. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 63 n. 161 (1939). 
54 Diana B. Henriques, Fidelity’s World 63 (1995). 
55 The first open-end mutual fund was the Massachusetts Investors Trust that was created by Edward G. 
Leffler in Boston. Leffler. George Putnam formed another open-end fund, Incorporated Investors, in 1925. 
The State Street Investment Corporation, which was originally formed by Paul Cabot, Richard Saltonstall 
and Richard Paine in 1924, became an open-end company in 1927. Investment Trusts and Investment 
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investment company field before 1927.”56 “This type of company allowed shareholders to 
have their shares redeemed at any time upon giving a prescribed notice.”57 The 
redemption was based on the net asset value of the shares, less a charge, which was 
usually $2.58 
The investment companies were especially hard hit by the stock market crash. 
The United Founders Corp. and the American Founders Corp. were the largest 
investment trusts in the country in the 1920s. The price of American Founders Corp. 
stock dropped from $30 to 38 cents. The stock of the United Founders Corp. fell from a 
high of over $75 to 25 cents a share. Another very popular investment company, the 
Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation, was trading at $1.75 per share in 1932, down from 
a high of $326. A spin off of that company, the Blue Ridge Corporation, witnessed a drop 
in its share from a high of $100 to 63 cents.59 The assets of the Kidder, Peabody 
investment companies declined in value from $85 million to $20 million. 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 
Investment companies were regulated under a belated piece of New Deal 
legislation that arose from the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great 
Depression. A study by the SEC of the operations of investment companies was 
 
Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 
101-103 (1939); John Brooks, The Go-Go Years 129 (1973). 
56 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. 
Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 101 (1939). 
57 Id. at  105. 
58 Id.
59 The Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation stock was a “hot issue.” Priced initially at $104, its shares were 
soon trading at $136.50. Five days later, its price had reached $222.50. This was twice the value of its 
assets. The Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation created the Shenandoah Corporation, which sold its shares 
at $17.50. Those shares more than doubled in price on the first day of trading to $36. Shenandoah 
Corporation in turn sponsored the Blue Ridge Corporation, which sold securities totaling $142 million to 
the public. Lisa Endlich, Goldman Sachs, The Culture of Success 45-46 (1999)  
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authorized by the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935.60 The SEC 
investigation, which discovered a number of abuses, resulted in the passage of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.61 That legislation has rightly been said to be “the most 
intrusive financial legislation known to man or beast.”62 “It places substantive restrictions 
on virtually every aspect of the operations of investment companies; their valuation of 
assets, their governance and structure, their issuance of debt and other senior securities, 
their investments, sales and redemptions of their shares, and, perhaps most importantly, 
their dealings with service providers and other affiliates.”63 
The Investment Company Act throws its net over a range of investment company 
formats, classifying them into three categories: “face amount certificates,” “unit 
investment trusts,” and “management companies.”64 The first two do not actively manage 
or trade components in their portfolios. Instead, they have fixed portfolios in one form or 
 
60 15 U.S.C. § 79a et seq. The Public Utilities Holding Company Act was another rare piece of federal 
legislation that sought to control corporate governance of the companies subject to its regulation. It 
required a simplification of pyramided holding companies largely as the result of the failure of the giant 
Insull electric company empire during the Great Depression. II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of 
the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investor (1900-1970) 358 (2002). The Public 
Utilities Holding Company Act was repealed in 2005. 109 Pub. L. No. 58, 119 Stat. 594 (Aug. 8, 2005).  
61 As the Supreme Court has noted: 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in congressional concern that the Securities Act 
of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 
881, 15 U.S.C.§ 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect the purchasers of investment company 
securities. Thus, in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 837, 15 U.S.C. § 
79z-4, Congress directed the SEC to study the structures, practices, and problems of investment 
companies with a view toward proposing further legislation. Four years of intensive scrutiny of  
the industry culminated in the publication of the Investment Trust Study and the recommendation 
of legislation to rectify the problems and abuses it identified. After extensive congressional 
consideration, the Investment Company Act of 1940 was adopted. 
United States v. National Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 704 (1975). 
62 Clifford E. Kirsch ed., The Financial Services Revolution: Understanding the Changing Role of Banks, 
Mutual Funds, and Insurance Companies 382 (McGraw-Hill 1997). 
63 Paul F. Roye, Remarks Before American Law Institute/American Bar Association Investment Company 
Regulation and Compliance Conference (Oct. 16, 2003). 
64 I5 U.S.C. § 80a-4. 
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another.65 The third group, management companies, was sub-classified into closed and 
open-end investment companies, and further sub-divided into “diversified” and “non-
diversified companies.” To obtain diversified status, an investment company could invest 
no more than 5 percent of its assets in the stock of any one company and could hold no 
more than 10 percent of the voting securities of any one company.66 
Non-exempt investment companies were required to register their offerings to the 
public under the Securities Act of 1933.67 They were also required to register with the 
SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940.68 The latter registration requirement 
then became the hook for the substantive regulation of those companies. Not all 
collective investment mediums were required to register under the Investment Company 
Act. Among those exempted from registration, and hence regulation, under that statute 
were insurance companies, banks and “any common trust fund or similar fund maintained 
by a bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of monies 
contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator or 
guardian.”69 Also exempted were any qualified “employees’ stock bonus, pension, or 
profit sharing trust.”70 
65 Face amount certificates involve are agreements to pay investors a stated amount in the future. The 
investor pays for that investment through installment payments. See generally Securities and Exchange 
Commission, v. Mount Vernon Memorial Park, 664 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982) 
(describing the basis for regulating these instruments). The unit investment trust holds a fixed group of 
securities in its portfolio and does not trade those securities. See generally Investment Company Institute v. 
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625 (1970) (describing unit investment trusts); Thomas S. Harmon, “Emerging 
Alternatives to Mutual Funds: Unit Investment Trusts and Other Fixed Portfolio Investment Vehicles,” 
1987 Duke L.  J. 1045 (same). 
66 I5 U.S.C. § 80a-5. 
67I5 U.S.C. § 80a-24. 
68I5 U.S.C. § 80a-8. 
69 54 Stat. 789, 798 (1940). 
70 54 Stat. 789, 799 (1940). 
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Investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act were 
required to provide the SEC with periodic financial reports.71 Those requirements are 
similar to those imposed on other issuers of securities, but the Investment Company Act 
goes far beyond that pattern with other provisions. Among other things, that statute 
creates a minimum net worth requirement,72 a practice long abandoned in state 
incorporation laws.73 It governs the capital structure of investment companies, limiting 
the amount of their indebtedness acquired through “senior securities.”74 The act regulates 
dividend polices of investment companies, a matter normally left to state regulation.75 
The Investment Company Act seeks to dictate the manner of investment company 
governance in other ways. It prohibits securities law violators from serving as an 
employee or director or otherwise being affiliated with an investment company.76 
Shareholder approval is required where an investment company changes its status from a 
diversified to non-diversified investment company, where its investment plan changes or 
where it decides to deviate from previously stated investment policies.77 The act also 
regulates the election of directors to the board of investment companies.78 
Even more intrusively, the Investment Company Act requires that 40 percent of 
investment company board of directors be independent outside directors.79 The 
requirement for outside directors was expanded to a majority requirement by the SEC in 
 
71I5 U.S.C. § 80a-29.Sales literature must also be submitted to the SEC. I5 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b). 
72I5 U.S.C. § 80a-14. 
73 As a court noted with respect to one such statute: “One may start business on a shoestring in Kentucky, 
but if it is a corporate business the shoestring must be worth $1,000.” Tri-State Developers, Inc. v. Moore, 
343 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961).  
74I5 U.S.C. § 80a-18. 
75I5 U.S.C. § 80a-19. 
76I5 U.S.C. § 80a-9. 
77I5 U.S.C. § 80a-13. 
78I5 U.S.C. § 80a-16. 
79I5 U.S.C. § 80a-10. The Investment Company Act also provides a safe harbor for the sale of an advisory 
business if directors who are not interested persons of the adviser constitute at least 75 percent of a fund’s 
board for at least three years following the assignment of the advisory contract. 15 U.S.C. 80a-15(f)(1). 
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2001.80 Such independent directors were required to nominate other independent 
directors and legal counsel for the outside directors was required to be independent. That 
majority outside director requirement was added through the back door by the SEC by 
requiring such a board before investment companies become eligible for exemptions 
from SEC conflict of interest rules. Among other things, those exemptions permit mutual 
funds with majority outside directors to purchase securities in an initial public offering in 
which an affiliated broker-dealer is acting as an underwriter; permit the use of fund assets 
to pay distribution expenses; allow securities transactions between a fund and another 
client of the fund’s adviser; and permit funds to issue multiple classes of voting stock.81 
The SEC also used its exemption authority as a stick for creating other governance 
requirements including how board meetings are to be conducted.82 
This pervasive regulation is sought to be justified on the ground that “[u]nlike 
most business organizations. . .mutual funds are typically organized and operated by an 
investment adviser that is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the fund.”83 
“Investment advisers generally organize and manage investment companies pursuant to a 
contractual arrangement with the company. In return for a management fee, the adviser 
 selects the company's investment portfolio and supervises most aspects of its business.”84 
“In most cases, the investment adviser is separate and distinct from the fund it advises, 
with primary responsibility and loyalty to its own shareholders. The ‘external 
management’ of mutual funds presents inherent conflicts of interest and potential for 
 
80 66 Fed. Reg. 3,734 (Jan. 16, 2001). 
81 66 Fed. Reg. 3,734 (Jan. 16, 2001). 
82 See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4((b)(1)(ii) (directors participating in board meeting by phone must be able 
to communicate with other directors.). Such requirements are normally governed by state law. See e.g.,  
.Del. Corp. .L. §141(i) and Revised Model Bu. Corp. Act §8.20(b).    
83 66 Fed. Reg. 3,734 (Jan. 16, 2001).  
84 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, 450 U.S. 46, 50 
(1981) (footnotes omitted). 
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abuses . . . .”85 The role of investment advisers was deemed so sensitive that another 
statute was layered on top of the already intrusive regulation of mutual funds—the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.86 That act imposes a registration requirement, imposes 
books and records and disclosure regulations and places limits on the fees that may be 
imposed by the adviser.     
 
II 
LATE TRADING AND MARKET TIMING 
 
Background 
Mutual funds were not really the target of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
They were simply too young to have played any significant role in the abuses that led to 
that legislation. Nevertheless, mutual funds became popular investment mechanisms 
beginning in the 1940s, and soon replaced the closed-end fund as the investment vehicle 
of choice for most individual investors. In 1970, some 360 mutual funds held $47 billion 
in assets in the United States.87 Their growth exploded with the invention of the money 
 
85 66 Fed. Reg. 3,734 (Jan. 16, 2001). As the Supreme Court has noted: 
Congress consciously chose to address the conflict-of-interest problem through the Act’s 
independent-directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies such as complete 
disaffiliation of the companies from their advisers or compulsory internalization of the 
management function. . . . Congress’ purpose in structuring the Act as it did is clear. It ‘was 
designed to place the unaffiliated directors in the role of ‘independent watchdogs,’’ . . . who would 
‘furnish an independent check upon the management’ of investment companies . . . . This 
‘watchdog’ control was chosen in preference to the more direct controls on behavior exemplified 
by the options not adopted. Indeed, when by 1970 it appeared that the ‘affiliated person’ provision 
of the 1940 Act might not be adequately restraining conflicts of interest, Congress turned not to 
direct controls, but rather to stiffening the requirement of independence as the way to ‘remedy the 
act's deficiencies.’ Without question, ‘[the] function of these provisions with respect to 
unaffiliated directors [was] to supply an independent check on management and to provide a 
means for the representation of shareholder interests in investment company affairs.’ 
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979). 
86 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq.
87 Investment Company Institute, 2004 Mutual Fund Fact Book, A Guide to Trends and Statistics in the 
Mutual Fund Industry 105 (2004), available at ICI.org. 
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market mutual fund.88 By 1995, there were 5,700 mutual funds holding about $2.8 trillion 
in investor funds. In 2004, there were 8,000 mutual funds holding about $8.1 trillion in 
assets for ninety-five million investors.89 However, the bursting of the market bubble in 
2000, resulted in a sharp drop in the NAV of equity based mutual funds.  
Mutual funds trading equities experienced a $1.4 trillion drop in the value of their 
assets between 2000 and 2002.90 Mutual funds were also facing competition. Closed end 
funds had record years for attracting investor funds in 2002 and 2003.91 Those securities 
could be traded at any time when a market was open, unlike mutual funds that could only 
be bought or sold based on day’s end NAV. Another threat were Exchange traded funds, 
which started trading in the form of  SPDRs (Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts) or 
 
88 Henry B.R. Brown and Bruce R. Bent were the inventors of the money market fund. Their creation 
allowed investors to receive a higher rate of return on their cash holdings than was available under the 
interest rate ceilings set by bank regulators at that time. Those interest rate ceilings were later dropped, but 
the money market fund remained popular. III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, 
From the Age of Derivatives to the Internet (1970-2001) 6 (2002).   
89 Investment Company Institute, 2004 Mutual Fund Fact Book, A Guide to Trends and Statistics in the 
Mutual Fund Industry 105 (2004), available at ICI.org. Those mutual funds gave investors a broad range of 
investment opportunities. As previously noted: 
An investor seeking to invest in fixed income instruments could choose among mutual funds 
investing in money market instruments, municipal securities of most states and many subunits, 
federally insured bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and corporate bonds with sub choices of 
convertible bonds, global bonds and with differing maturities, and ratings grades down to and 
including junk bonds. Equity investors could pick from index funds on a broad range of indexes, 
funds that invest in a particular business sector such, option funds, growth funds and aggressive 
growth funds. Funds for contrarians trade against popular investment views; for the internationally 
inclined, there are global equity funds and emerging market funds for stocks of companies in 
lesser developed countries. Balanced funds (with varying balances) invest in both fixed income 
and equity securities, while “quant” funds use computer programs to make stock picks, and 
vulture funds invest in failing companies. There are even mutual fund portfolios for politically 
correct investors that invest in environmentally friendly companies and avoid tobacco stocks. For 
those interested in politically incorrect investments, the Vice Fund was investing in tobacco, 
alcohol, gambling and other sin stocks.  
Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 424-
425 (2006).          
90 Investment Company Institute, 2004 Mutual Fund Fact Book, A Guide to Trends and Statistics in the 
Mutual Fund Industry 107 (2004), available at ICI.org.  This reduction in NAV was due to reduced 
portfolio values from the drop in stock prices during the downturn. That downturn also caused many 
investors to pull their assets out of long term mutual funds. The number of redemptions from such mutual 
funds increased from an annual rate of 21.7 percent in 1999 to 27.9 per cent in 2002. Id. at 126. 
91 The assets held by closed-end investment companies increased from $143 billion in 1999 to 213 billion 
in 2003. Id. at 145 
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“spiders.” Those instruments became known as exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) after 
more appeared.92 The ETFs provided competition to the mutual funds because of their 
greater flexibility. They were the equivalent of a diversified mutual fund but allowed the 
investor to buy and sell their holdings at any time during the trading day at then current 
market prices.93 In contrast, mutual funds could be bought and sold only every twenty-
four hours at NAV price set on closing prices at 4:00 p.m. That flexibility and certain tax 
advantages made ETF’s almost instantly popular.94 The ETFs (spiders) had assets valued 
at $464 million in 1993, the year they first started trading. At the end of 2003, the number 
of ETFs had increased to 119 and their assets were valued at $151 billion.95 That amount 
paled in comparison to the trillions held in mutual funds, but there rapid growth was a 
distributing competitive threat.96 
92 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform 426 
(2006).        
93 The SEC has noted that: 
Exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) are investment companies that are registered under the 
Investment Company Act as open-end management investment companies or unit investment 
trusts. However, unlike typical open-end funds or unit investment trusts, ETFs do not sell or 
redeem their individual shares at NAV. Instead, ETFs sell and redeem their shares at NAV only in 
large blocks, generally in exchange for a basket of securities that mirrors the composition of the 
ETF’s portfolio, plus a small amount of cash. Shares of ETFs are listed on national securities 
exchanges for trading, which allows investors to purchase and sell individual ETF shares among 
themselves at market prices throughout the day. 
68 Fed. Reg. 70402, 70404 (Dec. 17, 2003). 
94 Mutual fund holders must pay taxes on net capital gains on shares bought and sold by the funds while 
ETFs avoid those taxes through exchanges in kind. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Keep it Simple, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 2006 at A10. However, ETF investors pay a commission on the execution of their 
trades and have bid and ask spreads that may increase costs. Jen Ryan, Risks, Fees Lurk in Overseas ETFs, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 2006, at C15. The ETFs have raised some issues on the valuation of the price/earnings 
ratios of the stocks comprising their portfolios. Shefali Anand, “The Inexact Business of Valuing ETFs,” 
Wall St. J. March 13, 2006, at C3.       
95 Investment Company Institute, 2004 Mutual Fund Fact Book, A Guide to Trends and Statistics in the 
Mutual Fund Industry 147 (2004), available at ICI.org.  The ETF offerings were increasing from broad 
based indexes to narrow sectors and even to commodities. Diya Gullapalli, “Too Narrow? ‘Sector’ ETFs 
Draw Investors,” Wall St. J., March 31, 2006, at C1. Ann Davis, “Silver May Be a Little Too Precious,” 
Wall St. J., March 31, 2006, at C1. 
96 The mutual funds knew well how competition could damage a franchise. Government regulations in the 
1970s had prevented banks from paying market rates on deposits. The money market mutual fund was 
invented to take advantage of that disability and drained massive amounts of deposits from the banks. 
Indeed, within ten years of their first appearance, money market funds were the most popular investment in 
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 The drop in mutual fund NAV after the market bubble burst in 2000 resulted in a 
reduction of their fees, which were based on NAV. Competition for investor assets from 
ETF s and closed-end funds was another threat to fees. In order to boost their fees and to 
compete with those entities, mutual funds began to allow market timing and late trading 
by hedge funds, which were using SEC restrictions to engage in “regulatory arbitrages.” 
This was not a new problem for the mutual fund industry, although the angle of attack 
had changed. Prior to the adoption of the Investment Company Act of 1940 there existed 
a “two-price system” system for mutual fund shares that created an active secondary 
market in those shares that was being abused.  
Most funds computed their net asset values daily on the basis of the fund’s 
portfolio value at the close of exchange trading, and that figure established the 
sales price that would go into effect at a specified hour on the following day. 
During this interim period two prices were known: the present day’s trading price 
based on the portfolio value established the previous day; and the following day’s 
price, which was based on the net asset value computed at the close of exchange 
trading on the present day. One aware of both prices could engage in ‘riskless 
trading’ during this interim period.97 
America. III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives into 
the New Millennium (1970-2001) 6-7 (2002). At the end of 2003, there was $2.051 trillion held in money 
market funds. 96 Investment Company Institute, 2004 Mutual Fund Fact Book, A Guide to Trends and 
Statistics in the Mutual Fund Industry 107 (2004), available at ICI.org. The percentage of funds held by 
American households as bank deposits was cut in half between 1979 and 1999 as a result of money market 
competition.  III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives 
to the Internet (1970-2001) 298 (M.E. Sharpe, 2002). 
97 United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422  U.S. 694, 707 (1975). “It was 
possible . . . for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a rising market at the current price with the 
advance information that the next day’s price would be higher. He thus could be guaranteed an immediate 
appreciation in the market value of his investment. . . .” Id.
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Most investors could not take advantage of that situation because of sales loads, but 
insiders were able to purchase shares without paying the load and could purchase shares 
for immediate redemption at the appreciated value. It was claimed that this diluted the 
equity of the existing shareholders. “The existing shareholders’ equity interests were 
diluted because the incoming investors bought into the fund at less than the actual value 
of the shares at the time of purchase.”98 
Section 22 of the Investment Company Act99 was employed to prevent those and 
other trading abuses by authorizing the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
(“NASD”) and the SEC to regulate the distribution and trading in mutual fund shares. 
They both adopted rules that were thought to have put an end to riskless trading in mutual 
fund shares.100 The SEC was sought further to have sealed the fate of such trading in 
1968 when it enacted a “forward pricing” rule101 that required redemptions and purchases 
to be priced after receipt of the order from the customer—“generally using the closing 
price for the stocks that were set at the end of that trading day.”102 
There were other concerns with using mutual funds for quick in-an-out-trading 
seeking short term profits (market timing). The SEC had long sought to prevent mutual 
fund salesmen from recommending market timing in mutual funds to retail customers 
because sales loads and time and place disadvantages made such trading unsuitable for 
them.103 However, market timing transactions in mutual funds by professional traders 
 
98 United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422  U.S. 694, 708, n. 17 (1975). 
99 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22. 
100 United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422  U.S. 694, 710 (1975). 
101 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a). 
102 David Ward, Protecting Mutual Funds from Market-Timing Profiteers: Forward Pricing International 
Fund Shares, 56 Hastings L.J. 585, 589 (2005). 
103 The SEC thus prohibited the practice of “switching” mutual fund investors in and out of different mutual 
funds in order to generate commissions. Such transactions were usually accompanied by promises of short 
term profits from trading opportunities that sought to anticipate favorable market moves and make quick-
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was not viewed by the SEC to be a matter of concern since the professionals could look 
out after themselves, and the restriction on buying and selling mutual fund shares at their 
net asset value was thought to be a practical barrier to market timing even by professional 
traders. Nevertheless, during the 1980s, there were some fifty money managers who 
specialized in market timing mutual funds for even small investors in amounts as low as 
$2,000.104 These market timers charged fess of 2 percent or more on assets under 
management, which was in addition to any mutual fund sales loads.  
Money Magazine conducted a study in 1988 of the five year performance of 
market timing by mutual fund money managers. They were remarkably successful in 
preserving investor capital during market downturns. Two-thirds of their investors did 
better than the Lipper mutual fund average. Clients of J.D. Reynolds Co experienced 
compound returns of more than 20 percent. However, these earlier market timers were 
not over night arbitrageurs. J.D. Reynolds Co. engaged in less than four market timing 
transactions per year.105 The goal of the market timers in the 1980s was to move 
investment funds between equity and fixed income funds in anticipation of changes 
between those two markets, say interest rates were expected to increase and equities to 
decline.  
The market timers were not popular with mutual fund sponsors because “[w]hen 
market-timing money managers move millions of dollars at a time in or out of funds, as 
 
in-and-out profits. Such “market timing” was not appropriate for small investors because of the large sales 
loads associated with some mutual fund classes. Further, as noted in text, mutual fund investors had a time 
and place disadvantage. They could only liquidate or buy mutual fund shares at the end of the day while 
professional traders could move in and out of the markets quickly throughout the trading day on the 
primary market and even into the evening by using alternative markets. See 23 Jerry W. Markham & 
Thomas Lee Hazen, Broker-Dealer Operations Under Securities and Commodities Laws, § 10:24 (2nd ed.  
2005) (describing SEC switching cases).   
104 Money Magazine, Money 1988 83 (1988).  
105 Money Magazine, Money 1988 83 (1988).  
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they often do, they force mutual fund managers to buy or sell large blocks of stock at 
inopportune moments. Hence, fund organizations view timers as disruptive.”106 Several 
no-load mutual funds sought to discourage market timers by limiting the number of 
switches that an investor could make, so the market timers moved to load funds which 
were less likely to impose such restrictions.107 
The Scandals 
Politically ambitious New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer saw opportunity in 
the widespread publicity given to the financial scandals occurring after the market 
downturn in 2000.108 He made headlines with sensational charges against prominent 
financial analysts that resulted in a massive $1.4 billion settlement with the firms where 
they worked.109 Spitzer struck again in September 2003, when he charged Edward J. 
Stern and a hedge fund he managed, Canary Capital Partners, LLC, with improperly 
 
106 Id. at 84. 
107 Id. at 85-86. 
108 After reaching prominence from his prosecutions, Spitzer announced that he was running for the 
governorship in New York. “This Time, No Laurels for Eliot,” Financial Times (London) February 3, 
2006, at 10. 
109 The financial analysts’ scandals began after Eliot Spitzer revealed that a Merrill Lynch analyst, Henry 
Blodget, had called stocks he was promoting to public investors “crap” and a “piece of junk” in private 
emails. The scandal widened when it was revealed that Sandy Weill, the head of Citigroup Inc., had his 
bank make a $1 million contribution to an elite preschool as a part of an elaborate scheme to acquire 
control of Citigroup, as well as to acquire the investment banking business of AT&T. Conflicts of interests 
on the part of analysts were found to be widespread. Among other things, financial analysts were being 
compensated for promoting their firm’s investment banking business, undercutting their independence as 
analysts. Spitzer was also attacking share “spinning” schemes in which underwriters allocated shares in hot 
issue IPOs to executives of large companies in order to gain investment banking business. In December 
2002, ten investment banking firms agreed to a $1.4 billion settlement with Eliot Spitzer and other state, 
federal and self-regulatory organizations in an action challenging analysts conflicts. For a description of the 
financial analysts scandals see Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate 
Scandals, From Enron to Reform 405-420 (2006). A part of the settlement required the settling firms to 
spend $450 million to purchase “independent research for their clients. Id. However, independent 
researchers were under assault from lawsuits from the companies they covered and were leaving the 
business. Jesse Eisinger, “Why Independent Research is Drying Up,” Wall St. J., March 8, 2006, at C1. The 
SEC staff joined in one of those battles by issuing subpoenas to analysts and reporters covering 
Overstock.com, which was claiming that the analysts were joining with hedge funds to drive down its stock 
price. The SEC staff withdrew those subpoenas after their issuance was criticized in the press. Stephan 
Labaton, “S.E.C. Leader Issues Rebuke Over Journalist Subpoenas,” N.Y. Tmes, Feb. 28, 2006, at C3. 
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market timing and late trading in shares of the Strong mutual fund complex.110 Canary 
Capital Partners was required to pay $40 million to settle this problem, part of which was 
to be used for restitution to mutual fund investors. Edward Stern agreed not to trade in 
mutual funds or manage any public investment funds for ten years.111 Spitzer brought 
several other suits against mutual funds and others for allowing or engaging in market 
timing and late trading, resulting in more publicity and extraordinary fines.112 
The charges filed by Spitzer ignited much controversy since it was not entirely 
clear why a state attorney general was seeking to regulate mutual funds that were under 
the pervasive control of the SEC. In fact, “because of perceived inefficiencies inherent in 
dual state and federal securities registration schemes, Congress passed the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (‘NSMIA’),113 primarily to preempt state 
‘Blue Sky’ laws that required issuers to register many securities with state authorities 
prior to marketing in the states.”114 That legislation specifically exempted from state 
regulation shares of investment companies registered with the SEC115but provided that 
the states “shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and bring 
 
110 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, (Sept. 3, 2003), available at www.oag.state.ny.us.   
111 Riva D. Atlas, “Trial Hears Testimony About Late Trading,” N.Y. Times, May 14, 2005, at 2. 
112 See Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to 
Reform, 421-439 (2006) (describing the mutual fund scandals).  See also “Bear Stearns Fined Millions 
Over Trading,” N.Y. Times, March 17, 2006, at C2 (Bear Stearns agreed in March 2006 to pay $250 
million to the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC to settle late trading charges in its mutual funds).    
113 National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in 
part at 15 U.S.C. §77r) (October 11, 1996).  
114 Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 32, n. 3 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“because of 
perceived inefficiencies inherent in dual state and federal securities registration schemes, Congress passed 
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”), Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §77r), primarily to preempt state ‘Blue Sky’ laws that required issuers to 
register many securities with state authorities prior to marketing in the states.”).  
115 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2). 
24
enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a broker or 
dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions.”116 
Spitzer was claiming fraud in his late trading or market timing, but those claims 
were premised largely on the SEC’s forward pricing rule for mutual funds under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, which was for the SEC to enforce rather than Spitzer. 
Spitzer created more controversy when he began affirmatively regulating mutual fund by 
requiring them to reduce their fees as a part of their market timing and late trading 
settlements.117 Those fees had previously been regulated under the Investment Company 
Act by the NASD under the oversight of the SEC as mandated by Congress.118 Spitzer 
simply ignored that congressional mandate and creating his own public utility regulatory 
format governed solely by his personal views on what constitutes appropriate fees.  
Further criticism was directed at Spitzer for criminalizing what were common 
business practices. In that regard, the fact that market timing was occurring in mutual 
funds was known before Spitzer’s charges.119 Spitzer admitted as much when he cited in 
 
116 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c). 
117 Heather Timmons, “2 Fund Groups Agree to Pay $450 Million To End Inquiry,” N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 
2004, §C, col. 5. 
118 As noted by one author: 
The NASD Rules of Fair Practice place a ceiling on the ‘sales load,’ or the sales commission, for 
transactions in shares of open-end companies that an NASD member may charge to investors. The 
limits placed on mutual fund sales loads are in sharp contrast to the free competition with regard to 
brokers’ commissions generally. The ceiling on sales loads is in accordance with [Investment 
Company Act] section 22(b)’s mandate that the price allowed by NASD rules ‘shall not include an 
excessive sales load but shall allow for reasonable compensation for sales personnel, broker-
dealers, and underwriters and for reasonable sales loads to investors.’ Under these rules a fund is 
limited to a maximum sales charge of 7.25 percent, subject to mandatory quantity discounts, 
unless it offers additional services which in the aggregate carry a maximum additional 1.25 
percentage point value. 
3 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation 719-720 (4th ed West Group 2002). 
119 See e.g., Walter Hamilton, “Clear Vision Guides Success of a Corporate Watchdog;  
New York Atty. Gen. Eliot Spitzer Goes After Abuses that Other Regulators Have Ignored,” L.A. Times, 
Nov. 8, 2004, at C1. (“Market timing and late trading by mutual funds, meanwhile, were well-known 
practices among Wall Street’s stock-trading fraternity -- and considered acceptable by many until Spitzer 
began poking around.”); Craig D. Rose, “Tricks of the Trade; The SEC is Cracking Down on Two Mutual 
Fund Scams, But Some Fear the Reforms Will be Ineffective,” The San Diego Union-Tribune December 7, 
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his complaint against Canary Capital Partners a study published a year earlier at Stanford 
University that claimed mutual funds were losing billions to market timers.120 Another 
article published almost three years earlier made a similar complaint.121 In 1998, long 
before the Spitzer complaints, David Dubofsky, a professor of finance at Virginia 
Commonwealth University, published a paper on market timing and notified the SEC of 
his findings.122 Dubofsky began following market timing practices after a student alerted 
to him to such trading after the Stock Market Crash of 1987.123 
Another weakness in Spitzer’s crusade was that no court had ruled on the validity 
of his claims. The only proceeding to contest his charges was a criminal trial brought 
against Theodore Charles Sihpol III, an employee of Banc of America Securities LLC. 
Sihpol was in charge of the “most extensive” of Canary Capital’s late trading and market 
timing relationships and arranged a $300 million line of credit for Canary Capital to use 
in such trading.124 The evidence against Sihpol was rather dramatic. He created an 
electronic trading platform that allowed Canary Capital Partners to late trade. Tape 
recordings also revealed that Sihpol was time stamping order tickets in advance to 
conceal that the late trades had been entered after 4:00 p.m.125 Nevertheless, his criminal 
trial resulted in a not guilty verdict on twenty-nine counts and a hung jury (11-1 in favor 
of acquittal) on the four remaining counts. Spitzer initially announced that Sihpol would 
 
2003, at H-1 (“Professor John Coffee Jr. of Columbia University, who specializes in the study of white-
collar crime, said an SEC survey found that 25 percent of brokers allowed the practice.”). 
120 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 28 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.  The complaint further charged that: 
121 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 23, n. 2 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at 
www.oag.state.ny.us.  
122 Alan Zibel, “Trading in Trust,” Oakland Tribune, Nov. 30, 2003.    
123 Aaron Lucchetti, “Discovering Profits in Timing Funds,” Wall St. J., May 3, 2004, § R, at 1. 
124 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 50 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at www.oag.state.ny.us.   
125 People of the State of N.Y. v. Sihpol, Indictment No. 1710/2004 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2004), available at 
www.oag.state.ny.us.   
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be retried on the charges on which the jury was hung, but backed off that decision after 
receiving much criticism, and the criminal charges were dropped.126 
In SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund Management, LLC,127 A federal district court  
uphold certain claims brought by the SEC involving the late trading and market timing of 
Canary Capital. However, the court dismissed fraud claim for lack of scienter. The court 
also stated that “the market timing agreement with Canary, standing alone, could not be 
considered per se a fraudulent device intended to defraud investors. The SEC does not 
allege, nor could it, that market timing practices are per se illegal, since many individual 
and institutional investors, as part of not uncommon investment strategies, continue to 
attempt to time markets with varying degrees of success.”128 
In another case, a federal district court dismissed SEC charges against two senior 
executives at Columbia Funds Distributors Inc. who allowed market timing in mutual 
funds that were being sold under prospectuses which stated that such trading was barred 
by the mutual fund. The court stated that “market timing arrangements are not the kind of 
sham transactions which have been held to qualify as schemes to defraud.”129 In still 
another case, a federal district court dismissed aiding and abetting charges brought by the 
SEC over market timing. However, that court and two other district courts allowed fraud 
claims against defendants who had used subterfuges and deceptive devices to avoid 
mutual fund restrictions on such activity.130 Separately, NYSE arbitrators imposed a $14 
million award against Merrill Lynch for firing three brokers who had engaged in late 
 
126 Reuters, Spitzer Drops Charges Against an Ex-Broker, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2005, § C, at 3. Sihpol did 
settle SEC charges without admitting or denying those claims. In the Matter of Theodore Charles Sihpol 
III, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 27113, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2633 (Oct. 12, 2005). 
127 341 F. Supp.2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
128 341 F. Supp.2d at 468. 
129 SEC v. Tambone 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8120 (D. Mass. 2006). 
130 SEC v. Gann, 2006 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 9955 (N.D. Tex. 2006). See also SEC v. Druffner, 353 F. Supp.2d 
141 (D. Mass. 2005); JB Oxford Holdings Inc., No. CV-04-07084 (C.D. Cal. 2004).  
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trading. Apparently, the arbitrators were also unconvinced that late trading was the crime 
of the century.131 
So was there a crime? Spitzer’s civil suit against Canary Capital Partners LLC 
charged that the late trader was defrauding long term mutual fund shareholders by 
“diluting” their holdings because the late trading arbitrageur’s profits come “dollar for 
dollar” from the mutual fund. Those profits “would otherwise have gone completely to 
the fund’s buy and hold investors.”132 Spitzer noted that late trading was exploiting the 
SEC’s forward pricing rule for mutual fund purchases and redemptions and charged that 
such conduct was fraudulent in violation of the New York Martin Act.133 Spitzer’s press 
release accompanying the Canary Capital Partners complaint stated that: “Allowing late 
trading is like allowing betting on a horse race after the horses have crossed the finish 
line” and that market timing trading “is like a casino saying that it prohibits loaded dice, 
but then allowing favored gamblers to use loaded dice, in return for a piece of the action.” 
134 
131 Susanne Craig, “Merrill Brokers Fired In Scandal Win $14 Million,” Wall St. J., January 6, 2006, at C1. 
Merrill Lynch is appealing that decision. Susanne Craig & Tom Lauricella, “How Merrill, Defying 
Warnings, Let 3 Brokers Ignite a Scandal,” March 27, 2006, at A1.  
132 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 18 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.   
133 N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-353 (Consol. 1921). That statute allows the New York Attorney General to 
investigate and prosecute any person that:  
employs, or is about to employ, any deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, 
fraud, false pretense or false promise, or shall have engaged in or engages in or is about to engage 
in any practice or transaction or course of business relating to the purchase, exchange, investment 
advice or sale of securities or commodities which is fraudulent or in violation of law and which 
has operated or which would operate as a fraud upon the purchaser, or that any broker, dealer, or 
salesman . . . . 
N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352. 
134 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, “State Investigation Reveals 
Mutual Fund Fraud,” Sept. 3, 2003, available www.oag.state.ny.us. Spitzer’s claim concerning market 
timing was based on he fact that many mutual fund prospectuses stated that they discouraged market 
timing. 
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Late trading involves the entry of a purchase or redemption of a mutual fund share 
after 4:00 p.m., the time at which the NAV is computed for the forward pricing of orders 
received earlier in the day.135 Take the simplest (non-existent) case of mutual fund that 
has only one stock in its portfolio--the equally nonexistent ABC Corp.--and assume that 
ABC Corp. closes for trading on the hypothetical XYZ Stock Exchange at 4:00 p.m. on 
day 1 at $50. One hour after the close on the XYZ Exchange the price of the ABC Corp. 
stock trades up to $55 in an alternate market. The late trader buys the mutual fund shares 
at 5:00 p.m. at its $50 NAV that was set at 4:00 p.m. and immediately sells the 
underlying stock short into the alternate market at $55. The short sale in the alternate 
market is covered on day 2 by the late trader through a purchase of the ABC Corp. stock 
at the close on the XYZ Stock Exchange. The late trader redeems the mutual fund shares 
purchased on Day 1 and uses the proceeds of that redemption to pay for the purchase on 
the XYZ Exchange on day 2. Presumably, the mutual fund is notified before the market 
close of that redemption request and it sells the necessary shares on the close as well. 
Whatever market changes may have occurred in the interim between the close of 
trading on day 1 and day 2, this sequence will assure the late trader of a profit of $5. For 
example, say that the price of ABC Corp. increased to $60 on the close of trading on day 
2. The late trader still has a profit because, even though he must cover his short position 
by a $60 purchase on the close, that increase will be exactly offset by the increase in the  
 
135 Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC at 70: Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market 
Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate, 80 Notre Dame 
Law. 909, 930 (2005). Lawyers for the mutual funds had concluded that trading could continue as late as 
5:45 p.m. eastern time because, even though mutual funds were supposed to price funds at 4 p.m., the funds 
did not actually report their pricing until 5:30 p.m., or later. The lawyers thought that a 5:45 p.m. cutoff 
would prevent anyone from taking advantage of information to profit from knowledge of the fund pricing 
and events occurring after the close of trading. However, sophisticated traders could price the NAV 
themselves at the 4 p.m. close. David Hechler, “Suit Highlights Issue of Legal Advice to Brokers,” New 
York L. J., Sept. 30, 2004, at 5.   
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NAV of the mutual fund used for redemption. The late trader is using the mutual fund as 
a hedge to lock in price disparities that occur in the one or two hour window used for late 
trading, but just how are the holdings of other owners of the mutual fund diluted? If the 
price increase in the alternate market carries over to the close of trading on the XYZ 
Stock Exchange, there seems, on its face, to be no harm and hence no foul because the 
long term mutual fund investors will enjoy the same profit as the late trader. If prices go 
up or down between the NAV computations on day 1 and day 2, the status of the late 
trader and the mutual fund’s long term investors remain the same. However, the late 
trader paid cash on day when he bought the mutual funds at their 4:00 p.m. NAV. That 
cash did not fluctuate in value. Consequently, the NAV on day 2 will not increase to 
cover the price change in the ABC Corp. The other mutual fund holders will have to bear 
the cost of that fluctuation, unless the ABC Corp. stock drops in the interim below $50.136 
Market timing is more problematic. According to Spitzer’s complaint against 
Canary Capital Partners, such trading is made possible by the fact that some mutual funds 
use “stale” prices to compute NAV.137 Spitzer did concede that market “[t]iming is not 
 
136 Late traders could also sell the stocks underlying the portfolio of a mutual fund short when the fund’s 
NAV is under priced. See State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 49 & 67 (Sept. 3, 2003), 
available at www.oag.state.ny.us. (describing complex arrangements under which such transactions were 
effected). 
137 As noted in his complaint: 
A typical example is a U.S. mutual fund that holds Japanese shares. Because of the time zone 
difference, the Japanese market may close at 2:00 a.m. New York time. If the U.S. mutual fund 
manager uses the closing prices of the Japanese shares in his or her fund to arrive at an NAV at 
4:00 p.m. in New York, he or she is relying on market information that is fourteen hours old. If 
there have been positive market moves during the New York trading day that will cause the 
Japanese market to rise when it later opens, the stale Japanese prices will not reflect them, and the 
fund’s NAV will be artificially low. Put another way, the NAV does not reflect the true current 
market value of the stocks the fund holds. On such a day, a trader who buys the Japanese fund at 
the “stale” price is virtually assured of a profit that can be realized the next day by selling. This 
and similar strategies are known as “time zone arbitrage.”  
State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 25 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at www.oag.state.ny.us.  The 
complaint further charged that: 
A similar type of timing is possible in mutual funds that contain illiquid securities such as high-
yield bonds or small capitalization stocks. Here, the fact that some of the fund’s securities may not 
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entirely risk free . . . . For example, the timer has to keep his or her money in the target 
fund for a least a day, so he or she may enjoy additional gains or incur losses, depending 
on the market.”138 Nevertheless, Spitzer charged that the activity diluted the holdings of 
other mutual fund owners and imposed transaction costs on them. Spitzer also focused on 
the fact that mutual fund prospectuses warned that market timers were unwelcome and 
that their redemption privileges could be suspended. He claimed that this misled other 
investors into believing that such trading was prohibited.139 
Actually, market timing seemed less like illegal activity and more like fund 
inefficiency, since the mutual fund could use “fair value” pricing to prevent the 4:00 p.m. 
from being stale.140 However, a subsequent SEC inquiry into fair value pricing also 
resulted in industry comments that pointed out that fair value pricing alone would not 
prevent market timing.141 Some mutual funds used fair value pricing in their international 
funds in order to prevent traders from arbitraging its funds, but critics claimed that such 
pricing was arbitrary and resulted in differing values on the same assets because of 
varying methodologies in making the valuations.142 Fair value pricing posed other 
problems. Garrett Van Wagoner, a popular mutual funds manager, was charged by the 
SEC with improperly using fair value pricing to improve his funds performance.143 
have traded for hours before the New York closing time can render the fund’s NAV stale, and thus 
open it to being timed. This is sometimes known as “liquidity arbitrage.” 
Id. at ¶ 24. 
138 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 26 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.   
139 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 34 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.  The complaint further charged that: 
140 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 29 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at www.oag.state.ny.us.   
141 70 Fed. Reg. 13328, 13330, n. 19 (March 18, 2005). 
142 Kunal Kapoor, “Fund Spy: With International Funds, the Price Isn’t Always Right,” Morningstar, July 
14, 2005 (available LEXIS-NEXIS). 
143 In the Matter of Garrett Van Wagoner, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No.26579 (S.E.C. 
Aug. 26, 2004) (by consent).  
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Some mutual funds imposed redemption fees144 and even had “market timing 
police” to detect and prevent such trading.145 Those restrictions were waived for large 
hedge fund traders. There was an incentive for such waivers. The hedge funds engaged in 
market timing increased the amount of funds under management by many millions of 
dollars, which resulted in higher fees to mutual fund sponsors, i.e., NAV was the basis for 
their compensation.146 Those funds also provided the liquidity needed for market timing, 
helped meet increased costs from such trading and were used for hedging against the 
deleterious effects of such trading on the mutual fund.147 The market timers also agreed 
to make substantial long term investments (“sticky” assets) with the fund managers. Such 
sticky assets were “typically long-term investments made not in the mutual fund in which 
the trading activity was permitted, but in one of the fund manager’s financial vehicles 
(e.g., a bond fund or a hedge fund run by the manager) that assured a steady flow of fees 
to the manager.”148 
The SEC Responds 
The SEC was severely embarrassed by Spitzer’s suits and his claim that late 
trading and market timing abuses were widespread in the mutual funds industry. The 
SEC’s reputation had already been badly blemished by the accounting scandals at Enron 
Corp. and several telecoms, including WorldCom Inc. Despite its pervasive and intrusive 
 
144 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 29 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.  The complaint further charged that: 
145 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 75 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.  The complaint further charged that: 
146 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 32 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.  The complaint further charged that: 
147 Spitzer claimed, that the fund contributions from hedge funds  was ineffective in offsetting the costs of 
market timing and was a deviation from the published trading strategies of the funds. State of N.Y. v. 
Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 27 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available www.oag.state.ny.us.  The 
complaint further charged that: 
148 State of N.Y. v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, ¶ 33 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at available 
www.oag.state.ny.us.  The complaint further charged that: 
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regulations, the SEC had failed to prevent or detect those problems.149 The agency had 
literally read about those scandals in the press before becoming involved. Spitzer added 
to SEC’s growing aura of incompetence with his spectacular charges against the financial 
analysts that were also regulated by the SEC. Spitzer even began taunting the SEC and 
other federal agencies, stating that they had “been so beaten down and neutered and 
diminished that they have been rendered incapable of fulfilling their fundamental 
mandate” and that they “have been sapped of the desire to regulate.”150 
In an effort to regain some credibility the SEC filed its own suits for late trading 
and market timing, often in tandem with Spitzer.151 Their combined efforts resulted in 
settlements totaling over $4.25 billion in penalties, disgorgement and reduced fees by the 
end of 2005.152 Even with the pressure from Spitzer, the SEC’s charges on market timing 
were somewhat hesitant. The SEC thus conceded that market timing was not “illegal per 
se”153 but argued that market timing could damage the mutual fund because (a) it can 
dilute the value of their shares, if the market timer is exploiting pricing inefficiencies, (b) 
it can disrupt the management of the mutual fund’s investment portfolio, and (c) it can 
cause the targeted mutual fund to incur costs borne by other shareholders to 
 
149 For a description of those scandals see Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. 
Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform 421-440 (2006). 
150 Acting Comptroller of the Currency Julie L. Williams Issues Statement Responding to New York 
Attorney General, 2005 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 74; OCC NR 2005-52 (MAY 19, 2005). The SEC wilted 
from that blast, but one federal regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, rejected Spitzer’s 
rhetoric. Id. That office then had Spitzer permanently enjoined by a federal court from investigating 
discriminatory lending practices by national banks. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 
No. 05 Civ. 5636 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005).  
151 See e.g., In re Massachusetts Financial Services Co., Investment Company Act Release No. 26347 (Feb. 
5, 2004); In re Alliance Capital Management, L.P., Investment Company Act Release No. 26312 (Dec. 18, 
2003); In the Matter of Putnam Investment Management, Investment Company Act Release No. 26232 
(Nov. 13, 2003); SEC v. Calugar, (D. Nev. ), SEC Litigation Release No. 19,526 (Jan. 10, 2006)(trader 
agrees to pay $153 million to settle SEC late trading and market timing charges).  
152 Susanne Craig & Tom Lauricella, “How Merrill, Defying Warnings, Let 3 Brokers Ignite a Scandal,” 
March 27, 2006, at A1. 
153 70 Fed. Reg. 13328, n. 4 (March 18, 2005); 68 Fed. Reg. 70402, 70404 (Dec. 17, 2003). 
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accommodate the market timer’s frequent buying and selling of shares.”154 The SEC was 
more emphatic about late trading charging that such “trading violates Rule 22c-1(a) under 
the Investment Company Act,155 defrauds innocent shareholders in those mutual funds by 
giving to the late trader an advantage not available to other shareholders, and harms 
shareholders when late trading dilutes the value of their shares.”156 
The SEC also began adopting proposing regulations that its staff thought would 
prevent market timing and late trading. That effort was less than successful. One 
regulatory fix proposed by the SEC for the mutual fund and late trading problem was the 
adoption of a rule requiring a “hard close” of mutual funds that would prevent the filling 
of any purchase or redemption requests after 4:00 p.m. Orders received after that time 
would have to be filled at the next day’s NAV. That approach proved to be too 
complex.157 Another proposal requiring mandatory redemption fees also stalled, 158 and 
the SEC adopted a rule that “allowed” but did not require a 2 percent redemption fee.159 
Even this precatory approach proved to be too complex raised and the SEC staff was 
 
154 In the Matter of Strong Capital Management, Inc., Strong Investor Services, Inc., Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 49741 (May 20, 2004). 
155 This rule states in part that: 
No registered investment company issuing any redeemable security, no person designated in such 
issuer's prospectus as authorized to consummate transactions in any such security, and no principal 
underwriter of, or dealer in, any such security shall sell, redeem, or repurchase any such security 
except at a price based on the current net asset value of such security which is next computed after 
receipt of a tender of such security for redemption or of an order to purchase or sell such security . 
. .
17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1. 
156 In the Matter of Theodore Charles Sihpol III, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 27113, 
2005 SEC LEXIS 2633 (Oct. 12, 2005). The SEC complaint in the Sihpol case charged that, while the 
Investment Company Act and SEC rules did not require a 4:00 p.m. hard cutoff in trading, mutual fund 
prospectuses had represented that such time would be the normal point for orders received before that time: 
“Orders received after the end of a business day will receive the next business day's net asset value per 
share.” Id.
157 Carol E. Curtis, “Unfinished Business,” Securities Industry News, Aug. 9, 2005 (available on LEXIS).  
158 Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (Mar. 11, 2004). 
159 70 Fed. Reg. 13,328 (March 18, 2005). 
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examining the rule for amendment.160 Other rules were adopted that, among other things, 
required mutual funds to disclose the effects of market timing.161 
A particularly controversial rule adopted by the SEC required the chairman of 
mutual fund boards be independent from that of the chief executive officer and increased 
the majority requirement for outside directors to 75 percent for exemptive relief from 
SEC rules governing mutual fund conflicts. Those outside directors would have to meet 
in separate sessions at least quarterly and be allowed to have their own staff.162 Although 
there was no evidence that such a corporate governance structure was more efficient or 
provided greater shareholder protection, the SEC had long pursued efforts to increase 
participation by outside directors in public corporations as a check on management 
excesses. This has also been a popular cause for corporate reformists over the last quarter 
or century. Their efforts stepped up after the Enron Corp. scandal, leading the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and Nasdaq to require that at least a majority of the board of 
directors of their listed companies be composed of outside directors and that nominating 
and compensating committees be composed entirely of such directors.163 However, audit 
committees at public companies had been required since 1977 to be composed entirely of 
outside directors, but that had not stopped the audit based scandals at Enron and 
elsewhere.164 
There is also no empirical evidence to support requirements for majority outside 
director boards: 
 
160 Judith Burns, “SEC Floats Changes to Market-Timing Restraints,” Wall St. J., March 4, 2006, at B6.  
161 Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings. 69 Fed. Reg. 
22,300 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
162 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
163 See  Section 303A of the Corporate Governance Standards of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (2004) 
and Nasdaq Marketplace Rule 4350.  
164 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just 
Might Work) 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915 (2003). 
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An important article by Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black reviews the 
results of 112 empirical studies of various aspects of corporate governance, from 
the 1980s and 1990s. On the basic question whether independent directors 
improve economic performance, they conclude that ‘studies of overall firm 
performance have found no convincing evidence that firms with majority 
independent boards perform better than firms without such boards.’ Indeed, firms 
with a majority of inside directors ‘perform about as well’ as firms with a 
majority of independent directors.165 
Bhagat and Black also concluded that “firms with supermajority-independent 
boards [i. e., those with only one or two inside directors] might even perform worse, on 
average, than other firms.”166 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that increasing the 
number of outside directors added nothing to good governance. The boards of directors at 
Enron and WorldCom and other centers of scandal were comprised of large percentages 
of prominent outside directors who were unable to do anything to prevent the problems at 
those companies.167 In addition, most outside directors are not selected by shareholders. 
 
165 Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But Uncertain 
Benefits, 25 Iowa J. Corp. L. 349, 367 (2000), citing Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain 
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921 (1999). 
166 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921 (1999). 
167 A massive accounting scandal also occurred at Fannie Mae that had a board of directors composed 
largely of outside directors who were unable to detect or prevent manipulations by managers. Peter 
Wallison, “$1.5 trillion of Debt,” Wall St. J., March 7, 2006, at 12A. Consider the troubling case of 
Eastman Kodak Co.: 
It was among the one percent of companies receiving a perfect score for corporate governance in a 
survey of public corporations by an international governance rating body. Kodak’s board of 
directors consisted of eleven outside directors and only one inside director. Those outside directors 
included such luminaries as Paul H. O’Neill, the former Secretary of the Treasury . . . ; Bill 
Bradley, the former senator and professional basketball player; Martha Layne Collins, former 
governor of Kentucky; Laura D’Andrea Tyson, former chair of the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisors; and Delano E. Lewis, former ambassador to South Africa. Yet, despite this 
politically correct structure Eastman Kodak is possibly the worst managed company in America. 
For decades, shareholders there were pummeled by management blunders. The company first lost 
out to foreign film makers and then completely misjudged the digital revolution in cameras. The 
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Rather, their nomination comes from the chief executive officer who often chooses them 
because they are his golfing buddies or have some other social relationship with him or 
her.168 
There was thus little empirical support for the corporate governance reforms that 
were added after the Enron and World Com scandals.169 Adding more outside directors to 
 
price of Eastman Kodak stock dropped from $76 in 1999 to $25 in April 2004, after the company 
cut its dividend from $1.80 to fifty cents and slashed 16,000 jobs . . . [bringing the total to over 
100,000 employees being laid off since 1988, twenty times the number of jobs lost at Enron.] 
Kodak was taking accounting charges of over $1.3 billion and was dropped from the list of stocks 
included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the new century. . . .[It also announced a further 
$1.3 billion loss in the third quarter of 2005].   
Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform  259-
261, 590 (2006). Eastman Kodak also made the Wall Street Journal “Laggard List” of 1000 major U.S. 
companies in 2005. Eastman Kodak was last in that list for ten-year performance with a negative 7.2 
percent return. Performance of 1,000 Major U.S. Companies Compared With Their Peers in 76 Industry 
Groups, Wall St. J., February 27, 2006, at R6.   
In contrast, Berkshire Hathaway, one of the most successful companies in the country in recent 
years, had one of the most politically incorrect board of directors until the Enron era reforms. The 
members of its board included Warren Buffett, his wife (before her death), his son, his longtime 
business partner and an insider who was a co-investor. Berkshire Hathaway itself existed at all 
only because of a loophole in the Investment Company Act of 1940 administered by the SEC. 
Were it required to register as an investment company, Berkshire Hathaway’s decidedly non-
independent board would have to be restructured and its operations terminated. ‘Berkshire 
Hathaway escapes the 1940 Act only by folding its strategic investment activities into an 
insurance subsidiary, and exploiting Nebraska’s permissive insurance statute in a fashion that no 
other company can be expected to duplicate.’ Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, “Investment 
Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance 
Debate,” 45 Stanford Law Review 945, 1003 (1993).  
 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform  259-
261 (2006). 
168 Landon Thomas, Jr., “A Path to a Seat on the Board? Try the Fairway, March 11, 2006, at A1 
(describing several such relationships).  
169 As one author notes with respect to reforms contained in he Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 107 Pub. L. 
No. 204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002): 
The existence of a literature that addresses the efficacy of some of the SOX mandates highlights 
an even more troubling feature of the legislative process than the opportunistic packaging of 
initiatives as preventatives for future Enrons when their relationship to the problem at hand was, at 
best, attenuated. The gist of the literature, that the proposed mandates would not be effective, was 
available to legislators while they were formulating SOX. Yet it went unnoticed or was ignored. 
With the scholarly literature at odds with the proposed  governance mandates being treated as 
though it did not exist, the quality of decisionmaking that went into the SOX legislative process 
was, to put it mildly, less than optimal. . . . 
 
The fact that the literature indicates that the corporate governance provisions in SOX are ill 
conceived raises the puzzling question of why Congress would enact legislation that in all 
likelihood will not fulfill its objectives. Simply put, the corporate governance provisions were not 
a focus of careful deliberation by Congress. SOX was emergency legislation, enacted under 
conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving several high-profile 
37
mutual fund boards as a way of stopping scandals had even fewer bases. The requirement 
for a majority of outside directors that was already in place did nothing to prevent the late 
trading or market timing scandals.170 Moreover, the 40 percent outside director 
requirement imposed since 1940 under the Investment Company Act, which had 
effectively been expanded to a majority requirement by the SEC in 2001, did nothing to 
prevent the market timing and late trading scandals.171 
A study by the Fidelity mutual funds submitted in response to the SEC’s request 
for comment on its then proposed 75 percent outside director requirement actually 
showed there was empirical evidence to the contrary, but that study was given “short 
shrift” by the SEC.172 The SEC gave similar treatment to legislation passed by Congress 
in response to the SEC’s then proposed requirement for splitting the role of chairman and 
 
corporate fraud and insolvency cases. These occurred in conjunction with an economic downturn, 
what appeared to be a free-falling stock market, and a looming election campaign in which 
corporate scandals would be an issue. The healthy ventilation of issues that occurs in the usual 
give-and-take negotiations over competing policy positions, which works to improve the quality of 
decision making, did not occur in the case of SOX. That is because the collapse of Enron and its 
auditor, Arthur Andersen, politically weakened key groups affected by the legislation, the business 
community and the accounting profession. Democratic legislators who crafted the legislation 
relied for policy guidance on the expertise of trusted policy entrepreneurs, most of whom were 
closely aligned with their political party. Insofar as those individuals were aware of a literature at 
odds with their policy recommendations, they did not attempt to square their views with it. Nor 
did legislators of either party follow up on the handful of comments that hinted at the existence of 
studies inconsistent with those recommendations. Republican legislators, who tended to be more 
sympathetic to the regulatory concerns of accountants and the  business community, dropped their 
bill for the Democrats’, determining that it would be politically perilous to be perceived as 
obstructing the legislative process and portrayed as being on the wrong side of the issue. 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 
1521, 1527-1529 (2005). 
170 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 412 F.3d 133, 141 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
171 Indeed, several other mutual funds scandals emerged in the wake of the late trading and market timing 
cases involving “shelf space” payments to sales staff to prefer one mutual fund over another in their 
recommendations to customers; failure to disclose breakpoints (commission discounts based on the size of 
the investment); and lavish entertainment of investment advisers as an incentive to direct mutual fund 
trades to broker-dealers. See Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, 
From Enron to Reform 437-440 (2006) (discussing those problems).  
172 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 412 F.3d 133, 142 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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chief executive officer at mutual funds. Congress thus required the SEC to provide 
“justification" for the independent chairman condition,173 
The independent chairman and increase in outside director rule was passed in a 3-
2 vote of the commission. The vote was highly politicized with two Republican 
commissioners dissenting.174 The rule was promptly challenged by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and was set aside by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court 
concluded that the SEC had the authority to adopt such a proposal, but held that the SEC 
had not adequately considered its costs or available alternatives.175 The SEC shrugged off 
that ruling by readopting the same rule only one week after it was stricken, without even 
awaiting the mandate of the court of appeals. The passage of the rule was also once again 
highly politicized, being passed over the dissenting votes of the two Republican 
commissioners, one of whom apologized to the Court of Appeals for the majority’s high-
handed approach.176 The rule was set aside once again by the court of appeals.177 The 
Court held that the SEC should have sought public comment before adopting the rule so 
quickly after the Court’s prior ruling of lack of justification. The Court stayed its 
judgment for 90 days in order to allow the SEC to seek public comment. The new 
 
173 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004), but that demand 
was brushed aside by the SEC in adopting the rule by an assertion that the evidence on the value of an 
independent chairman was inconclusive either way. 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,382-85 (Aug. 2, 2004).  
174 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
175 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 412 F.3d 133 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
176 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (July 7, 2005). Hasty action was necessary because SEC chairman William 
Donaldson was leaving the SEC and there would no longer be a majority of activist commissioners to 
readopt the rule. That act set off a storm of controversy and did even further damage to the already 
tarnished reputation of the SEC. Id.
177 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Securities and Exchange Commission, --- F.3d --- (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
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chairman Christopher Cox would be the deciding vote on the rule after comment was 
received.178 
More embarrassment to the SEC followed after a study in 2006 by a Harvard 
Business School professor revealed that mutual funds were still wrongly pricing their 
mutual fund asset levels. The study found that, while most mutual funds calculated NAV 
by using the closing price on the day of the pricing, they applied that value to the shares 
held on the previous day. That could result in substantial differences in pricing, 
depending on market conditions.179 In all events, the intrusive regulation mandated by the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 had failed completely in preventing scandal. Hampered 
by that regulation, mutual fund performance was less than impressive.180 Market studies 
found that mutual funds on an overall basis were lagging behind the market. Depending 
on the study, the lag in performance ranged from severe to moderate. Some 6.5 percent of 
equity funds were also closed or merged each year in order to boost mutual fund complex 
trading records.181 
178 In the meantime, the SEC staff was restructuring mutual fund governance through settlements in 
enforcement proceedings, a process that the Wall Street Journal has called “Governance at Gunpoint” in 
the context of shareholder lawsuits. Phyllis Plitch, “Governance at Gunpoint,” Wall St. J., October 17, 
2005, § R at 6.  The Federated funds thus recently agreed to pay $100 million to settle late trading and 
market timing charges. It was also forced to hire an independent chairman; to take no board action without 
approval of a majority of outside directors (which must comprise a minimum 75 percent of the board); and 
to hire an “Independent Compliance Consultant” approved by the SEC staff who will decide how the 
company should be managed in the future. In the Matter of Federated Investment Management Co., 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 52839 (Nov. 11, 2005). See also In the Matter of Strong Capital 
Management, Inc., Strong Investor Services, Inc., Strong Investments, Inc., Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 49741 (May 20, 2004) (imposing similar governance changes). 
179 Mark Hulbert, “Uh-Oh. Something Else is Stale at Mutual Funds,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2006, §BU, at 6  
180 Former directors of the SEC’s Division of Investmant Company Regulation have expressed concern that 
the maze and expense associated with mutual fund regulation is barring new entrant who might provide 
competition and reduce investor costs. “Four Former SEC Directors Agree Mutual Fund Industry 
Overregulated,” 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 376 (March 6, 2006).     
181 Eleanor Laise, “Mutual-Fund Mergers Jump Sharply,” Wall St. J., March 9, 2006, at D1 (noting that 
such mergers are sought to be justified as creating cost savings); .Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History 
of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 425 (2006). Not all mutual funds were bested 
by the market. Bill Miller, the manager of Legg Mason Value Trust Fund, did beat the S&P 500 for the 
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Hedge Funds 
The hedge funds were at the center of the market timing and late trading scandals 
because they were the one engaging in that trading. The hedge fund is a relatively new 
entrant into the financial world that had not been regulated by the SEC. The hedge fund 
traces its history back to A.W. Jones & Co., a firm that was founded in 1949 by Alfred 
Winslow Jones. That company rewarded its managers with an incentive fee of 20 percent 
of the profits gained from the collective investment of its clients’ funds. By 1961, Jones’s 
hedge fund had obtained a 21 percent annual rate of return, with gains of over 1,000 
percent in one ten year period. Even so, Jones’s fund operated in obscurity until an article 
published in 1966 in Fortune magazine described its operations. It then became the 
model for other funds.182 By 1969, there were about 150 hedge funds operating in the 
United States. Those funds held some $1 billion invested by about 3,000 investors. The 
funds used borrowed money to obtain leverage, engaged in exotic derivative and other 
complex transactions and often sold short.183 By 1994, some 800 hedge funds were 
holding $75 billion in assets.184 The number of hedge funds had jumped to 6,000 as the 
new century began, and they were managing some $600 billion.185 In 2004, there were 
some 7,000 hedge funds managing an estimated $850 billion.186 
fifteenth straight year in 2005. Legg Mason Value Trust Beats S&P Index for the 15th Year, Money 
Marketing, Jan. 5, 2001 (available LEXIS-NEXIS).  
182 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 358 (2002). 
183 Id. at pp. 358-359. 
184III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the 
Internet (1970-2001) 218 (2002). 
185 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform 
439 (2006). 
186 The SEC noted at the end of 2004 that: 
It is difficult to estimate precisely the size of the hedge fund industry because neither we nor any 
other governmental agency collects data specifically about hedge funds. It is estimated that there 
are now approximately $870 billion of assets in approximately 7000 funds. What is remarkable is 
the growth of the hedge funds. In the last five years alone, hedge fund assets have grown 260 
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Hedge funds sometimes posed problems. Several hedge funds experienced large 
losses when bond prices dropped abruptly in 1994. More serious were the losses that 
occurred at Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a hedge fund that lost 90 
percent of its $4.8 billion in capital in September of 1998 as a result of its trading 
positions. LTCM employed twenty-five Ph.D.’s on its payroll, including some academic 
superstars, to guide its “market-neutral” trading.187 LTCM’s problems were of such a size 
that concern was raised that its failure would pose a systemic risk to the American 
economy.188 That concern necessitated a rescue arranged by the Federal Reserve 
Board.189 
The SEC, until the market timing and late trading scandals, had resisted the 
regulation of hedge funds. Initially, those funds avoided regulation under the Investment 
 
percent, and in the last year, hedge fund assets have grown over 30 percent. Some predict the 
amount of hedge fund assets will exceed $ 1 trillion by the end of the year. Hedge fund assets are 
growing faster than mutual fund assets and already equal just over one fifth of the assets of mutual 
funds that invest in equity securities.  
69 Fed. Reg. 72054, 72055-56 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
187 LTCM was engaged in “convergence” trading. In one instance, it borrowed Brady bonds, selling them 
short and buying non-Brady bonds issued by the same countries. LTCM anticipated a narrowing of the 
price gap between the Brady bonds and the non-Brady bonds. If the prices widened between these two 
securities, however, LTCM lost money. Another LTCM investment involved total return swaps in which it 
agreed to pay an institution a fixed interest rate on the amount it would cost to buy a block of stock. The 
institutional investor agreed to pay LTCM an amount equal to the dividends generated by the stock during 
the period of the swap, as well as any increase in the price of the stock. LTCM had to pay any decrease in 
value in the stock. III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of 
Derivatives to the Internet (1970-2001) 316 (2002).  
188 See generally, Lakonia Management Ltd. v. Meriwether, 106 F. Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(describing the breakdown); Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management-
Report of The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Apr. 1999) (report containing 
recommendations on regulatory responses thought necessary to respond to that crisis, including a desire for 
more transparency, reduction of leverage and greater internal controls).  
189 Tiger Management, another high profile hedge fund that had $23 billion under management, lost $2.1 
billion in September and $3.4 billion in October of 1998. That hedge fund lost $2 billion from currency 
trading losses in the latter month. But, even with that loss, the hedge fund showed a positive performance 
for the year. Another hedge fund experiencing trouble in October of 1998 was Ellington Capital 
Management. George Soros’s $20 billion Quantum Group suffered large losses when the Russian 
government defaulted in August of 1998. Soros then announced that he was shutting down a $1.5 billion 
emerging markets hedge fund that was a member of his Quantum hedge fund group. III Jerry W. Markham, 
A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the Internet (1970-2001) 317 
(2002).  
42
Company Act through a provision that exempted investment companies with less than 
100 investors. That exemption applied regardless of the amount of money under 
management, provided that the company was not making a public offering of its 
securities.190 “The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996191 gave more 
flexibility to hedge funds. It allowed investment companies to act without registration, if 
their investors were qualified purchasers – that is, large, sophisticated investors – without 
limitation as to the number of persons.”192 
The treatment of hedge funds in the futures industry was markedly different. 
Many hedge funds trade regulated commodity contracts. As a CFTC commissioner has 
noted, the “commodity pool industry . . . , which includes many of the largest hedge 
funds, plays an extremely important role in the functioning of the futures markets in the 
United States as well as the rest of the world.”193 That trading activity initial led those 
funds to register with the CFTC as commodity pool operators (“CPOs”) and commodity 
trading advisers (“CTAs”) under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.194 However, 
“[i]n 1992, the CFTC adopted a key liberalizing measure, Rule 4.7, which preserved CPO 
registration requirements but provided an exemption from most regulatory requirements 
 
190 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). 
191 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (October 11, 1996). 
192 III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the 
Internet (1970-2001) 218-219 (2002). A Qualified” investor would include someone owning $5 million in 
investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(51)(A). 
193 CFTC Weekly Advisory, April 1, 2005. 
194 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. As a CFTC commissioner has noted: 
 Based on data collected by the CFTC with help from the NFA, the number of Institutional 
Investor’s Platinum 100 largest hedge funds that were registered as Commodity Pool Operators 
(CPOs) under the CFTC’s delegated authority grew from 55 in 2002, to 65 of the top 100 funds in 
2003, and we have continued to see growth in 2004. In addition, 50 out of the 100 largest hedge 
funds were also registered with the CFTC as Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) in 2003 and 
this has also grown in 2004. Among the 25 largest hedge funds, the proportions get even higher, 
with 68% registered as CPOs in 2003. Thus, a significant proportion of the hedge fund industry is 
duly registered with the CFTC and this number is growing. 
“CFTC Commissioner Addresses FIA/FOA International Derivatives Conference,” U.S. Fed News, June 
29, 2004. 
43
for pools offered only to highly accredited investors,” which composed most of those 
persons investing in hedge funds.195 
Similar relief was not given for CTA registration. In measuring whether the 
exemption from registration for advisers with less than fifteen clients is available under 
the Commodity Exchange Act where a corporation or other business entity was being 
advised,196 the CFTC had looked through to count the number of clients of the separate 
corporate or entity. The CFTC’s look-through position was upheld by the Ninth Circuit in 
an early challenge on that issue.197 At about the same time, the Second Circuit made a 
similar ruling with respect to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, holding that a general partner of a limited partnership was an adviser to the limited 
partners rather than to the limited partnership as an entity.198 However, in 1985, the SEC 
adopted a rule199 that “permitted advisers to count each partnership, trust or corporation 
as a single client,” allowing “advisers to avoid registration even though they manage 
large amounts of client assets and, indirectly, have a large number of clients.”200 
195 Susan C. Ervin, “Letting Go: The CFTC Rethinks Managed Futures Regulation,” 24 Futures & 
Derivatives L. Rep. 1, 8, n. 5 (May 2004). Several hedge funds remained registered with the CFTC as 
CPOs, including Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”). See Brooksley Born, “International 
Regulatory Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, 21 NW J. Int’l L. & Bus. 607, 635 (2001) (describing registration of LTCM). It has been 
noted that: 
any hedge fund that uses the markets under CFTC’s jurisdiction, even if their advisors qualify for 
an exemption from registration, continue to fall under the legal definition of a CPO or CTA, 
meaning that certain of the CFTC’s rules and provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act--such as 
those proscribing fraud or manipulation--continue to apply. 
“CFTC Commissioner Addresses FIA/FOA International Derivatives Conference,” U.S. Fed News, June 
29, 2004. 
196 7 U.S.C. § 6m. 
197 In CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held that clients of a separate entity 
would be counted for purposes of determining whether CTA registration was required under the CEA.  
198 Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).  
199 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1). 
200 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
44
The CFTC’s look-through position swept up a lot of hedge funds as CTAs even 
though those entities were advising only wealthy and sophisticated clients. In contrast, 
the SEC’s rule excluded those hedge funds from the Investment Advisers Act registration 
requirement.201 “By regulating commodity pools of all shapes and sizes, and treating 
investment funds as the sum of their individual investors, the CFTC became, by default, 
the only active regulator of the hedge fund marketplace.”202 However, the CFTC began 
rethinking its regulatory role after the enactment of the Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000.203 That statute was a statutory reflection of the CFTC’s 
decision to deregulate the commodity markets for transactions in which only wealthy and 
sophisticated investors are involved. The CFTC was thus receptive to a petition from the 
“Managed Funds Association . . . a trade association for hedge fund managers and CPOs” 
that sought “a ‘sophisticated investor’ exemption” from registration as a CTA for 
advisors advising only wealthy and sophisticated clients.204 That exemption was adopted 
by the CFTC on August 8, 2003.205 It was designed expressly to conform to the SEC 
 
201 As one author has noted: 
 Ever since hedge funds became participants in the securities markets, in the 1950s, they have 
endeavored to operate as unregulated entities and the . . . SEC has been uncertain about how, if at 
all, to regulate them. Most hedge funds in the United States are formed as limited partnerships in 
order to obtain flow-through tax treatment. The general partner of the partnership falls within the 
definition of an ‘investment adviser’ under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, but if the hedge 
fund is counted as only one client, the entity generally is exempt from registration because it has 
fewer than fifteen clients and it does not hold itself out to the public as an adviser.  
Roberta S. Karmel, “The SEC at 70: Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market 
Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate,” 80 Notre Dame 
Law. 909, 923 (2005). 
202 Susan C. Ervin, “Letting Go: The CFTC Rethinks Managed Futures Regulation,” 24 Futures & 
Derivatives L. Rep. 1, 3 (May 2004).  
203 Pub. L. Rep. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
204 Susan C. Ervin, “Letting Go: The CFTC Rethinks Managed Futures Regulation,” 24 Futures & 
Derivatives L. Rep. 1, 3 (May 2004).  
205 68 Fed. Reg. 47221 (Aug. 8, 2003).   
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position on not looking through entities to count clients for purpose of registration as an 
adviser.206 
One commentator predicted that, as a result of that and other changes made to 
CFTC rules, “the CFTC’s regulatory role in the managed futures markets will shrink to a 
fraction of its former size and this development may well presage a new regulatory map 
in which the  . . . SEC exercises regulatory oversight over the hedge fund marketplace, 
including commodity pools and trading advisors previously regulated by the CFTC.”207 
Indeed, that process was already underway at the SEC where the staff was considering 
whether regulation of hedge funds was needed as a result of their involvement in the 
market timing and late trading at the mutual funds. Not surprisingly, government being 
what it is, the SEC staff study concluded that regulatory control over the hedge funds was 
needed, seeking to have them register as investment advisers.208 
Some sixteen months after the CFTC acted to adopt the SEC’s approach on 
looking-through entities to count clients, the SEC changed its position and adopted the 
old CFTC view and began looking through entities to count the number of clients in order 
to require the registration of hedge funds as investment advisers.209 That action was taken 
after another highly politicized vote of 3-2 by the SEC commissioners, and the rule is 
under challenge in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.210 Hedge fund advisers 
 
206 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(10). See 68 Fed. Reg. 47,221, 47,226 (August 8, 2003) and 68 Fed. Reg. 12,622, 
12629 (March 17, 2003).. 
207 Susan C. Ervin, “Letting Go: The CFTC Rethinks Managed Futures Regulation,” 24 Futures & 
Derivatives L. Rep. 1 (May 2004). 
208 Staff Report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Implications of the Growth of Hedge 
Funds” xi (Sept. 2003) 
209 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 & -2. See 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
210 Goldstein v. SEC, Civ. No. 04-1434 (D.C. Cir.). 
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were required to register with the SEC as investment advisers by February 1, 2006.211 
Predictably that requirement will become the basis for more regulation after every new 
hedge fund scandal.212 As it stands now, registered hedge fund advisers are subject to 
SEC audits, are required to maintain specified books and records, must hire a compliance 
officer and establish a compliance program. Those hedge funds must also disclose the 
amount of money under management.213 The SEC staff is additionally seeking corporate 
governance reforms in its settlements with hedge funds involved in the late trading and 
market timing cases.214 
III 
REGULATION OF COMMODITY POOLS 
 
These SEC failings in regulating mutual funds gave rise to the question of 
whether alternative regulatory schemes for collective investments might be preferable.215 
One such alternative is the commodity pool operator that is regulated by the CFTC under 
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. A commodity pool is a form of collective 
investment that, as already seen, is regulated under a regimen that varies significantly 
 
211 Excepted from the registration requirement were hedge funds that required clients to keep their funds 
invested in the hedge fund for at least two years, absent extraordinary circumstances. 17 C.F.R. § 
275.203(b)(3)-1(d)(2). About 1,100 hedge fund advisers were registered with the SEC prior to the rule. Its 
adoption resulted in almost another 1,000 registrations. Kara Scannell, Making Hedge Funds Less Secret, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 2006. 
212 See Michael R. Koblenz, et al., “The SEC’s New Regulatory Agenda: What Every Hedge Fund Manager 
Needs to Know,” 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1935 (BNA) (Nov. 11, 2005) (discussing likelihood of more 
regulation).     
213 Kara Scannell, Making Hedge Funds Less Secret, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 2006.  
214 For example, in  In re Millennium Partners L.P., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 52,683 (Dec. 1, 
2005), a hedge fund agreed to pay $180 million to settle late trading and market timing charges. The hedge 
fund also agreed to create a Compliance, Legal and Ethics Oversight Committee to oversee its operations.   
215 Two anthropologists found that the intrusive regulation mandated by the Investment Company Act had 
created a strange culture at the mutual funds in which legal requirements were often espoused by non-
lawyer executives as grounds for action even where they were wrong of did not understand the law. 
William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Fortune and Folly: The Wealth and Power of Institutional Investors 
(1992).   
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from the one employed under the Investment Company Act of 1940. A commodity pool 
is the commodity futures industry’s analogue to an investment company. Investors 
contribute their funds to the pool and those funds are commingled and traded as a unit 
with other investors.216 A commodity pool is essentially an entity soliciting funds from a 
group of customers and trading those funds in commodity futures contracts through a 
single collective account.217 
“The advantage of a commodity pool is that individuals who would not otherwise 
have the time or expertise to devote to futures trading may receive the benefits of expert 
advice from the commodity pool operator or its commodity trading adviser.”218 “The 
separate corporate existence or, most frequently, the use of limited partnerships is 
common to commodity pools.”219 This is done to limit liability to the amount of 
investment in contrast to the unlimited liability of an individual trader. In addition, the 
commodity pool provides diversification and eliminates margin calls on its investors.220 
The commodity pool is a relatively new entrant to the field of regulation. Little 
has been written about them, their history is obscure, and the basis for their regulation is 
 
216 Roberta Romano, “A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation,” 55 Md. L. Rev. 
1, 27 (1996) (commodity pool operators are “the futures analogy to a mutual fund”); Rosenthal & Co. v. 
CFTC, 802 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A commodity pool is the commodity futures equivalent of a mutual 
fund; the investor buys shares in the pool and the operator of the pool invests the proceeds in commodity 
futures.”); Frank A. Camp, “The 1981 Revisions in the CFTC’s  Commodity Pool Operator Regulations,” 7 
J. Corp. L. 627, 630 (1982) (earlier in their history commodity pools were referred to as  “commodity 
mutual funds”). 
217 As noted in one treatise: 
To summarize, a commodity pool is typically an organization that raises capital through the sale of 
interests in it, such as shares or limited partnerships, and uses that capital to invest either entirely 
or partially in commodity contracts. In its features, the typical commodity pool bears a strong 
resemblance to mutual funds and similar investment companies that have operated for decades in 
the securities industry.  
Philip McBride Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, 1 Derivatives Regulation, § 1.11 at 1-250 & 251 (2004).  
218 13 Jerry W. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims § 17A:1, at 17A-
8 (2005). 
219 Id. at p. 17A-9. 
220 Philip McBride Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, 1 Derivatives Regulation, § 1.11 at 1-251 (2004). 
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uncertain. “Legislative history regarding the derivation of the concept of the commodity 
pool operator is sparse indeed.”221 What is known is that a run up in commodity market 
prices in the 1970s gave rise to concerns at the Commodity Exchange Authority (a no 
longer existing bureau in the Department of Agriculture) that registration of CPOs and 
CTAs was needed “in order to eliminate practices that had enticed unsuspecting traders 
into the markets with, far too often, substantial loss of funds.”222 
Some commodity exchanges had already adopted rules requiring disclosures 
concerning the affiliation of commodity pools with the exchanges in order to assure that 
investors were not misled. The commodity exchanges also imposed special margin 
requirements that were needed because of the limited liability of the commodity pool 
owners and the size of the pool positions.223 Those rules were deemed inadequate by 
Congress when it overhauled the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”)224 through 
the passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.225 CPOs  were 
required to register with the CFTC,226 a process now administered by the National 
 
221 Jeffery S. Rosen, “Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange Act,” 40 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 941 (1983).   
222 Jerry W. Markham, The History of Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation 64 (1987)  (quoting 
H.R. Rep. 975, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 79 (1974)). The House Report also stated that the legislation was 
needed to protect “unsophisticated traders.” Id.
223 Philip McBride Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, 1 Derivatives Regulation, § 1.11 at 1-251 (2004).  
224 7 U.S.C. §1 et seq.
225 Pub. Law. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).  
226 The CEA defines a “commodity pool operator” as:  
any person engaged in the business which is of the nature of an investment trust, syndicate, or 
similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives from 
others, funds securities or property, either directly or through capital contributions, the sale of 
stock or other forms of securities, or otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for 
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market, but does not include such persons 
not within the intent of this definition as the Commission may specify by rule or regulation or by 
order. 
7 U.S.C. § 1a(4). This definition has been interpreted  by the courts:  
Those courts which have raised the issue require the following factors to be present in a 
commodity pool: (1) an investment organization in which the funds of various investors are 
solicited and combined into a single account for the purpose of investing in commodity futures 
contracts; (2) common funds used to execute transactions on behalf of the entire account; (3) 
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Futures Association (“NFA”), a self-regulatory organization much like the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”).227 “Associated persons” of those 
entities are also required to register.228 
There are presently some 3,500 commodity pools managed by CPOs, with 
approximately $600 billion in assets.229 Most of those commodity pools are privately 
placed and would fall into the category of hedge funds that are sold only to institutions 
such as pension plans, university endowments and other sophisticated investors.230 
However, a relatively small number of commodity pools are publicly offered and 
registered with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933231 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.232 
participants share pro rata in accrued profits or losses from the commodity futures trading; and (4) 
the transactions are traded by a commodity pool operator in the name of the pool rather than in the 
name of any individual investor.  
Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 805 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1986), citing CFTC v. Heritage Capital Advisory 
Services, Ltd. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,627 (N.D. Ill. 1982) and Meredith v. ContiCommodity 
Services, Inc. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,107 (D.D.C. 1980). See also, Nilsen v. Prudential-Bache, 
761 F.2d 279, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Essentially, a commodity pool operator is one who manages an 
investment fund, similar to a mutual fund, in which the assets of several investors are invested together 
with gains or losses shared pro rata by the participants.”).  
227 Order Authorizing the Performance of Registration Functions, 49 Fed. Reg. 39,530 (1984). 
228 17 C.F.R. § 3.12 (a). Commodity pools are subject to periodic inspections (once every three years) by 
the NFA. A similar requirement is imposed by the SEC on investment advisers. 
229 The growth in commodity pools over the last thirty years has been substantial. The amount of funds 
under management in commodity pools in 1976 was estimated to be only about $75 million. Jeffery S. 
Rosen, “Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange Act,” 40 Wash. & Lee 
L. Rev. 937, 943 n. 19 (1983). A former CFTC acting chairman has noted that, while the over $600 billion 
now under management at commodity pools is small in comparison to the almost $9 trillion in mutual 
funds, “it is a significant amount of money – even here in Washington.” Opening Statement of Acting 
CFTC Chairman Sharon Brown-Hruska Before the CFTC’s CPO and Commodity Pool Roundtable, April 
6, 2005.  
230 The CFTC to exempt entities or persons from the CPO registration requirement. Such exemptions 
include uncompensated single pool operators, small commodity pool operators managing less than 
$400,000 and funds with no more than fifteen investors.17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(1) & (2). Also exempted are 
certain pools that restrict their futures trading to a small percentage of their investment activities. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 4.13(a)(1). Still another exemption from registration applies to investment companies (including mutual 
funds), banks, insurance companies and certain pension plans. Those entities must file a notice of 
exemption with the NFA. 17 C.F.R. § 4.5. 
231 15 U.S.C. §77a et seq.
232 15 U.S.C. §78a et seq.
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The CFTC opted for a disclosure approach in regulating CPOs.233 “This is one of 
the few areas where the CFTC had sought specific disclosures in other than a very 
summary form” as a part of its regulation of registrants.234 The CFTC requires CPOs to 
provide clients with a disclosure document.235 A key part of that document is a “risk 
disclosure statement” that warns in stark terms of the high risk of derivatives trading, the 
effects of restrictions on the withdrawal of investor funds and the substantial fees that 
may attach to investments in commodity pools.236 The use of such summary risk 
disclosure requirements was adopted after the CFTC rejected the “suitability” rule in the 
securities industry that prohibits a broker-dealer from recommending a security that is not 
suitable in light of the particular investments needs and objectives of the customer.237 The 
CFTC risk disclosure statement tells customers that they should themselves carefully 
consider whether commodity futures trading is suitable for their own investment 
interests.238 
233 This regulatory approach apparently stems from the report and recommendations of the CFTC’s 
Advisory Committee on Commodity Futures Trading Professionals. Jerry W. Markham, The History of 
Commodity Futures Regulation and its Regulation 92 (1986). 
234 Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 Notre Dame Law Review 
199, 246 (1992). 
235 17 C.F.R. §4.21. That information may be supplied electronically through the Internet. Brooksley Born, 
“Symposium: Derivatives & Risk Management,” 66 Fordham L. Rev. 761 (1997). Interestingly, the SEC 
also has a written disclosure requirement for investment advisers, which in some respects requires less 
disclosure than the CFTC regulation. Compare SEC rule 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3 (requiring disclosure 
statement containing information in Part II of ADV registration statement), with, CFTC rules 17 C.F.R. §§ 
4.31 and 4.34 (requiring a broad range of disclosures including track records).  
236 17. C.F.R. § 4.24. 
237 See, 13 Jerry W. Markham Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, § 9:1 
(2005). The North America Securities Administrators Association, however, has sought to impose 
suitability and other requirements on CPOs through model state regulation. James G. Smith, “A Securities 
Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators,” 1996 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 281, 323. The states were not 
deterred in imposing such regulation by the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (October 11, 1996).  
238 The differences in the regulatory approaches of the SEC and CFTC is evidenced by the risk disclosure 
statement required for single stock futures over which the SEC was given joint regulatory control with the 
CFTC. Instead of the brief warning used by the CFTC for high risk futures contracts, the disclosure 
statement for single stock futures became a long, complex, mini-prospectus, negating its value as a warning 
to unsuspecting investors. 67 Fed. Reg. 64162 (Oct. 17, 2002). See also, Jerry W. Markham, A Financial 
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The CFTC further requires the CPO brochure to provide substantive disclosures 
such as background information on the CPO and its CTAs.239 Disclosure is required of 
the “principal risk factors” associated with participation in the pool, including the use that 
will be made of the proceeds obtained from investors, a description of the instruments to 
be traded, and the investment programs and polices to be followed by the pool.240 In 
addition, a summary description of the pool’s CTA is required.241 Disclosure is required 
of restrictions on transfer of pool ownership interests,242 distribution policies and the 
federal income tax effects of distributions.243 Redemption policies must also be 
 
History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 359 (2006) (noting that the margin 
requirement demanded by the SEC for these products is magnitudes higher than that required in the futures 
industry).  
239 17 C.F.R. § 4.24.   
240 17 C.F.R. §4.24(g). 
241 17 C.F.R. §4.24. The following is a summary of the disclosures required in the CPO brochure: 
the name and main address of the commodity pool operator and each of its principals as well as 
their business commodity pool operator and each of its principals as well as their business 
background for the preceding five years; the business background, for the same period, of any 
commodity trading advisor to the pool (and its principals); any actual or potential conflict of 
interest” in regard to the pool by the operator or manager, major commodity trading advisor (or 
their principals), or service provider (or their principals or introducing brokers); . . . whether the 
operator, commodity trading advisor, or any principal has a beneficial interest in the pool and, if 
so, the extent of that interest; an identification of all types of expenses and fees that were incurred 
by the pool in the preceding fiscal year and are expected to be incurred in the current year; 
information regarding any minimum or maximum contribution requirements and, if applicable, 
what will be done with the funds until trading begins; how the pool will fulfill its margin 
requirements on transactions, and how it will use funds in excess of margin requirements; any 
restrictions upon transfer or redemption of interests in the pool; the extent to which pool 
participants may be liable in excess of their capital contributions; the pool’s distribution policy 
with respect to profits or capital, and its federal income tax effects for the participants; any 
“material” administrative, civil, or criminal action against the operator, commodity trading 
advisor, or a principal in the preceding five years; any fee payable by the operator, commodity 
trading advisor, or a principal to any person for soliciting capital contributions to the pool; 
whether the operator, commodity trading advisor, or a principal trades (or intends to) and, if so, 
whether participants will be permitted to inspect those trading records; a statement that all 
participants will receive monthly or quarterly account statements and either a certified or 
uncertified annual financial report; and on the cover page of the disclosure document, a disclaimer 
that the Commission has neither reviewed nor passed on the accuracy or completeness of that 
document. 
Philip McBride Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, 1 Derivatives Regulation, § 1.11 at 1-257-58 (2004). 
242 17 C.F.R. §4.24(p).  
243 17 C.F.R. §4.24(r). Federal income tax treatment has driven the use of limited partnerships as the format 
for commodity pools because otherwise there would be a double tax, one at the pool level and one at the 
investor level. James G. Smith, “A Securities Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators,” 1996 Colum. 
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disclosed.244 Redemption policies vary, but a cursory survey of several public commodity 
pools suggest that most CPOs allow redemptions at net asset value at month end, often 
requiring from five to ten days advance notice.245 This effectively prevents market timing 
in those pools. In order further to discourage market timers, many CPOs require funds to 
be held in the pool for eleven months or more before withdrawal. Other CPOs impose a 
redemption fee varying from 3 percent or more where a withdrawal is made before the 
end of such a period.246 
“The centerpiece of the disclosure document is the ‘track record’ provision, which 
requires that the disclosure document set forth the actual performance record in mandated 
form for the pool, other pools operated by the commodity pool operator, and commodity 
interest accounts directed by the pool’s commodity trading advisor.”247 This requires 
disclosure of past trading performance,248 including the actual trading performance of the 
pool and its CTAs for the preceding five years. That performance must be in a form 
 
Bus. L. Rev. 281,296-297. There is no double tax exemption such as the one available for mutual funds. 26 
U.S.C. §§ 851-852. A “publicly traded partnership” is also subject to a double tax because they are taxed as 
corporations. 26 U.S.C § 7704. However, double taxation can be avoided if the limited partnership is not 
considered to be publicly traded. That is accomplished by imposing restrictions on transfers of limited 
partnership interests, which many large publicly owned commodity pools have done. Avoiding the status of 
a publicly traded partnership also allows deduction of the pool’s losses up to the extent of the investor’s 
taxpayer’s basis in the pool. See e.g., Prospectus, 2,000,000 Units of Limited Partnership Maximum, 
Rogers International Raw Materials Fund, L.P., at pp. 51-57 (March 31, 2005) (discussing those issues).  
The taxation of gains from commodity futures contracts was changed by the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 §§ 501-09) after a massive tax shelter scandal in the 
futures markets. See Jerry W. Markham, Prohibited Floor Trading Activities Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 58 Fordham Law Review 1, 22-29 (1989) (discussing those scandals and the tax law 
changes). Gains from regulated futures contracts are taxed at a mixture of the 60 percent long term capital 
gains rate and 40 percent short term rates, regardless of the holding period. Open positions are marked-to-
market and any gains taxed at those rates, which can cause some cash flow issues. 26 U.S.C. § 1256.  
244 17 C.F.R. §4.24(p).  
245 As noted, many public pools restrict transfers for tax reasons. See e.g., Prospectus, 2,000,000 Units of 
Limited Partnership Maximum, Rogers International Raw Materials Fund, L.P., at 4  (March 31, 2005) 
(describing such restrictions).   
246 Compare Prospectus, 2,000,000 Units of Limited Partnership Maximum, Rogers International Raw 
Materials Fund, L.P., at pp. 42-43 (March 31, 2005) (10 days notice before end of month is required for 
redemption but no redemption fee is charged). 
247 Jeffery S. Rosen, “Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange Act,” 40 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 982 (1983).  
248 17 C.F.R. §4.24(n). 
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specified by CFTC regulations which require, among other things, disclosure of the 
“worst peak-to-valley drawdown during the most recent five calendar years.”249 
CFTC regulations prohibit CPOs from co-mingling the funds of a pool with any 
other person.250 Participants in larger pools must be given monthly account statements in 
the form of a statement of income and a statement of changes in net asset value computed 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.251 Pool participants must be 
given an annual report containing financial statements certified by an independent public 
accountant.252 CFTC regulations also contain a Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002253 type 
requirement that requires each account statement and annual financial report to contain a 
“signed oath or affirmation of the sole proprietor, general partner of a partnership, or 
chief executive or chief financial officer of a corporate pool that these reports are 
accurate and complete to the best of his or her belief.”254 
“A significant provision under the 1940 Act, but absent from the commodity pool 
regulatory structure, is the role of independent directors.”255 Moreover, the outside 
director requirements adopted by the New York Stock Exchange after the Enron scandal 
were not applied to limited partnerships because of their “unique attributes.”256 It is also 
 
249 17 C.F.R. §4.25(a). 
250 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(c). 
251 17 C.F.R. § 4.22. 
252 17 C.F.R. §4.24(u). The form for that annual report is also specified in CFTC regulations. 17 C.F.R. 
§4.22. 
253 107 Pub. L. No. 204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002), promulgated at 15 U.S.C. § 7241. 
254 Philip McBride Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, 1 Derivatives Regulation, § 1.11 at 1-260, referencing 
17 C.F.R. §4.22(h). 
255 James G. Smith, “A Securities Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators,” 1996 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
281,290.  
256 That rule mandated that at least a majority of the board of directors of listed companies be composed of 
outside directors and that nominating and compensating committees be composed entirely of such 
directors. However limited partnerships were exempted from those requirements. See Section 303A of the 
Corporate Governance Standards of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (2004). Those requirements do 
apply at the general partnership level if the general partner is a listed corporation, which would be rare for a 
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“noteworthy that the CEA [Commodity Exchange Act], unlike the Investment Company 
Act, does not mandate a corporate form for CPOs, and thus permits a contract form of 
governance and greater flexibility than the Investment Company Act in advisory 
arrangements.”257 
“Commodity pools are not subject to specific governance procedures under the 
CFTC regulations. Rather, the relationship between the pool and the pool participants is 
based on state law depending on the form of entity.”258 For tax reasons, “[t]he limited 
partnership is the most common form of commodity pool, although the limited 
partnership is often set up with a corporation acting as the general partner.”259 The 
governance structure of limited partnerships is regulated by state law, usually some form 
or another of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.260 Those statutes require the 
limited partnership to file a statement before commencing business, with the Secretary of 
State or some other state functionary. Usually, that statement must contain the name and 
address of the general partner and little else.261 
CPO.  Nasdaq also exempts limited partnerships from its outside directors requirement. See Nasdaq 
Marketplace Rule 4350. 
257 Daniel F. Zimmerman, “CFTC Reauthorization in the Wake of Long-Term Capital Management,” 2000 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 121, 135-136, citing, Stephen K. West, “The Investment Company Industry in the 
1990s: A Rethinking of the Regulatory Structure Appropriate for Investment Companies in the 1990’s, The 
Background and Premises for Regulation,”16-17 (1990) (Report for the Investment Company Institute). 
258 James G. Smith, “A Securities Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators,” 1996 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
281,291. 
259 Frank A. Camp, “The 1981 Revisions in the CFTC’s  Commodity Pool Operator Regulations,” 7 J. 
Corp. L. 627, 630 (1982). Pools operating as corporations were initially so rare that the CFTC had to make 
a special exemption for them under its regulations. Jeffery S. Rosen, “Regulation of Commodity Pool 
Operators Under the Commodity Exchange Act,” 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 951 (1983).   
260 See, Thomas Lee Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Cases and 
Materials 64-75 (2nd Standard ed. West Group 2006) (describing state regulation of limited partnerships). 
See also, Id. at p. 21 (describing advantages and disadvantages of limited partnerships). 
261 See e.g., Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §2001. New York law is more expansive in the 
information to be filed with the county clerk by limited partnerships, requiring a statement of the term of 
the limited partnership, a description of the contributions of limited partners and policies for making 
distributions to limited partners. N.Y. Consolidated Law Service, Partnerships § 91.  
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The general partner manages the limited partnership’s business while the limited 
partners play a passive role like shareholders in a corporation.262 Unlike the limited 
partners, the general partner does not have limited liability but may shield its owners by 
incorporating.263 Most general partners in large CPO limited partnerships are 
incorporated.264 This means that, “[u]nlike a traditional corporate entity whose managers 
are natural persons, a pool’s managers are typically corporations or other entities.”265 
A general partner of a limited partnership owes fiduciary duties under state law to 
limited partners but their scope and application is uncertain.266 CFTC regulations also 
seem “to recognize that commodity trading advisers and commodity pool operators owe 
greater duties to their customers and that their customers need special protection.”267 Of 
particular concern to the CFTC has been the fees charged to pool participants. It had 
initially considered “adopting a restriction on the amount of management and advisory 
fees a commodity pool might charge. After considering such a measure and the negative 
comments received, however, the Commission decided not to impose such a rule.”268 
262 Thomas Lee Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Cases and 
Materials 64-66 (2nd Standard ed.  West Group 2006). 
263 See e.g., Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977). The limited 
liability of a corporate general partner has led the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to “permit a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a national bank to act as sole general partner and commodity pool operator to 
trade, invest in, and hold forward, option, and futures contracts that are permissible for a national bank to 
purchase and execute either for their own account or for the account of their customers.” Steven McGinity, 
“Symposium on Derivative Financial Products: Derivatives-Related Bank Activities as Authorized by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board,” 71 Chi. Kent. L. Rev. 1195, 
1120 (1996).    
264 A limited liability company (LLC) structure may also be used. See Brian L. Schorr, “Limited Liability 
Companies: Features and Uses,” C.P.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 32-34 (stating that LLCs are desirable for 
commodity pools). 
265 James G. Smith, “A Securities Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators,” 1996 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
281, 287. 
266 Thomas Lee Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Cases and 
Materials 64-66 (2nd Standard ed.  West Group 2006). 
267 Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 Notre Dame Law Review 
199, 237 (1992).   
268 Jeffery S. Rosen, “Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange Act,” 40 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 959 (1983). The CFTC has also struggled with commission and fee disclosure 
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Another contrast between the securities and futures industry is their treatment of 
incentive fees paid on the basis of profits from trading. The CFTC rejected a prohibition 
on incentive fees from trading profits such as the one contained in the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940.269 That decision was made after the CFTC Advisory Committee on 
Commodity Futures Trading Professionals concluded that the Investment Advisers Act’s 
prohibition on incentive fees was due to the fact that Congress thought that such 
arrangements resulted in undue risk taking.270 The advisory committee believed that 
concern was inapplicable to futures trading because speculation and risk taking are an 
accepted part of the futures industry.271 
Instead of the more parental restrictions used by the Investment Advisers Act, the 
CFTC opted for its disclosure approach. This includes disclosure in the CPO brochure of 
management fees, brokerage commissions, trailing commissions, allocations from the 
pool to any person, trading adviser fees, clearing fees, and professional and 
administrative fees, including legal fees.272 The CPO must provide in tabular format an 
analysis of the pool’s break even point and that analysis must include all fees and 
commissions. Certain additional and specific disclosures are required for incentive 
 
requirements for commodity futures commission merchants, the futures industry analogue to the broker-
dealer in the securities industry. The agency has required disclosure of fees where they are material but 
rejected claims that an excessive fee or commission is inherently fraudulent. An issue raised periodically is 
whether, in addition to their amounts, disclosure of the effects of excessive fees and commissions is 
required. See, 13 Jerry W. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, § 
8:10 (2005).   
269 Id. The prohibition in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 applies to “capital gains” or “capital 
appreciation” of the funds under management. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(1). The SEC has exempted from that 
prohibition advice given by an investment adviser to defined wealthy clients. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3.   
269 17 C.F.R. §4.24(j). 
270 A Senate report to that legislation likened such arrangements to a “heads I win, tails you lose” 
investment approach. S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22 (1940). 
271 Jeffery S. Rosen, “Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange Act,” 40 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 959 (1983).    
272 17 C.F.R. §4.24(i). 
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fees.273 Some of those incentive fees can be significant. In addition to management and 
brokerage fees ranging from around 2 to 6 percent of NAV, a 20 percent incentive fee 
based on profits is common.274 
Another concern based on fiduciary principles is reflected in the CFTC 
regulations that require disclosure in the CPO brochure of “any actual or potential” 
conflicts of interest.275 This includes disclosure of arrangements in which any person 
might benefit from the maintenance of the pool’s account with a particular futures 
commission merchant or its introduction by an introducing broker. This would include 
payments for order flow or soft dollar arrangements,276 which have also raised concerns 
at the SEC.277 Another disclosure required by the CFTC that is also popular with the SEC 
is that of related party transactions.278 The CFTC requires disclosure of costs to the pool 
of transactions (for which there is no publicly disseminated price) between the pool and 
any affiliated persons.279 Where the CPO, CTA or their principals plan to trade for their 
own account, disclosure must be made of that fact and any written policies governing 
such trading. In addition, disclosure must be made as to whether pool participants will be 
allowed to inspect the trading records of the persons engaging in such trading.280 
Overlapping SEC Jurisdiction 
 
273 17 C.F.R. § 4.21(i)(3). 
274 See e.g., The Beacon Financial Futures Fund L.P., Prospectus at 13 (May 13, 2005) (20 percent 
incentive fee); JWH Global Trust, Prospectus at 31-32 (Nov. 1, 2004) (20 percent incentive fee and 6.5 
percent annual brokerage fee).   
275 17 C.F.R. § 4.24(j) 
276 17 C.F.R. § 4.24(k).  
277 See, 23 Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Broker-Dealer Operations Under Securities and 
Commodities Laws, §5:8 (2nd ed. 2005) (describing soft dollar restrictions and SEC enforcement cases) and 
Id. at § 6:13 (describing payment for order flow issues).     
278 The scandal involving the Enron Corp. was occasioned by the disclosure of certain suspect related party 
transactions involving the company’s chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow. Jerry W. Markham, A 
Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform 82 (2006). 
279 17 C.F.R. § 4.24(k). 
280 17 C.F.R. § 4.24(m). 
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The SEC has maintained a regulatory role over commodity pools through the 
backdoor of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, i.e., the 
SEC claims those ownership interests are “securities” subject to its regulation. Whether 
the SEC had jurisdiction over such securities was in doubt after the CFTC was created 
because the latter agency was given “exclusive” jurisdiction over the regulation of futures 
trading.281 Clouding the picture further was the issue over whether discretionary 
commodity futures accounts were securities subject to SEC regulation.282 The courts are 
divided on the issue of whether such accounts are securities, an issue that hinges on 
whether “vertical” commonality, as opposed to “horizontal” commonality, meets the 
investment contract definition established by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W. J. Howey 
Co.283 The majority of the courts seem to have concluded that discretionary accounts are 
not securities subject to SEC jurisdiction,284 but there is horizontal commonality in 
commodity pools so the result might very well have been different for investments in 
those entities. 
The CFTC early in its history asserted exclusive jurisdiction over the operation 
and investment activities of pools, and the SEC did not challenge that claim. Therefore, 
even publicly offered commodity pools are not subject to the Investment Company Act of 
1940, unless they are also trading securities and do not otherwise fall within in an 
exemption to that statute. However, the CFTC declined to decide whether the solicitation 
 
281 7 U.S.C. §2(a)(1)(A). 
282 The issue of whether a discretionary commodity account is a security gave rise to much litigation and 
not a little commentary. See e.g., Note, “Are Discretionary Commodity Trading Accounts Investment 
Contracts? The Supreme Court must Decide,” 35 Catholic U. L. Rev. 635 (1986); Bradley D. Johnson, 
“Discretionary Accounts as Securities: An Application of the Howey Test,” 53 Fordham L. Rev. 639 
(1984).  
283 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See, Thomas L. Hazen, Securities Regulation, Cases and Materials, 23-27 (2d ed. 
1996). 
284 13 Jerry W. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, § 21:3 (2005).  
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of funds by commodity pool operators were within its exclusive jurisdiction or whether 
the SEC had concurrent jurisdiction over such solicitation under the Securities Act of 
1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.285 As a consequence of this uncertainty 
most commodity pools registered their public offerings with the SEC under the Securities 
Act of 1933, but not the Investment Company Act of 1940. Nevertheless, the issue of 
what regulations applied remained open because the SEC and CFTC were locked in a 
jurisdictional war from their inception over their respective regulatory roles for futures 
type instruments that involved securities.286 
The SEC got the worst of its jurisdictional fights with the CFTC in the Seventh 
Circuit,287 and it entered into a demarche with the CFTC in 1981 that allocated 
jurisdiction between the two agencies. That agreement was called the Shad-Johnson 
Accords in honor of the chairmen of those agencies who negotiated the agreement. The 
Shad-Johnson Accords did not end the jurisdictional turf battles between the SEC and 
CFTC,288 but did lead to legislation that defined the boundaries for futures and options 
trading.289 
The Shad-Johnson Accords also addressed the regulation of commodity pools. In 
order to resolve the uncertainty in this area, those Accords sought legislation that would 
provide that nothing in the CEA would affect the applicability of the Securities Act of 
 
285 Don L. Horwitz and Jerry W. Markham, “Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: 
Scene II,” Bus. Law. 67, 75 (1983).  
286 See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, “The Stock Market Crash of 1987 -- The United 
States Looks at New Recommendations,” 76 Geo. L. J. 1993, 2024-2027 (1988) (describing those 
conflicts). 
287 Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 
(1982). 
288 See e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) and Board of Trade of the 
City of Chicago v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1999) (both cases rejecting expansive claims by the SEC to 
jurisdiction over futures instruments).  
289 Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294. 
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1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to securities issued by 
commodity pools. “Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, commodity pools and 
persons managing them may be subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and, if a 
pool conducts not only a commodities business but also acts as an investment company, 
the Investment Company Act of 1940.”290 In seeking this amendment, however, the 
agencies made clear that they did not intend to “imply that the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 are applicable to the activities of 
commodity pools, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisors when such 
entities or persons purchase commodity futures contracts (or options thereon) based on 
securities or give advice as to the purchase and sale of futures contracts (or options 
thereof) based on securities.”291 
In response to that request, the CEA was amended in 1982 by Congress during a 
periodic CFTC reauthorization process, “so that the CEA now reflects that the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 apply to solicitations for 
investments in a commodity pool.”292 However, as the House Agriculture Committee 
report to that legislation noted, the Investment Company Act of 1940 would not apply to 
the CFTC regulated instruments,293 “giving the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over the 
 
290 [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,332 at p. 25,605 (Feb. 2, 1982). 
291 S. Rep. No. 384, 97th Cong. 2nd, Sess. 82 (1982).  
292 Don L. Horwitz and Jerry W. Markham, “Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: 
Scene II,” Bus. Law. 67, 75 (1983).  
293 H.R.Rep. No. 565 (pt. 1) 97th Cong. 2d Sess.82-83 (1982); Don L. Horwitz and Jerry W. Markham, 
“Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene II,” Bus. Law. 67, 75 (1983). As the SEC 
has somewhat confusedly noted: 
It appears, therefore, that without regard to whether futures on securities or options on such futures 
are securities, an entity investing in such interests is not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 unless such entity is otherwise an investment 
company under the Investment Company Act, in which case the person advising the investment 
company about its investments in futures may be an “‘investment adviser’ of an investment 
company” under section 2(a)(20) of the Investment Company Act and its contract subject to the 
provisions of section 15 of the Investment Company Act. A person giving advice concerning the 
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form of the pool, fee setting practices, and trading conduct,” while subjecting sales of 
investment interests to SEC regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.294 
Oddly, given their history, there has been very little tension between the SEC and 
CFTC over the joint regulation of commodity pools. This is apparently due to the fact 
that many commodity pools would be exempt from SEC registration requirements in any 
event because their offerings are limited to sophisticated wealthy investors.295 In addition, 
the disclosures mandated by the CFTC for registered CPOs is not substantially different 
from that required by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933.296 Further, the financial 
reports required by the CFTC for registered pools can be readily conformed to meet the 
reporting requirements created by the SEC under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange 
Act.297 
To the extent that a commodity pool invests in securities instead of commodity 
instruments, concerns arise over whether the pool becomes an investment company, 
 
making of investments in futures on exempted securities (other than municipal securities) or in 
futures on indices of securities as permitted pursuant to the Futures Trading Act of 1982, or as 
previously approved by the CFTC, or on options on such futures is excluded by the CEA from 
being subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC under the investment Advisers Act of 1940 unless the 
person provides advice about investing in securities, otherwise than by advising about such futures 
or options on such futures or about certain securities which may be termed, generally, United 
States government securities. 
Peavey Commodity Futures Funds I, II and III, SEC No-Action Letter, June 2, 1983. 
294 Commodity pools making public offerings disclose in their prospectuses filed under the Securities Act 
of 1933 that they are not registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. For example, the 
prospectus of one high profile commodity pool states: 
The Index Fund is not a regulated investment company or ‘mutual fund’ subject to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. Therefore, you do not have the protections provided by that statute. 
Prospectus, 2,000,000 Units of Limited Partnership Maximum, Rogers International Raw Materials Fund, 
L.P., at p. 4 (March 31, 2005).   
295 Many such offerings use Rule 506 in SEC Regulation D to avoid registration under the Securities Act of 
1933. That regulation allows offerings to be made in an unlimited amount to an unlimited amount of 
“accredited investors.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.   
296 James G. Smith, “A Securities Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators,” 1996 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
281, 281 et seq. (comparing the disclosure requirements mandated by the SEC for securities offerings and 
CFTC for CPOs). 
297 Id. at 303-304. See, 15 U.S.C. § 78m and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 et seq.    
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subjecting the CPO to the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the 
CTA to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.298 However, there are several exemptions 
available under those statutes. For example,  the Investment Company Act will not apply 
if the CPO does not hold itself out as being “primarily” engaged in the business of 
investing or trading in securities299 and does not own investment securities in value 
exceeding 40 percent of the pool’s total assets (exclusive of cash and government 
securities) on an unconsolidated basis.300 Conversely, mutual funds may avoid 
registration as CPOs under the exemption granted by the CFTC.301 
Commodity Pool Issues 
Regulatory problems involving traditional commodity pools have been relatively 
moderate. Of recent interest are the public commodity pools that traded through Refco, 
Inc. That firm was a large futures commission merchant that failed two months after its 
initial public offering when it revealed that its chief executive officer had hidden $430 
million in obligations from its auditors. That was a failure of the SEC’s full disclosure 
regimen, but a commodity pool sponsored by celebrity commodity trader James B. 
Rogers had $362 million on deposit with Refco, and its bankruptcy placed those funds at 
 
298 Thus, “in appropriate circumstances, commodity pools and persons managing them may be subject to 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and if a pool conducts not only a commodities business but also acts 
as an investment company, the Investment Company Act of 1940.” H.R. Rep. No. 626. (pt. II), 97th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 14 (1982). The IRS is challenging mutual funds that use swaps, threatening to revoke their mutual 
fund pass-through tax treatment if swaps exceed a certain portion of assets. Eleanor Laise, Investors Are 
Cautioned to Review Fund Strategies Amid IRS Ruling, Wall St. j., December 21, 2005, at D2. 
299 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A). 
300 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C). As will discussed below, there are other exemptions that allowed many 
hedge funds to avoid registration under the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act.  
301 17 C.F.R. § 4.5. Investment companies engaging in futures trading have encountered some esoteric 
issues over whether the leverage in those contracts and the posting of margin creates a “senior security” 
that is subject to some special restrictions in the Investment Company Act of 1940. 37 Fed. Reg. 12790 
(June 9, 1972). Meeting margin requirements for futures contracts also required the creation of 
“safekeeping” accounts, but that requirement was later dropped because it was largely redundant of CFTC 
segregation requirements. 23 Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Broker-Dealer Operations Under 
Securities and Commodities Laws, §5:8 (2nd ed. 2005).     
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risk. The Rogers Fund sued Refco claiming that the monies in that commodity pool 
should have been held at the CFTC regulated arm of Refco where they would be immune 
from claims of other Refco creditors.302 Refco has denied that claim, and it will probably 
take some time to sort out that situation.303 
The worst abuses involving commodity pools have involved fly-by-night 
operators using high pressure sales tactics to downplay risks and overstate the likelihood 
of profits. Such pools are usually unregistered and are simply Ponzi schemes, looting 
customer assets before finally collapsing.304 Since these same problems have been 
plaguing the securities industry in even greater magnitude, it is hard to assign blame on 
the basis of the regulator involved.305 For CFTC regulated CPOS and CTAs, the use of 
 
302 Rogers was co-founder of the Quantum Fund with George Soros, the billionaire hedge fund manager. 
Rogers was also a popular business talk show commentator, and he had written a book advocating 
commodity investments as a profitable alternative to stocks and other investments. Published before the 
Refco bankruptcy, the book noted that his funds were up 165 percent and included the best performing 
index fund in the world in any asset class. See, Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. 
Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform 577-580 (2006) (describing the Refco scandal and Rogers’ 
funds). 
303 See Alistair Barr, “Refco rebuts $362M legal claim from Rogers Funds,” MarketWatch, Nov. 2, 2005 
(describing conflicting claims by the Rogers Funds and Refco lawyers). 
304 See 13 Jerry W. Markham Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, § 24:15 
(2005) (describing these CPO and CTA regulatory problems). Some scandals have also involved registered 
CPOs and their CTAs. See e.g. United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 1069 (1987). (boiler room operation); CFTC v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 
1480 (10th Cir. 1983) (“An FBI investigation disclosed evidence that, from 1975 to 1981, Chilcott had 
attracted nearly $80 million in investments for a commodities pool from approximately 400 persons. The 
FBI estimated that in 1981 the commodities pool had only about $8 million in liquid assets, over one-half 
of which were held by Chilcott in his own name. The remainder was allegedly diverted by Chilcott into 
personal ventures or lost in speculative trading.”) 
305To cite a few examples, the Republic of New York Securities Corp pleaded guilty to two felony counts 
of securities fraud and agreed to pay $606 million in restitution as the result of looting conducted through 
its facilities by Martin Armstrong. He had been running a Ponzi scheme that cost Japanese institutional 
investors about $700 million. In another Ponzi scheme, Martin Frankel looted about $200 million before 
fleeing. Frankel was arrested in Germany with twelve passports in different names and diamonds worth 
millions of dollars. Patrick Bennett was the architect of one of the largest Ponzi schemes in American 
history. He defrauded investors of $700 million. InverWorld, Inc. defrauded clients in Mexico of $475 
million. J.T. Wallenbrock & Associates sold promissory notes to over 6,000 investors, raising over $230 
million in that Ponzi scheme. Reed E. Slatkin bested that fraud with a $600 million Ponzi scheme. Over 
$250 million of that amount could not be recovered. Kevin Leigh Lawrence pled guilty for his involvement 
in a $100 million Ponzi scheme. D. W. Heath & Associates Inc. and others defrauded some 800 elderly 
investors out of $60 million. Eric Stein defrauded 1,800 investors of $34 million through a Ponzi scheme 
targeting those over age fifty. Even bigger was the sale of by Kenneth Kasarjian of over $800 million in 
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hypothetical instead of actual trading results to profile trading systems without proper 
disclosures has been a recurring problem, and books and records violations are not 
uncommon. In other instances, the disclosure brochure given to clients was either false or 
its stated policies were not followed.306 
The SEC and CFTC have also been concerned with hedge fund frauds. As the 
SEC has noted, “[t]he growth in hedge funds has been accompanied by a substantial and 
troubling growth in the number of our hedge fund fraud enforcement cases. In the last 
five years, the Commission has brought 51 cases in which we have asserted that hedge 
fund advisers have defrauded hedge fund investors or used the fund to defraud others in 
amounts our staff estimates to exceed $1.1 billion.”307 Still the amount of losses cited by 
the SEC from hedge fund frauds was only a small percentage of the $870 billion 
managed by over 7,000 hedge funds in the United States308 and constitutes just a small 
proportion of the funds looted in Ponzi schemes in the securities industry. 
Among the hedge funds committing fraud was the Manhattan Investment Fund 
managed by Michael Berger. Investors there lost $350 million. In Naples, Florida, David 
Mobley’s Maricopa Index Hedge Fund turned out to be a Ponzi scheme that defrauded 
some 300 wealthy investors of over $120 million between 1993 and 2000. Mobley used 
the money for personal extravagances, including expensive real estate in Naples and a 
 
lease assignments that had already been assigned or which did not exist. Terry L. Dowdell was the 
mastermind of a $120 million scheme involving what he claimed were foreign bank trading instruments 
that provided a return of 160 percent. David and James Edwards and others raised $98 million from 1300 
investors through a prime bank scheme. The Credit Bancorp. Ltd. (CBL) defrauded investors of $210 
million. That scheme was master minded by Richard J. Blech. See, Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History 
of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 23-24, 487-489 (2006) (describing this 
pandemic of Ponzi schemes). 
306 See, 13 Jerry W. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, e.g., §§ 7:7 
and 24:15 (2005) (describing these CPO and CTA regulatory problems).  
307 69 Fed. Reg. 72054, 72056 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
308 That would be .001149 percent. 
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fleet of luxury automobiles.309 On the opposite coast, another hedge fund, the KL Group, 
defrauded wealthy Palm Beach investors of an estimated $200 million.310 Another hedge 
fund, Bayou Securities LLC, which had $440 million under management was found to be 
missing large amounts of those funds after its founder, Samuel Israel III, announced that 
he was retiring at age 46 in order to spend more time with his family. Israel and his chief 
financial officer, Daniel Marino later pleaded guilty to criminal charges of fraud.311 
The CFTC charged another hedge fund, Tradewinds International II LP, with 
overstating the value of its assets. The hedge fund claimed assets of over $18 million 
when the actual amount was $1.1 million and gains of twelve percent when it was 
actually experiencing losses. The fund’s manager, Charles L. Harris, used monies not lost 
in trading to buy himself luxury cars, a house in Florida and a yacht. Harris sent his 
investors a DVD of himself confessing to improper trading while fleeing authorities in 
his yacht. He was later caught.312 
309 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 
441 (2006). 
310 Shawn Bean, “The Fund and Damage Done,” Florida International Magazine, March 2006, at 118. 
311 Id. at 591. The SEC has uncovered abuses by hedge funds dealing in PIPEs (private investments in 
public equity), which  have become a popular tool for raising private equity. In such transactions, hedge 
funds purchase unregistered stock of a public company at a substantial discount. These transactions are 
used where the expense of a public offering or other concerns make the private equity market more 
attractive. See generally, George L. Majoros, Jr., Comment: The Development of “PIPEs” in Today's 
Private Equity Market, 51 Case W. Res. 493 (2001) (describing losses from PIPEs). The abuses uncovered 
by the SEC involved purchases by hedge funds of PIPEs where they anticipate a drop in the price of the 
stock. The hedge funds then sold the sold the company’s stock short and covered with the short sale with 
their unregiostered PIPE shares. Floyd Norris, “A Troubling Finance Tool for Companies in Trouble, N.Y. 
Times, March 15, 2006, at C4. One hedge fund is claimed to have persuaded an independent research firm 
to delay release of a negative report on a company so that the hedge fund could short its stock. Jenny 
Anderson, “True or False: A Hedge Fund Plotted to Hurt a Drug Maker,” N.Y Times, March 26, 2006, at 
BU2.   
312 Id. at 441. Broadening the scope of examination of regulatory problems to include publicly offered 
limited partnerships that are not commodity pools or hedge funds, will pick up other scandals. In the 1980s, 
for example, tax shelters were being sold as limited partnerships in large numbers to the public through 
inadequate or fraudulent disclosures. In one case, a shelter promoter, Edward Markowitz, was prosecuted 
for tax fraud in selling limited partnerships with large tax write-offs. Purchasers were told that they could 
receive a fifteen to one tax deduction. Another firm similarly engaged was Sentinel Government Securities. 
III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the 
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The CFTC’s approach to the regulation of commodity pools has defaulted to the 
full disclosure approach used by the SEC for any other public offering. The CFTC, 
however, has not used its exclusive jurisdiction over the operations of commodity pools 
to adopt the intrusive regulatory schemes found in the Investment Company Act or the 
Investment Advisers Act. There is no evidence that the CFTC’s hands off regulatory 
approach for CPO governance and operations has provided any less investor protection 
than that available for mutual fund investors.  
 
IV 
BANK COMMON TRUST FUNDS 
 
Background   
Another mechanism for collective investments is the common trust fund in which 
the funds of several individual trusts are pooled for collective investment by bank trust 
departments. Over 100 banking institutions held $780 billion in assets for collective 
investment in 2004.313 Although the management of those funds raised conflict of interest 
 
Internet (1970-2001) 146 (2002).  More spectacularly, Prudential Securities Inc. (“PSI”) was charged by 
the SEC with fraud in selling some 700 limited partnerships valued at over $8 billion to “tens of thousands” 
of unsuitable investors. See In the Matter of Prudential Securities, Inc., 1993 SEC LEXIS 2866 (Oct. 21, 
1993) (consent settlement without admitting or denying the allegations). More than ten million people 
invested approximately $90 billion in limited partnerships during the 1970s and 1980s.” John Gesche, 
“Regulating Rollups: General Partners Fiduciary Obligations in Light of the Limited Partnership Act of 
1993,” 47 Stan. L. Rev. 85, 88 (1994) hereinafter “Regulating Rollups”). Much of their value was lost after 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 
(1986). That legislation sharply undercut the tax advantages of tax shelters sold through limited 
partnerships. Such enterprises were no longer able to multiply their tax deductions. The value of many of 
these investments also dropped sharply in economic downturns in real estate and oil and gas. Many of the 
limited partnerships were then reorganized by being consolidated and “rolled up” with other limited 
partnerships. Those roll-ups often were disadvantageous to the investors being rolled up. The SEC adopted 
regulations and Congress passed the Limited Partnership Roll-Up Reform Act of 1993 to deal with abuses 
in such transactions. Pub. L. No. 103-202, 107 Stat. 2359 (1993). 
313 This was just a small percentage of the almost $15 trillion dollars held by banking institutions in 
personal, employee benefit and corporate trust assets in 2004. Banking institutions also held over $33 
trillion in custodial and safekeeping assets. American Banking Association website (ABA.com) visited on 
December 21, 2005). 
67
concerns, they have not been regulated in the same manner as mutual funds, largely as a 
matter of history and the separate regulatory structure created for banks. Banking 
regulation is pervasive, but it has not focused on corporate governance as the basis for 
regulating common trust funds. Rather, common law fiduciary principles have been its 
guiding force. Those principles were at first constraining, but have adopted to modern 
portfolio theory. Still, the strictures of trust investment requirements and their illiquidity 
have been other constraints that prevented banks from competing directly with mutual 
funds. Instead, as will be seen, the dropping of restraints on bank mutual fund activities 
led the banks to sponsor their own mutual funds and even covert their common trust 
funds into mutual funds. 
The operation of collective investments by banks has a long history that traces 
back to the introduction of the trust fund concept from England early in our history.314 
The trustees appointed to administer trusts were often family members or some other 
individual known and trusted by the creator of the trust. A problem with such 
appointments was that the trustee might die before the completion of the objects of the 
trust. That event would require the appointment of another individual, but the creator of 
the trust was also often deceased, and the new appointment might not have met with his 
approval. Another concern was that friends and relatives of the creator often did not have 
the expertise to invest the trust funds. Those problems were solved by the trust companies 
 
314 The trust concept was given explicit recognition in England in 1536 with the adoption of the Statute of 
Uses. Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 Notre Dame Law 
Review 199, 208 (1992). 
68
that began appearing in America as early as 1818. One such company formed in that year 
commingled trust funds for collective investment.315 
The trust companies, which engaged in a wide variety of financial activities, met 
competition in their trust operations from insurance companies that acted as trustees, as 
well as underwriting and selling insurance. For example, the New York Life Insurance 
and Trust was formed in 1830 and was followed by similar enterprises. The United States 
Trust Company was the first company to act exclusively as a trustee for trust funds. It 
was formed in 1853.316 As custodian of customer funds, banks were in a natural position 
to serve as trustees for trusts, but regulatory restrictions limited such activity; the trust 
companies operated outside of most bank regulatory structures in the nineteenth century. 
Some banks formed their own trust companies to compete with the trust companies. 
Gradually, banks were allowed to manage trusts internally. That business had 
developed to the point that the American Banking Association created its own Trust 
Department in 1897 so that members could keep themselves informed of developments in 
that area of their business.317 That business was largely concentrated in state banks, but 
the Stock Market Crash of 1907 resulted in a boost in trust business for national banks. 
That crash was triggered by the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company and set off a 
long running investigation by a Senate committee that resulted in the creation of the 
 
315 I Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From Christopher Columbus to the 
Robber Barons (1492-1900)  375 (2002).   
316 Id.
317 American Banking Association website (ABA.com) visited on December 21, 2005). There is also a 
degree of self-regulation for bank trust activities. The American Banking Association created the National 
Trust School in 1965. It provides preparation for the Institute of Certified Bankers (ICB) and Certified 
Trust & Financial Advisor (CTFA) exam. American Banking Association website (ABA.com) visited on 
December 21, 2005). 
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Federal Reserve Board in 1913.318 Section 11(k) of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 also 
authorized the Federal Reserve Board to grant of trust powers to national banks.319 The 
exercise of such powers was subject to state laws governing the operation of trusts and 
the responsibilities of trustees.320 
Fiduciary  Duties 
State laws governing trusts imposed fiduciary duties of loyalty and care on 
trustees. The duty of loyalty prohibited self-dealing and other conflicts of interest on the 
part of trustees. The duty of care sought to assure careful consideration by trustees in 
investing trust fund assets. That duty of care received its most famous explication in the 
1830 decision in Harvard College v. Amory,321 where the Massachusetts court created the 
“prudent man” rule. That rule required trustees to act in the same manner “as men of 
prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to 
speculation, but in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of 
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital 
to be invested.”322 
The prudent man rule was disliked by trustees because it was uncertain in scope 
and a breach resulted in personal liability to the trustee who was surcharged for 
 
318 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 358 (2002). 
319 12 U.S.C. § 92a. That power was later shifted to the Comptroller of the Currency (“OOC”) in 1962. 
American Trust Co. v. South Carolina State Board of Bank Control, 381 F. Supp. 313, n. 14 (D.S.C. 1974). 
The grant of trust powers to the national banks was attacked by the trust companies on constitutional 
grounds but was upheld by the Supreme Court. First Bank of Bay City v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416 (1917).  
320 This meant that a national bank could be surcharged in state court proceedings for breaches of fiduciary 
duty in investing trust fund assets in an imprudent manner. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. 
Martin, 425 So.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. Alas.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). The Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency could also revoke its permission for a national bank to engage in trust activities where the 
bank had unlawfully or unsoundly exercised those powers. Central National Bank of Matton v. U.S. Dept. 
of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1990). 
321 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 454 (1830),  
322 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 454 (1830),  
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imprudent investments. To relieve that concern, many states passed statutes creating so-
called “legal lists” that specified certain securities that a trustee could safely invest in as a 
prudent man.323 Those legal lists were supplanted in recent years by modern portfolio 
theory that is based on a strategy of diversification that might even include some 
speculative investments in the portfolio.324 
Another development was the adoption of statutes that permitted the commingling 
of funds of several trusts into one or more common trust funds.325 As in the case of single 
trusts, state laws required periodic accountings in a judicial proceeding for common trust 
funds that tested the investments made by the trustee for prudence.326 Those proceedings 
were binding and relieved the trustee of any liability for investments approved by the 
court.327 The easing of investment restrictions led to the creation of “discretionary 
common trust funds,” which were no longer restricted to investments on the state legal 
list.328 
323 One issue was whether trustees could permissibly invest trust funds in equity securities. Colorado 
amended its constitution in 1950 to allow trustees to make such investments. The Model Prudent Man 
Investment Act also eased investment restrictions. Twenty-two states adopted that legislation by 1963. 
Lissa Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Banking Financial Service Activities, Cases and 
Materials, 763 (2d ed. 2004). See also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the 
Future of Trust Investing 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641 (1996) (describing that legislation).  
324 Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 Notre Dame Law Review 
199, 213-214 (1992). 
325As the Supreme Court has noted: 
Mounting overheads have made administration of small trusts undesirable to corporate trustees. In 
order that donors and testators of moderately sized trusts may not be denied the service of 
corporate fiduciaries, the District of Columbia and some thirty states . . . . have permitted pooling 
small trust estates into one fund for investment administration. The income, capital gains, losses 
and expenses of the collective trust are shared by the constituent trusts in proportion to their 
contribution. By this plan, diversification of risk and economy of management can be extended to 
those whose capital standing alone would not obtain such an advantage.  
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
326 Class action lawsuits were also used to challenge whether particular investments made by bank trustees 
for common investment funds were in accordance with fiduciary standards. See First Alabama Bank of 
Montgomery, N.A. v. Martin, 425 So.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. Alas.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). 
327 Id. See generally, In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974) (periodic accounting 
proceeding for discretionary common trust fund).  
328 In the Matter of Onbank & Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 245 (App. Div. N.Y. 1997).  
71
Common trust funds were boosted in 1936 by the addition of provisions in the 
Internal Revenue Act of 1936, which granted pass-through tax treatment to the 
beneficiaries of trusts participating in a common trust fund, an advantage enjoyed by 
mutual funds as well.329 The Federal Reserve Board amended its regulations in 1937 to 
allow national banks to operate common trust funds for “bona fide fiduciary purposes” 
and not “solely” for investment purposes. The Investment Company Act exempted 
common trust funds from its reach,330 and the Securities Act of 1933331 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 were amended in 1970 to exclude those collective investments 
from their reach.332 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) dropped the limitation on 
bona fide fiduciary purpose requirement in 1963 in an unsuccessful effort to allow banks 
to operate their own mutual funds.333 In 2001, in another effort to expand national bank 
trust fund activities, the OCC amended its regulations to allow national banks to engage 
in multi-state trust operations. The OCC asserted that the states could restrict those 
operations only to the extent that state imposed restrictions on state chartered trustees.334 
The OCC also proposed a rule that would have created uniform standards of care for 
 
329 26 U.S.C. §§ 851-852. 
330 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3). The exemption is available only where: 
such fund is employed by the bank solely as an aid to the administration of trusts, estates, or other 
accounts created and maintained for a fiduciary purpose; (B) except in connection with the 
ordinary advertising of the bank's fiduciary services, interests in such fund are not-- (i) advertised; 
or (ii) offered for sale to the general public; and fees and expenses charged by such fund are not in 
contravention of fiduciary principles established under applicable Federal or State law. 
Id. 
331 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2). 
332 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4)(B)(ii).   
333 Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 622 (1971). 
334 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. In response to that action, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors adopted a Model 
Multi-State Trust Institutions Act that was adopted in whole or part by several states. Lissa Broome & Jerry 
W. Markham, Regulation of Banking Financial Service Activities, Cases and Materials, 759 (2d ed. 2004).   
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national bank trust departments.335 That proposal met with opposition, and its adoption 
was deferred.336 
Mutual Fund Competition 
The collective trust fund is often likened to a mutual fund, but there are some 
significant differences between those two forms of investments. Mutual fund 
shareholders may select their own investment strategy, while the bank will, for the most 
part, make the investment decision for trust beneficiaries. The investor in a mutual fund 
may freely redeem his holdings at NAV, while the trust beneficiary is subject to the terms 
of the trust, rendering the investment illiquid. Interestingly, some banks invested their 
common trust funds into mutual funds, which somewhat diminished their money 
management role.337 
The breakdown in the restrictions in the Glass-Steagall Act’s338 prohibitions on 
investment banking activities before its repeal by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999339 
witnessed some aggressive efforts by banks to enter into the mutual fund business on 
their own. Those efforts were not always successful. In Investment Company Institute v. 
Camp,340 the Supreme Court held that a commingled managing agency account 
authorized by the OCC for national banks was actually a mutual fund that was not a 
 
335 65 Fed. Reg. 75,872 (Dec. 5, 2000). 
336 66 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (July 2, 2001). 
337 In In the Matter of Onbank & Trust Co., 649 N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div. 1997), a New York court 
considered a claim that a national bank had improperly delegated its discretionary trust powers by investing 
trust assets in mutual funds. The court noted that, under OCC regulations, state law would control that 
determination. The court held such investments were permissible because the bank trustee retained control 
of the investment decision by selecting mutual funds that conformed with the investment objectives of the 
underlying trusts. However, the court concluded that it was improper for the trustee to charge what in effect 
amounted to a double fee for the management of the trust assets, i.e., the trustee’s fee and that of the mutual 
fund. The New York legislature then acted to specifically authorize mutual fund investments by a bank 
common trust fund, and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the case. In the Matter of Onbank & 
Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).  
338 48 Stat. 162. 
339 Pub. L. No. 106-102. 
340 401 U.S. 617 (1971). 
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permissible investment for nation banks.341 Undeterred by that defeat national banks 
began marketing mutual funds through “independent” sponsors342and then began 
sponsoring their own mutual fund complexes.343 The banks were also authorized by 
legislation enacted in 1996 to convert their common trust funds into mutual funds; 
thereby providing liquidity for the underlying trusts. 344 The banks then began competing 
 
341 That plan was described by the court as follows: 
Under the plan the bank customer tenders between $ 10,000 and $ 500,000 to the bank, together 
with an authorization making the bank the customer’s managing agent. The customer’s investment 
is added to the fund, and a written evidence of participation is issued which expresses in “units of 
participation” the customer’s proportionate interest in fund assets. Units of participation are freely 
redeemable, and transferable to anyone who has executed a managing agency agreement with the 
bank. The fund is registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 
1940. The bank is the underwriter of the fund’s units of participation within the meaning of that 
Act. The fund has filed a registration statement pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. The fund is 
supervised by a five-member committee elected annually by the participants pursuant to the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. . . . The actual custody and investment of fund assets is carried 
out by the bank as investment advisor pursuant to a management agreement. Although the 
Investment Company Act requires that this management agreement be approved annually by the 
committee, including a majority of the unaffiliated members, or by the participants, it is expected 
that the bank will continue to be investment advisor. 
401 U.S. at 622-623.  
342 By 1987 over 200 mutual funds were being distributed through banks. III Jerry W. Markham, A 
Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the Internet (1970-2001) 239 (2002).  
Concord Holding Group and some sixteen other entities were handling bank mutual funds by 1993. Id. In 
1994, federal bank regulators adopted an inter-agency directive requiring banks to maintain written 
procedures governing their sales of mutual funds and other non-deposit services that included requirements 
of disclosures to customers. Id. at 239. 
343 III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the 
Internet (1970-2001) 239-240 (2002).  
344 Those conversions were facilitated by the Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-
188, 110 Stat. 1755), which amended the tax treatment of conversions into mutual funds under Section 584 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. More recently, one commentator has noted that: 
We’re now starting to see the banks having second thoughts about whether it was a good idea to 
convert their collective funds to mutual funds.  And some of them are going back and reconverting 
them back to collective funds.  We’re starting to see a movement where investment advisors are 
teaming up with bank trust departments and creating collective funds as investment options for 
401(k) plans because the world has changed.  Back then, collective funds did not have daily 
valuation.  Today, you can get daily valuation in a collective fund.  The values of a collective fund 
are not published in the newspaper, but any participant has easy access on the internet to go to a 
website and find the daily valuation of its interest in its collective fund.  And while you cannot 
move the interest in your collective fund to another, to an IRA if a participant leaves its plan, 
leaves the employer, that seems to be of less concern today than the fact that the collective funds 
come in at lower costs than the mutual funds.  And there’s lots of debate as to why the collective 
funds are less expensive to maintain, whether they have less regulatory costs, whether they’re--
they don’t have a distribution network in place and are less of a retail oriented 
product. Nevertheless, we see collective funds being offered at where the asset management fee 
and the other fees are less than comparable mutual funds.  And that’s providing significant 
competitive opportunity for these collective funds. 
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with the traditional sponsors of mutual funds for that business.345 The banks were in turn 
receiving “competition in their trust activities from other financial services firms such as 
Vanguard, Fidelity and MetLife. A survey showed that banks and savings and loans held 
only about forty percent of the trust services market in 2002.”346 
Governance Concerns  
 “A bank is the corporate trustee of the common trust fund. There is no other 
governing body. The underlying assumption is that the bank will be responsible for 
making all decisions. . . .”347 That arrangement is in contrast to the arrangement for 
mutual funds in which the investment adviser actually manages fund assets. OCC 
Regulation 9 supplements state regulations governing trusts.348 With respect to corporate 
governance, that regulation states that a “national bank’s fiduciary activities shall be 
managed by or under the direction of its board of directors. In discharging its 
responsibilities, the board may assign any function related to the exercise of fiduciary 
powers to any director, officer, employee, or committee thereof.349 Annual or 
“continuous” audits of the bank’s trust operations are required. Those audits must be 
 
Remarks of Donald Myers, partner Reed Smith LLP, at the American Enterprise Institute Conference on 
The Regulation of Mutual Funds, Competition With other Investment Vehicles for Retirement Savings, 
Wash. D.C. (Jan.3, 2006) available at  http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1223/transcript.asp.
(visited on Feb. 19, 2006). 
345 By 2005, banks were sponsoring 10 percent of all mutual fund complexes. Investment Company 
Institute, 2005 Mutual Fund Fact Book, A Guide to Trends and Statistics in the Mutual Fund Industry 
Section 1 (2005), available at ICI.org. 
346 Lissa Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Banking Financial Service Activities, Cases and 
Materials, 766 (2d ed. 2004) (citation omitted). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act narrowed “the exemption 
from Investment Company Act registration for bank common trust funds; under the Act, the exemption will 
continue to be available only to those bank common trust funds that are not advertised or offered to the 
general public except in connection with the ordinary advertising of the bank’s fiduciary services.” Paul J. 
Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 1, 23 
(2000).   
347 Comparison of the Regulation of Common Trust  Funds Subject to the Comptroller of the Currency’s 
Regulation 9 and the Regulation of Mutual Funds Subject to Federal Securities Laws Administered by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, paper presented at an AEI conference held in Washington, D.C. on 
October 24, 2005. 
348 12 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq.
349 12 C.F.R. § 9.4. 
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conducted under the direction of a “fiduciary audit committee.350 Written procedures are 
required to assure that the bank trustee meets its fiduciary responsibilities351 and record 
keeping requirements are imposed.352 
Banks operating a common trust fund are paid fees by the individual trusts. They 
normally do not charge a separate fee for the management of the common trust fund.353 
“If the amount of a national bank’s compensation for acting in a fiduciary capacity is not 
set or governed by applicable law, the bank may charge a reasonable fee for its 
services.”354 In addition, certain self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions are 
prohibited such as purchasing the bank’s own stock for trust accounts.355 Custody 
safeguards are required for trust assets.356 
The banks are also regulated intensively on safety and soundness issues. That 
regulation includes loan limits, capital requirements and regular inspections by bank 
examiners.357 Some officer and director conflicts are also addressed, such as limitations 
 
350 12 C.F.R. § 9.9. The fiduciary audit committee: 
must consist of a committee of the bank's directors or an audit committee of an affiliate of the 
bank. However, in either case, the committee: 
(1) Must not include any officers of the bank or an affiliate who participate significantly 
in the administration of the bank's fiduciary activities; and 
(2) Must consist of a majority of members who are not also members of any committee to 
which the board of directors has delegated power to manage and control the fiduciary 
activities of the bank. 
Id.
351 12 C.F.R. § 9.5. 
352 12 C.F.R. § 9.8. 
353 Comparison of the Regulation of Common Trust  Funds Subject to the Comptroller of the Currency’s 
Regulation 9 and the Regulation of Mutual Funds Subject to Federal Securities Laws Administered by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, paper presented at an AEI conference held in Washington, D.C. on 
October 24, 2005. 
354 12 C.F.R. § 9.15. 
355 12 C.F.R. § 9.12. 
356 12 C.F.R. § 9.13. 
357 Lissa Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Banking Financial Service Activities, Cases and 
Materials, chs. 5, 7 & 8 (2d ed. 2004).   
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on loans to officers.358 Until recently, there were no particular outside director 
requirements. Following the general hysteria surrounding the Enron scandal, however, 
Sarbanes-Oxley required audit committees of publicly traded companies to be staffed by 
outside directors,359 a requirement previously imposed by the NewYork Stock Exchange 
and Nasaq.360 Those self-regulatory bodies also require that nominating and 
compensation committees be composed of outside directors, as well as requiring a 
majority of all board members be independent.361 
Bank Problems 
The banks were heavily involved in the late trading and market timing scandals 
through their mutual funds, but had not previously experienced much scandal in their 
money management activities. One case of interest involved a proxy fight over the 
merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq in 2002. Walter B. Hewlett, a family member of 
one of the company’s founders, challenged that vote in the Delaware chancery court. He 
claimed that Carelton (Carly) Fiorina, the Hewlett-Packard chief executive officer, 
bought votes by threatening Deutsche Bank with a loss of Hewlett-Packard business, if its 
money mangers did not vote the stock they controlled in favor of the merger. Banks 
usually form a committee that votes proxies for stocks held in their common trust fund 
portfolios. They often use the services of corporate governance firms to decide how to 
vote those proxies. The money mangers at Deutsche Bank, under some slightly irrational 
 
358 Lissa Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Banking Financial Service Activities, Cases and 
Materials, chs. 331-332 (2d ed. 2004). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits loans to officers of publicly 
traded companies but exempts bans from that prohibition where the loans are in accordance with bank 
regulatory requirements. Id. at 332.   
359 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301 (July 30, 2002). Bank regulators announced that they would extend that 
requirement to non-public banks with assets of more than $500 million. Bill Stoneman, Governance 
Reforms a Puzzle for Small Banks, 168 American Banker  6A (Sept. 19, 2003).  
360 See supra, n. ---. 
361 Thomas Lee Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Cases and 
Materials 194 (2nd Standard ed.  West Group 2006) 
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theory of fiduciary duties, were planning to vote Compaq shares under their management 
in favor of the vote, while voting the Hewlett-Packard shares they managed against the 
merger.  
The Delaware court dismissed Hewlett’s charges even though Fiorina had placed 
much pressure on Deutsche Bank executives to change their opposition votes. In one 
phone call to one of her own executives that was taped Fiorina stated that “you and I need 
to demand a conference call, an audience, etc. to make sure that we get them in the right 
place. . . . get on the phone and see what we can get, but we may have to do something 
extraordinary for those two to bring ‘em over the line here.” After leaving that message, 
Fiorina called the Deutsche Bank officials, and they switched their vote on seventeen 
million of the twenty-five million shares they had under management in favor of the 
Hewlett-Packard-Compaq merger. The Delaware judge found no misconduct in that call, 
which had been taped without Fiorina’s knowledge.362 The SEC was not so forgiving; the 
investment advisory unit of the Deutsche Bank was fined $750,000 by that agency. The 
SEC claimed conflicts of interest because the advisory unit failed to disclose that it had 
worked for Hewlett-Packard and that it was intervening in the voting process.363 
Another concern with common trust fund management is the misuse of inside 
information from the bank’s commercial banking operations. To avoid such problems, 
the OCC requires national banks to maintain written procedures designed to ensure “that 
fiduciary officers and employees do not use material inside information in connection 
with any decision or recommendation to purchase or sell any security.”364 Banks create 
Chinese Walls to isolate common trust fund managers from their commercial banking 
 
362 Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
363 In the Matter of Deutsche Asset Management, Inc., 2003 SEC LEXIS 1977 (S.E.C. Aug. 19, 2003). 
364 12 C.F.R. § 9.5. 
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colleagues activities. There apparently have been few leaks through those walls, but the 
financial analysts scandals exposed by Eliot Spitzer evidenced that the Chinese Walls 
employed by the SEC that separated the analysts and the investment bankers at broker-
dealers were quite porous.365 
V
PENSION FUNDS 
 
Private Pension Funds  
Related to the common trust fund are collective investment funds that manage 
pension plan assets. Private sector pension funds in America trace their beginning to a 
retirement plan created 1875 by the American Express Co. for its employees. Thereafter, 
some large railroad companies, such as the B&O Railroad began offering pension plans 
that included both employer and employee contributions. By 1905, about one-third of 
railroad employees in the country were participating in pension schemes.366 The Illinois 
Railroad allowed its employees to buy the company’s stock. The Proctor & Gamble Co. 
created a profit sharing plan for its employees in 1886.367 Nearly 200 companies were 
offering employee pensions as the 1920s began. They were holding almost $90 million in 
assets to support those obligations.368 The number of pension plans doubled in the next 
few years after the Revenue Act of 1921 exempted employer contributions to pension 
 
365 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 
406-416 (2006) (describing analysts’ conflicts with investment banking activities of their firms). 
366 In future decades, railroad employees were covered by the Railroad Retirement System Act 
administered by the Railroad Retirement Board. 45 U.S.C. § § 231 et seq.
367 I Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From Christopher Columbus to the 
Robber Barons (1492-1900)  325-326 (2002).   
368 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 90 (2002). 
79
plans from taxation. By the middle of the 1920s, some 4 million workers were covered by 
pension plans.369 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 excluded from its reach “employees stock 
bonus, pension, or profit sharing plans” that met certain provisions in the Internal 
Revenue Code.370 This spurred further growth. By 1950, the number of pension plans had 
expanded to 2,000, holding about $8 billion in assets. By the end of that decade, 14 
million employees were participating in pension plans that were holding assets valued at 
$22 billion.371 The growth of the labor movement resulted in increased demands for 
pensions. In particular, John L. Lewis, the head of the United Mine Workers of America 
fought for and succeeded in creating a broad pension scheme in the coal industry. In 
1947, the Taft-Hartley Act allowed the creation of union pension funds jointly managed 
by the unions and contributing employers.372 
Pension fund growth accelerated in the 1960s, adding assets at a rate exceeding 
$3.5 billion per year. Early pension plans had largely invested their assets in corporate 
bonds, but by the 1960s many plans were investing in common stock after General 
Motors announced that it would be making such investments for company pension plans. 
In 1970, collective investment trust funds maintained by a bank for the collective 
management of pension funds were excluded from the provisions of the Investment 
 
369 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 124 (2002). 
370 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(11). 
371 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 318 (2002). 
372 29 U.S.C. § 186(c). See generally Stephen Fogdall, Exclusive Union Control of Pension Funds Taft-
Hartley's Ill-Considered Prohibition, 4 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 215 (2001) (describing such plans). The 
union pensions were sometimes abused as demonstrated by the conviction of Jimmy Hoffa, the head of the 
Teamsters in the 1960s, for pension fund fraud. Labor Racketeering: The Mafia and the Unions, 30 Crime 
& Just. 229, 236 (2003).  
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Company Act of 1940.373 Banks were then being used to serve as professional managers 
of some pension funds. Morgan Guaranty Co. had $9 billion in pension funds under 
management in 1968.374 By 1982, banks and other professional advisers were managing 
about one half of the pension fund assets that totaled almost $570 billion. Pension plans 
were then holding about 20 percent of publicly traded securities.375 
Management of defined benefit plans376 were subjected to regulation under the 
provisions of Employment Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 (“ERISA”).377 That 
statute was passed in response to the failure of the Studebaker Corp. an automobile 
company that failed and left 4,000 employees with unfunded benefits. ERISA created the 
Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) to insure the “vested” rights of 
workers participating in defined benefit plans from such failures.378 ERISA also imposed 
 
373 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(11). 
374 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 357 (2002). 
375 III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the 
Internet (1970-2001) 98 (2002).   
376 Pension plans are broadly broken down into two categories; “defined benefit” and “defined 
contribution” plans”: 
In the often opaque morass of pension terminology, the distinction between defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans is surprisingly clear. A defined benefit pension, as its name implies, 
specifies an output for the participant. Traditionally, such plans defined benefits for particular 
employees based on the employees' respective salary histories and their periods of employment. 
Thus, for example, a prototypical defined benefit formula specifies that a participant is entitled at 
retirement to an annual income equal to a percentage of her average salary times the number of 
years of her employment with the sponsoring employer.  
 
In contrast, a defined contribution arrangement, as its equally apt moniker indicates, specifies an 
input for the participant. Commonly, the plan defines the employer's contribution for each 
participant as a percentage of the participant's salary for that year. Having made that contribution, 
the employer's obligation to fund is over because the employee is not guaranteed a particular 
benefit, just a specified input. In a defined contribution context, the participant's ultimate 
economic entitlement is the amount to which the defined contributions for her, plus earnings, grow 
or shrink.  
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J. 451, 455 (2004) (footnotes 
omitted). 
377 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.
378 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (“ERISA protects employee pension and other 
benefits by providing insurance” for vested pension rights); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980) (describing insurance program administered by PBGC). The PBGC insured up 
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some incredibly complex regulations on the activities of plan administrators and 
fiduciaries, including record keeping requirements, disclosure obligations, investment 
standards and conflict of interest regulations.379 
Among other things, the common law of trusts was engrafted by ERISA onto the 
requirements imposed on plan fiduciaries, which included the fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care (prudence).380 The statute adopted the prudent man standard for investment 
decisions made by plan fiduciaries.381 The Secretary of Labor, who was given 
administrative authority over the application of ERISA, adopted regulations that 
recognized modern portfolio theory that assess portfolio performance on an overall basis, 
rather than the common law standard that examined each investment for prudence.382 
ERISA proved to be a costly failure. The liabilities imposed on the PBGC became 
massive in the early (some $4 billion) and the Retirement Protection Act of 1994383 was 
passed to shore up the PBGC and provide greater supervision over under funded plans.384 
That had a positive effect for a time, but the market downturn in 2000 increased 
 
to $47,659 per year per worker for under funded defined benefits. That amount was sufficient to insure all 
of the benefits claimed by 90 percent of workers in under funded pensions. www.pbgc.gov (visited on 
January 25, 2006).   
379 Mertens v. Hewitt  Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 251-252 (1993). 
380 Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 
570 (1985). 
381 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(B). 
382 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(2). However, the scope of investment discretion by a plan fiduciary may be 
limited by the terms of  the plan. 29 U.S.C. § §1104(a)(1)(d). Applying modern portfolio theory, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled in Laborers National Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 
313 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 967 (1999) that the purchase of high risk “interest only” payments 
stripped from mortgage pools was not an imprudent investment and in accordance with that plan’s 
investment guidelines. The standard of performance for plan fiduciaries is thus process based. The courts 
will look for whether the investment was permitted by modern portfolio theory and that it was in 
accordance with the plan’s guidelines. The courts then consider whether due care was used in selecting the 
investment. If those tests are met, no liability will lie even if the investment selected generated large losses. 
Laborers National Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., supra, 73 F.3d 313; 
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); and 
Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).     
383 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
384 Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials 932-933 (2004). 
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liabilities. By the end of 2005, PBGC had a $23 billion negative position and the total 
funding gap for liabilities from private sector pensions was estimated to be $450 
billion.385 The costs and liabilities imposed by ERISA on defined benefit plans led to 
their abandonment by many employers.  
Several large corporations tried to establish “cash balance” plans that were 
designed to reduce those liabilities and costs.386 However, those plans were successfully 
challenged in the courts, and they too are now being dropped by employers.387 After its 
cash balance plan was held to violate age discrimination laws,388 IBM announced on 
January 6, 2005 that it was freezing its cash balance pensions and turning to Section 
401(k) defined contribution accounts.389 Even before that action, almost 10 percent of 
existing defined benefit plans had frozen participation in their defined benefit plans.390 
385 Remarks by Bradley D. Belt, Executive Director PBGC, to the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Wash. D.C., Dec. 12, 2005. Congress was considering legislation in 2006 to once again 
rescue the PBGC from its own bankruptcy. Michael Schroeder, Congress Seeks to Rein in Special 
Executive Pensions, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 2006, at A1. 
386 Barry Kozak, The Cash Balance Plan: An Integral Component of the Defined Benefit Plan Renaissance, 
37 John Marshall L. Rev. 753 (2004) (describing growth of cash balance plans). One court defined a cash 
balance plan as: 
a defined benefit plan rather than a defined contribution plan, but resembles the latter. The 
ordinary defined benefit plan entitles the employee to a pension equal to a specified percentage of 
his salary in the final year or years of his employment. The plan might provide for example that he 
was entitled to receive 1.5 percent of his final year's salary multiplied by the number of years that 
he had been employed by the company, so that if he had been employed for 30 years his annual 
pension would be 45 percent of his final salary. A cash balance plan, in contrast, entitles the  
employee to a pension equal to (1) a percentage of his salary every year that he is employed (5 
percent, in the case of the Xerox plan) plus (2) annual interest on the ‘balance’ created by each 
yearly ‘contribution’ of a percentage of the salary to the employee’s ‘account,’ at a specified 
interest rate that in the Xerox plan is the average one-year Treasury bill rate for the prior year plus 
1 percent. These annual increments of interest are called future interest credits. 
Berger v. Xerox Corp. Retirement Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003). See also, Edward 
Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 Va. Tax Rev. 683 (2000) (describing operations of cash 
balance plans.). 
387 See e.g., Berger v. Xerox Corp. Retirement Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(benefits under cash balance plan computed wrongly). 
388 Cooper v. IBM Personal Benefit Plan, 274 F. Supp.2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003). 
389 Mary Williams Walsh, I.B.M. to Freeze Pension Plans To Trim Costs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2006, § A at 
1. 
390 www.pbgc.gov (visited on January 25, 2006).   
83
Large companies in the automobile and airline industries were also seeking to reduce 
retirement and other defined benefits that were bankrupting those industries.391 
Defined Contribution Plans 
Starting in 1962 with legislation allowing private retirement accounts for the self 
employed, Congress has been continually adding legislation encouraging individual tax-
advantaged retirement and savings accounts that are self-directed by the employee. Those 
plans include Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”) created by ERISA, Simplified 
Employee Pension Plans (“SEP” accounts), Money Purchase Plans, Target Benefit Plans, 
Roth Accounts, Section 401(k) Plans and so- called “Education IRAs” (that include 529 
Plans and Coverdell Accounts).392 These plans proved to be popular with employees and 
became the pension plan of choice for many employers. The number of defined benefit 
plans dropped by 60 percent between 1979 and 1999 while the number of participants in 
defined contribution plans more than doubled between 1980 and 2000.393 “Indeed, 
between 1984 and 1993 alone, defined contribution plans have grown by almost 
900%.”394 By 2003, individual retirement accounts were holding a total of $3 trillion in 
assets.395 
391 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 
544 (2006) 
392 Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials 945-947 (2004). 
393 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 
103 (2006).  
394 Kathleen H. Czarney Note: The Future of American’s Pensions: Revamping Pension Fund Asset 
Allocation to Combat the Pension Fund Guaranty Corporation’s Deficit, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 153, 169 
(2004). 
395 Sarah Holden et al., The Individual Retirement Account at Age 30: A Retrospective, 11 Investment 
Company Institute Perspective, at 1 (Feb. 2005). 
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Defined contribution plans are only lightly regulated under EIRSA396 because, for 
the most part, they are self-directed, which eliminates concern with conflicts of interest 
on the part of a plan adviser.397 Indeed, ERISA has even blocked employers from 
providing investment advice on employee choices for their Section 401(k) accounts, but 
proposed legislation that would allow such advice has caused much controversy.398 There 
are in fact  some dangers in employer promoted investments as illustrated by the losses in 
employee Section 401(k) retirement accounts at the Enron Corp. when that company 
collapsed. The holdings of employees there were heavily concentrated in Enron stock that 
became worthless when Enron became bankrupt.399 Such concentration was a risky 
investment strategy but was widespread in other companies and sometimes generated 
huge gains as in the case of Microsoft where over 20,000 employees became millionaires 
as the result of investments in that company’s stock.400 Professional management would 
undoubtedly introduce greater diversification into individual retirement accounts, 
 
396 Icia H. Munnell & Annika Sunden, Coming Up Short: The Challenge of 401(k) Plans 9 (2004) (the main 
thrust of ERISA is defined benefit plans). 
397 As has been noted: 
Under ERISA section 404(c), if a defined contribution plan permits each employee to direct the 
investment of the funds in his own account, the plan’s trustee bears no liability to the employee for 
investments, on the apparent assumption that the employee is deciding for himself. Such 
participant direction of plan investments is not feasible in the defined benefit context because the 
defined benefit participant has no discrete subset of assets earmarked to him that he can manage 
for himself. Rather, the defined benefit participant has a claim for future benefits against the 
totality of a common fund. 
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J. 451, 479 (2004) (footnote 
omitted). 
398 Jennifer Levitz, Congress is Split on 401(k) Advisers, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at D2. 
399 As has been noted: 
. . . ERISA established a strict numerical limit on the amount of the sponsoring employer's stock 
that may be held for a defined benefit plan, capping such stock holdings at ten percent of total plan 
assets. In contrast, ERISA enacted no such numerical limit on the employer stock held for 
individual account plans. As l’affaire Enron demonstrated, many employers grasped this 
difference, established defined contribution plans, and loaded them with quantities of employer 
stock that would not have been permitted for defined benefit plans.  
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J. 451, 479-480 (2004) (footnotes 
omitted). 
400 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 
102-107 (2006).  
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lessening losses such as those experienced at Enron and reducing gains such as those 
realized at Microsoft.401 
The problems at Enron have given rise to concerns that employees do not have 
sufficient sophistication to manage their own financial affairs. There is “a substantial 
consensus that many (perhaps most) employees in self-directed defined contribution 
arrangements are poor investors, regardless of how much is spent educating and advising 
them.”402 That consensus concern may be unwarranted.403 Most American households 
(almost 70 percent) own their own homes and automobiles and are otherwise capable of 
handling their own finances.404 Moreover most stock (85 percent as the new century 
began) was held through mutual fund shares, thereby providing at least some degree of 
professional management once the employee sets his or her investment goals.405 
Nevertheless, the need for professional management of defined contribution plans led to 
some collective investment mechanisms for self-directed retirement plans.  
In 1986, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in Investment Company 
Institute v. Conover,406 that national banks could be authorized by the OCC to manage 
individual IRA accounts through a common trust fund. That decision was followed by 
 
401 Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four Truths of Personal Social Security Accounts: Evidence From 
the World of 401(k) Plans, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 901, 950 (2003).   
402 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J. 451, 459 (2004) (footnote 
omitted). See also Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 
401(k) Plan Participants to Make Their Own Decision, 11 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 361 (2002) (asserting 
that protection is needed). 
403 Nevertheless, the lack of financial education in American schools is appalling. Foreign languages that, 
while enlightening, will never be used by most students and are given higher priority than financial matters 
that are vital to everyone. Consequently, most financial learning is self-taught. Investor education was 
sought to be encouraged by Congress through the Savings are Vital to Everyone Retirement Act of 1997, 
29 U.S.C. § 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-47. 
404 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 
522-523, 546 (2006). 
405 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 4 
(2006). 
406 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986). 
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other circuits.407 The OCC has also adopted a regulation to govern the operation of 
collective investment funds.408 That regulation requires a written plan by the bank 
governing the operation of such funds, as well as audits and financial reports.409 Certain 
conflicts of interests are prohibited and management fees are required to be reasonable. 
The SEC has been struggling for some time in separating the roles of broker-dealers in 
providing investment advice to their customer in connection with brokerage activities and 
as acting as advisers in more formal financial planning roles, as for example in retirement 
planning. The SEC ultimately adopted a rule requiring separate investment adviser 
regulation where fees are charged specifically for investment advice and not as a part of 
execution activities.410 
Government Pension Plans 
Another collective investment involves government pension plans. The federal 
government first entered the pension forum on a large scale basis after the Civil War.411 
The Civil Service Retirement System was created in 1920 for federal employees. It was 
 
407 See Curtis J. Polk, Banking and Securities Law: The Glass Steagall Act-Has It Outlived Its Usefulness? 
55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 812 (1987). 
408 12 C.F.R. § 9.18. 
409 Id. The written plan must contain the following: 
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(vii) Expected frequency for income distribution to participating accounts; 
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12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b). 
410 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (April 19, 2005). 
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followed by a pension plan for Federal Reserve Board employees in 1924.412 The Civil 
Service Retirement System was a defined plan that ultimately proved to be too expensive 
for even the federal government and was privatized in the 1980s. Civil service employees 
were then shunted into a defined contribution program with a fairly wide and 
sophisticated choice of investment funds.413 There are some 3 million federal government 
employees covered by this plan.414 The federal government also manages the Social 
Security System. That collective investment program operates much like a Ponzi scheme 
and is heading toward bankruptcy, making it a poor model for other collective 
investments.415 
State and municipal pension plans hold large amounts of funds for collective 
investment for the defined benefit plans they operate. The first of those funds was the 
New York City pension fund for policemen that was created in 1857.416 In recent years, 
many state pension funds have become corporate governance gadflies, using their large 
 
412 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 124 (2002). 
413 As noted elsewhere: 
This retirement program is called the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. It is managed by a Federal 
Retirement Thrift Investment Board that is composed of three members appointed by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate and in consultation with certain House leaders for two of 
those appointments. (1988). The Board is advised on investment policy by an Employee Thrift 
Advisory Council composed of fourteen representatives of employee organizations. An Executive 
Director is given overall responsibility for implementing investment policy, and the Board is 
barred from interfering with specific investment decisions of the Executive Director. Fiduciary 
duties are imposed on the Executive Director and to private sector advisers investing funds.  
Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 747, 807, n. 3187 (2001) (citations 
omitted). Civil Service employees may contribute up to a maximum of $10,000 of pretax earnings to the 
Federal Thrift Savings Plan, and the federal government makes matching contributions of up to 5 percent. 
Arthur Andersen, Financial Statements of the Thrift Savings Fund - 1999 and 1998 at 3 (Mar. 2, 2000). 
414 Note & Commentary, Keeping the Promise: Will the Bush Administration's Plan to Privatize the Social 
Security System Actually Work? 11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 433, 451 (2004 / 2005). 
415 Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 747, 756, n. 48 (2001). 
416 I Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From Christopher Columbus to the 
Robber Barons (1492-1900) 325 (2002).   
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equity holdings to demand governance reforms by publicly traded companies.417 As noted 
by one court, the New York City Employees’ Retirement System uses its shareholder 
status as a “bully pulpit.”418 The most prominent of those institutions is the California 
Public Employee Retirement System (“Calpers”). Their demands on corporate 
management are sometimes conflicted, as when Calpers used its status as a shareholder of 
the Safeway grocery store train to try and aid a strike of a union that had been headed by 
the Calpers president.419 
These institutions have also become professional plaintiffs under the federal 
securities laws, suing every public corporation that has a financial problem. Institutional 
investors were given preferred plaintiff standing in class action lawsuits under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1999 (“PSLRA”).420 These lawsuits are billed as 
reform efforts but are really an effort to increase the pension plans returns over what 
would be received from a diversified portfolio under modern portfolio theory.421 In any 
event, the managers of those plans, which are often controlled by union officials or state 
functionaries, have proved to be less than successful in their management. One estimate 
concludes that the total under funding for all state pension funds may be as high as $460 
billion.422 The West Virginia Teachers Retirement System is under funded by 78 percent. 
 
417 See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018 (1998) (asserting that this phenomenon is useful). 
418 New York City Employees’ Retirement System v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
419 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 
644 (2006). 
420 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5 (2000)). 
421 One study concluded that pension plans were being over-compensated in these lawsuits because of their 
diversification and that small undiversified investors were being under-compensated. Kenneth M. Lehn, 
“Private Insecurities,” Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16. 
422 Roger Lowenstein, The End of Pensions, N.Y. Times Magazine, Oct. 30, 2005, at 56, 70. 
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The Illinois pension system is under funded by $38 billion.423 These losses suggest that 
this is not a collective investment management system that should be emulated.424 
TIAA-CREF 
The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (“TIAA”) was founded 1918 by 
the Carnegie Foundation as a means to provide annuities to teachers. It was managed like 
an insurance company in investing reserves. Subsequently the College Retirement Equity 
Fund (“CREF”) was created as a means for teachers to invest in equities and operates as a 
defined contribution plan that operates like a mutual fund. The two now act as a 
combined entity (“TIAA-CREF”).425 In 1997, TIAA-CREF was holding the pension 
funds of some 1.5 million educators and had total assets of $125 billion.426 By 2004, 
those numbers had grown to over 2 million covered employees and assets of $340 billion, 
making it one of the largest retirement plans in the world.427 Almost all TIAA-CREF 
accounts are defined contribution plans that provide participants with a number of 
 
423 Id. at 63. 
424 Reform efforts have commenced in the form of proposed uniform state legislation for state end 
municipal pension funds: 
In July, 1997, the Uniform Law Commissioners approved the final text of an Act designed to 
bring uniformity to some aspects of public pension fund management. The Uniform Management 
of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act (‘UMPERS Act’) contains a tightly interconnected 
set of reforms focused on two important aspects of pension fund management, fiduciary duties, 
and disclosure obligations. First, the Act articulates the fiduciary duties of those who control 
public pension systems. These duties apply in all areas, but particularly in the areas of investment 
and financial management. In this regard, the impetus for the Act was the set of profound changes 
that have occurred in our understanding of the investment process during the past generation. This 
knowledge is generally called ‘modern portfolio theory’ (‘MPT’). The UMPERS Act follows in 
the path of other Uniform Law Commission products and other revisions elsewhere in the law that 
are designed to permit and encourage the use of MPT. 
Steven L. Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement 
Systems Act, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 141, 143-144 (1998). 
425 II Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional 
Investor (1900-1970) 90 (2002). 
426 III Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, From the Age of Derivatives to the 
Internet (1970-2001) 319-320 (2002).   
427 TIAA-CREF Annual Report 2004, at 1. 
90
investment choices in the equivalent of mutual funds. Those funds are managed in-house 
by TIAA-CREF.428 
TIAA-CREF performance record shows a 4.5 percent return on its retirement 
annuities for 2005, with a five year average return of 6.4 percent. Its supplemental 
retirement annuities showed a lower 4 percent return in 2005 with a five year average of 
5.9 percent.429 TIAA-CREF lost its tax exempt charitable status in 1997, but continues to 
manage retirement assets for teachers.430 TIAA-CREF claims low costs in its 
management of teacher retirement funds and has developed a squeaky clean image, 
supporting social investing and good corporate governance.431 
Endowments and Charitable Foundations 
Another collective investment of no small size is the endowments funds managed 
by universities, charities and not-for-profit organizations such as ballets, symphony 
orchestras and think tanks. Harvard University’s endowment fund, the largest, reached 
 
428 The TIAA-CREF website asserts that: 
TIAA-CREF has developed a uniform investment approach for its stock accounts (except for those 
which are fully indexed or use social screens). Its Dual Investment Management Strategy®
integrates two equity management techniques: Active Managers select specific stocks that they 
believe represent more potential for growth, while Quantitative Managers build an overall 
portfolio designed to reflect the basic financial and risk characteristics of the fund's benchmark 
index. Quantitative Managers may also attempt to boost performance by slightly varying the 
amount of certain holdings versus the index, based on proprietary scoring models designed to 
identify over- and underperforming stocks. The Dual Investment Management StrategySM seeks to 
achieve higher returns over each Fund's benchmark index, while attempting to maintain a risk 
profile for each Fund similar to its benchmark index. 
http://www.tiaa-cref.org/finance/our_philosophy.html (visited Feb. 3, 2006).. 
429 http://www.tiaa-cref.org/charts/ra-performance.html (visited Feb. 3, 2006). 
430 Evelyn Brody,” Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty,” 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 873, 
947 (1997). 
431 It has, however, encountered a corporate governance scandal of its own. TIAA-CREF’s chief executive 
officer, Herbert M. Allison, Jr., who was being paid a generous $9 million per year, failed to inform the 
TIAA-CREF board of a business arrangement between two TIAA-CREF trustees and the TIAA-CREF 
auditor, Ernst & Young, to jointly market a method for expensing employee stock options in order to 
comply with accounting changes made in the wake of the Enron scandal. That arrangement was a violation 
of the SEC’s auditor independence requirements. The two trustees resigned at the demand of the SEC staff. 
Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 641 
(2006). 
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$25.47 billion in 2005.432 The top ten university endowments totaled over $100 billion.433 
Total university and college endowments exceeded $300 billion. A survey of 746 higher 
education endowment funds showed an average return of 9.3 percent in 2005, with a five 
year average of 3.3 percent and a ten year average of 9.3 percent.434 The university 
endowments with over $1 billion did much better than those averages. Harvard had a 
return of 19.2 percent in 2005 and an average return over the prior ten year period of 16.1 
percent. Yale’s numbers for those periods respectively were 22.3 percent and 17.4 
percent.435 The average hedge fund returned only 7.61 percent in 2005 and had a five 
year average of 7.94 percent.436 
Those returns reflect the fact that endowment funds are often aggressively 
managed. Such risk oriented investment strategies were made possible by uniform state 
legislation adopted by many states that allows the use of modern portfolio theory in 
endowment and other charitable investments.437 The Harvard endowment was managed 
 
432 Yale University has the second largest endowment, which totals $15.2 billion. Jason Singer, “Ivy Leave: 
Yale Parts Ways With Hedge Fund,” Wall St. J., March 29, 2006, at C1.   
433 John Hechinger, Venture Capital Bets Swell Stanford’s Endowment, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 2006, at A1. 
434 http://www.nacubo.org/x7616.xml (visited on Feb. 3, 2006). 
435 John Hechinger, Venture Capital Bets Swell Stanford’s Endowment, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 2006, at A1, 
A10. Yale was choking on risk in one herdge fund. The university removed $500 million from the 
Children’s Investment Fund Management (U.K.) LLP after it doubled investor’s monies. Jason Singer, “Ivy 
Leave: Yale Parts Ways With Hedge Fund,” Wall St. J., March 29, 2006, at C1.  
436 Stephen Schurr, Hedge Funds Expect Spark of Volatility, Financial Times (London), Feb. 2, 2006, at 22.  
437 As one author has noted: 
Before the 1960s, educational endowment managers were extremely conservative in their 
investment strategies. During the 1960s and into the latter half of that decade, there was a large 
amount of controversy between endowment investment officers over the appropriate level of risk-
taking when investing their endowment funds. Specifically, many endowment officers felt that 
investing in capital markets for capital appreciation would allow endowments to maximize their 
returns. These endowment managers believed that investing to produce larger income growth at 
the expense of stability in that income was better than their current system of investing to preserve 
the purchasing power of the endowment. In response to this movement, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Management of Institutional 
Funds Act (UMIFA) in 1972. The creation of the UMIFA helped solve this controversy and other 
problems plaguing endowment management. Among these other problems, the UMIFA set 
guidelines on the delegation of investment authority, the trustees’ authority and responsibility for 
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much like a hedge fund by Jack Meyer who left after a compensation dispute and started 
his own hedge fund.438 In 2005, Stanford had 50 percent of its funds invested in private 
and equities, 16 percent in real estate and only 12 percent in fixed income instruments. 
Investments by university endowments grew to include junk bonds, venture capital 
startups and exotic derivative instruments.439 In one instance, the Class of 1960 Trust 
settled by members of that graduating class for the benefit of Harvard was using 
companies it created to securitize airline travel credit card receivables.440 
Risk and diversification did lead to large drops in the value of many endowment 
fund assets when the market bubble burst in 2000.441 Nevertheless, the investment 
policies of endowments and other charitable trusts have received little regulatory 
attention.442 Rather, the principal concern raised with their operations has centered on 
their spending programs.443 For example, massive litigation is under way at Princeton 
where donors are challenging the use of endowment funds.444 A matter of larger concern 
 
the management of an endowment, and the use of the total return concept in investing endowment 
funds 
Jason R. Job, “The Down Market and University Endowments: How the Prudent Investor Standard in the 
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act Does Not Yield Prudent Results,” 66 Ohio St. L.J. 569, 
574 (2005) (footnotes omitted). See generally J. Peter Williamson, Background Paper, in Funds For the 
Future: Report of The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on College and University Endowment Policy 
97-98 (1975) (describing earlier endowment investment policies). 
438 Stephen Schurr, “Former Harvard Manager’s Investment Fund Raises $5bn,” Financial Times (London), 
Feb. 3, 2003, at 13. 
439 John Hechinger, “Venture Capital Bets Swell Stanford’s Endowment,” Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 2006, at A1. 
440 Letter from Marc Weitzen to SEC Office of Chief Counsel, division of Investment Management, Aug. 8, 
1986. 
441 Jason R. Job, “The Down Market and University Endowments: How the Prudent Investor Standard in 
the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act Does Not Yield Prudent Results,” 66 Ohio St. L.J. 569 
(2005) 
442 For a description of the growth of charitable foundations and their regulation see Evelyn Brody, 
Institutional Dissonance in the NonProfit Sector, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 433 (1996).  
443 One scandal involved the use by the Red Cross and the United Way of donations made in the wake of 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to unrelated causes. Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of 
Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, From Enron to Reform 46 (2006).   
444 John Hechinger & Daniel Golden, Poisoned Ivy, Lawsuit Alleges Princeton Misused a Family’s Big 
Gift, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at A1. 
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has been whether the endowment funds are being spent fast enough. Many endowments 
limit such expenditures to assure their perpetuity.445 
Federal tax law has sought to curb some abuses by charitable foundations, 
particularly with respect to self-dealing transactions.446 There are few corporate 
governance requirements placed on endowments and foundations.447 However, New 
York Attorney General Spitzer has prepared a booklet for charitable foundations that 
advocates a broad number of corporate governance requirements including internal 
controls, audit committees composed of outside directors, independent accountants, codes 
of ethics and conflict of interest policies.448 Spitzer also became a champion for not-for-
profit organizations, even suing Richard Grasso, the retiring head of the New York Stock 
Exchange for receiving excessive compensation.449 
445 In that regard:: 
 
Jack Meyer, the president of the Harvard Management Company, asserts: ‘We have to keep pace 
with or outperform the growth in university expenses each year, and in addition disburse between 
4.5 and 5 percent of the fund's capital value each year.’ Under such a strategy, Harvard spent $322 
million from its endowment in the year ended June 30, 1996, during which time it earned $1.8 
billion. The amount of Harvard’s unspent endowment return could just about have covered its total 
annual budget of $1.5 billion! 
Evelyn Brody, “Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty,” 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 873, 933 
(1997). 
446 As one author notes: 
For example, prior to the enactment of minor reforms in 1950 and more significant ones in 1969, 
private foundations were free to make asset purchases from and sales to a donor, the donor’s 
family members, and the donor’s controlled corporations; they could accumulate income in the 
discretion of their trustees, thereby deferring indefinitely the distribution of any value to charitable 
ends; and they could operate businesses, sometimes on terms that were thought to provide an 
unfair advantage over competing firms that were organized as profit-seeking entities. 
 Richard Schmalbeck, “Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limitations,” 58 Tax L. Rev. 59, 60 
(2004). 
447 See generally Evelyn Brody, “Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to do with It?” 80 Chi.-Kent. 
L. Rev. 641 (2005) (describing charitable trust governance). 
448 Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Attorney General, Internal Controls and Financial Accountability for Not-For-Profit 
Boards (Jan. 2005), found at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/internal_controls.pdf. 
449 Grasso had been paid a retirement package of $187.5 million. The New York Stock Exchange 
subsequently became a for profit corporation, which meant that any recovery would go to the immensely 
wealthy members of the exchange. Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate 
Scandals, From Enron to Reform, 498, 505 (2006).  An earlier scandal of a similar ilk involved William 
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VI 
INSURANCE COMPANY RESERVES 
 
Background 
Insurance companies keep massive amounts of reserves to meet probable losses 
from their insured risks.450 Those funds are managed collectively by the individual 
insurance companies for investment returns. For historical reasons, those reserves are 
subject to state, rather than federal, regulation. Massachusetts required such reserves in 
1837, which called an “unearned premium fund.”451 New York imposed a similar 
requirement in 1853. That regulation spread to other states, but not to the federal 
government because the Supreme Court ruled in 1868 that insurance was not interstate 
commerce and could be regulated by the states as if it were an entirely local business.452 
The insurance business increased by almost 600 percent between 1870 and 1905. 
That growth led to criticism from Louis D. Brandeis who stated in 1905 that insurance 
companies were “the greatest economic menace of today” and that as “creditors of [the] 
 
Aramony, president of the United Way of America, who was jailed in the 1990s for fraud and income tax 
violations after it was revealed that he was receiving a salary of $463,000 and flying on the Concorde. see 
Evelyn Brody, “Institutional Dissonance in the NonProfit Sector,” 41 Vill. L. Rev. 433, 454-455 (1996).          
450 As the Supreme Court has noted: 
The term ‘reserve’ or ‘reserves’ has a special meaning in the law of insurance. In general it means 
a sum of money, variously computed or estimated, which with accretions from interest, is set 
aside, ‘reserved,’ as a fund with which to mature or liquidate, either by payment or reinsurance 
with other companies, future unaccrued and contingent claims, and claims accrued, but contingent 
and indefinite as to amount or time of payment. Reserves are held not only as security for the 
payment of claims but also as funds from which payments are to be made. The amount ‘reserved’ 
in any given year may be greater than is necessary for the required purposes, or it may be less than 
is necessary for the required purposes, or it may be less than is necessary, but the fact that it is less 
in one year than in the preceding year does not necessarily show either that too much or too little 
was reserved for the former year--it simply shows that the aggregate reserve requirement for the 
second year is less than for the first, and this may be due to various causes. 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 342 (1920). 
451 Id.
452 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868). 
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great industries,” they used their power “selfishly, dishonestly [and] inefficiently.”453 
Brandeis's criticism was supported by a scandal at the Equitable Life Assurance 
Company where its leader, James Hyde’s, extravagant spending in New York society led 
to an investigation by the insurance industry by the New York Superintendent of 
Insurance. The Superintendent was concerned that Hyde was using the company’s 
reserves to sustain his flamboyant lifestyle. The New York legislature also appointed an 
investigating committee headed by Senator William W. Armstrong. Among other things, 
the Armstrong Committee expressed concern with the fact that insurance company 
reserves were increasingly being invested in the stocks. Before 1890, life insurance 
companies had only small equity holdings, about 2 percent, but that profile changed 
quickly as the amount of equity holdings increased. The Armstrong Committee viewed 
this to be a speculative and dangerous practice and recommended the prohibition of 
insurance companies’ investment in stocks. The New York legislature, thereafter, 
restricted the ability of insurance companies to invest in common stocks.454 
Because insurance companies were forced out of common stock investments, they 
were able to avoid the excesses of the 1920s and escaped federal regulation. An effort 
was made to impose such regulation during a study by the Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC), which was studying the concentration of wealth in America just 
 
453 Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, “Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,” 25 J. Corp. L. 723, 725-726 (2000).  The insurance companies were then financial giants: 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the largest American financial institutions were not 
banks, which today have aggregate assets far exceeding any other type of financial institution, but 
insurance companies. Insurers were larger than banks by not just a hair; the largest insurance 
companies were twice as large and were already moving into adjacent financial areas. They were 
underwriting securities. They were buying bank stock and controlling large banks. They were 
assembling securities portfolios with the power to control other companies. The three largest 
insurers were fast growing and on the verge of becoming huge financial supermarkets. 
Mark J. Roe, “Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry,” 93 
Colum. L. Rev. 639 (1993). 
454 Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, “Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,” 25 J. Corp. L. 723, 729-730 (2000). 
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before World War II. The insurance companies caught that committee’s attention, and the 
SEC joined in with a proposal for federal regulation of that industry. However, both the 
Democratic and Republican Party platforms had pledged that supervision of insurance 
companies would be left to the states, and the SEC proposal was rejected.455 
TNEC did express concern with the enormous size of life insurance reserves, 
which had grown by over eight hundred percent between 1906 and 1938. TNEC asserted 
that the “investment policies and practices of the legal reserve life insurance companies 
admittedly influence practically every phase of this country’s economic life.”456 Another 
concern was that these reserves were largely concentrated in fixed income instruments, 
rather than equities. TNEC believed this was “in effect sterilizing the savings funds 
received and preventing them from flowing into new enterprises or undertakings where 
the element of venture or risk is present. Thus the small businessman or average 
industrialist is denied access to this more important capital reservoir.”457 In addition, the 
demand for bonds was causing companies to issue more debt, thereby unbalancing debt-
to-equity ratios and reducing interest rate returns. TNEC wanted more equity 
investments, a reversal of the Armstrong Committee’s efforts. Insurance companies, 
however, successfully argued that their avoidance of equity investments had prevented 
the insurance industry from being devastated by the stock market crash of 1929.458 
The insurance company thus dodged the New Deal bullets of regulation that were 
imposed on other financial services. However, the Supreme Court ruled in 1944 that 
 
455 Id.
456 Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Investigation of Concentration of 
Economic Power, Monograph No. 28, at 378 (GPO 1940). 
457 Id.
458 Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, “Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,” 25 J. Corp. L. 723, 733-734 (2000). 
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insurance companies were subject to the federal antitrust laws.459 Congress responded by 
passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945460 that granted immunity from federal 
antitrust laws to the extent an insurance company was regulated by state law. That picture 
changed a bit after the Supreme Court ruled that securities based variable annuities and 
other variable were securities subject to SEC regulation. Those instruments were created 
to compete with mutual funds that were draining funds away from whole life and annuity 
insurance.461 Variable insurance products shifted the risk of the rate of return to the 
investor based on investments through payment into accounts that operated like mutual 
funds. Those assets had to be held in “separate accounts” that were subject toe SEC 
requirements.462 Otherwise reserve requirements remained with the states, which required 
life insurance companies to maintain reserves “based on the type of contract, age of issue, 
and mortality and interest assumptions involved.”463 
Insurance companies doubled their assets in the ten years following adoption of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Life insurance companies remained the largest single lender 
in the corporate bond market, but they were seeking alternate sources of investment 
including commercial buildings. Investments in common stock increased as state law 
restrictions on such investments were eased.464 Assets of life insurance companies tripled 
between 1945 and 1960 and continued to be invested mostly in fixed income investments, 
often in the form of private debt placements. Insurance companies were managing about 
 
459 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
460 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
461 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. United Benefit 
Life Insurance Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967). 
462 Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964) (describing nature of separate 
accounts). 
463 Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Investigation of Concentration of 
Economic Power, Monograph No. 28, at 5, n.1 (GPO 1940).  
464 Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, “Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,” 25 J. Corp. L. 723, 735-736 (2000). 
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half of all pension fund assets in the 1970s.465 Insurance company assets exceeded $1.75 
trillion in 1988 and increased to $1.182 trillion in 2004. Those investments were heavily 
weighted in favor of fixed income instruments, less than 20 percent were held in 
equities.466 The mix of investments was changing. Mortgage holdings were less than 10 
percent, “the lowest percentage since record keeping began in 1890. In 1998, Kentucky 
and Minnesota allowed life insurers to invest up to twenty percent of their assets in 
common stock. The limit was ten percent in Arkansas, Ohio, and Indiana.”467 New York 
limited the common stock holdings in life insurance company reserves to five percent of 
total assets.468 
Investment programs for insurance company reserves are now affected by capital 
requirements imposed by state insurance regulators. This regulation began In the 1990s 
when the states began to modify their approach to regulation. Those regulators began 
using risk-based capital standards that were determined by a risk assessment of the assets 
held by the insurance company. That effort was in response to a number of insurance 
company failures:  
Between 1969 and 1990, more than 150 property-casualty companies failed. 
Seventy-five of those failures were between 1985 and 1990. . . . . By 1985, 
twenty-one large insurance companies had been liquidated. In 1988, state 
regulators assumed control of thirteen life insurance companies, thirty-two in 
 
465 Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, “Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,” 25 J. Corp. L. 723, 739 (2000). 
466 http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/industry/ (visited on February 13, 2006). 
467 Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, “Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,” 25 J. Corp. L. 723, 741 (2000). 
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1990, and thirty-four in the first nine months of 1991. Insurance company failures 
in the 1980s resulted in losses estimated at $ 10 billion.469 
The adoption of risk based capital requirements had a dramatic effect on the 
corporate governance and structure of many large insurance companies. It placed 
pressure on insurance companies to increase their capital, a task that was difficult for 
many insurance companies because they operated as mutual companies that were owned 
by their policy holders. In order to alleviate that problem, New York adopted legislation 
permitting mutual life insurance companies to convert to stock companies in order to 
allow mutual companies to raise capital by converting to a stock based entity. This idea 
quickly spread and many large mutual companies became conventional shareholder 
owned corporations. For example, the Equitable Life Assurance Society demutualized in 
1992. It was joined five years later by  the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 
company that had operated in a mutual form  for 150 years. Prudential, the largest 
insurance company in the country that was founded a mutual company some 130 years 
earlier, demutalized, as did the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and many 
others.470 
The states provide pervasive regulation over insurance companies. They have 
sought to provide some uniformity in regulation through the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) that was created in 1871. Among other things, 
 
469 Id. at 723, 740.  
In 1988, Congress began hearings to determine whether federal regulation was needed, but no 
legislation resulted. After forty multi-state insurance companies failed in 1992, the Federal 
Insurance Solvency Act (FISA) was introduced. It sought to create a Federal Insurance Solvency 
Commission (FISC) that would establish national standards for financial soundness and solvency 
of insurance companies. The legislation was beaten back by the industry and state insurance 
administrators. that would have created a Federal Insurance Solvency Commission charged with 
setting standards for financial soundness and solvency of insurance companies. That legislation 
was not passed. Id. at 739. 
470 Id. at 723, 745-746. 
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NAIC created a joint reporting and surveillance system for large interstate insurance 
companies.471 As an example of state regulation, insurance companies operating in New 
York are subject to audit by the Superintendent of Insurance472 and must file annual 
audited financial reports with the Superintendent.473 New York statutes set governance 
and voting procedures for mutual companies474 and regulates the conduct of board 
members on insurance companies acting as corporations.475 New York law sets reserve 
requirements; in the case of life insurance those reserves are based on approved mortality 
tables and interest rates.476 New York also has a legal list of investments permitted by 
insurance companies that places limits on the percentage of investments in such things as 
real estate and equities New York has raised limits on investments in equities to a 
maximum of 20 percent of reserve assets.477 
This regulation reflects a view that insurance reserves are a form of trust fund for 
the insured and should be protected from undue risk. The viewpoint is based on an early 
nineteenth century concept that the capital of a corporation is a trust fund for creditors.478 
Such an approach is inconsistent with investors seeking to maximize their returns and 
reflects an earlier era of prudence standards that has largely been replaced by modern 
portfolio theory for other collective investments.479 This restrictive regulation also did not 
 
471 Id. at 723, 739. 
472 NY CLS Ins § 310.   
473 NY CLS Ins § 307.   
474 NY CLS Ins § 1211.   
475 Among other things, New York requires a director to vacate his office if he fails to attend board 
meetings for an eighteen month period. NY CLS Ins § 1215.   
476 NY CLS Ins § 1304.   
477 NY CLS Ins § 1405. New York requires non-U.S. insurers to post collateral with the Superintendent of 
Insurance equal to their gross liabilities. Peter Levene, Handcuffs on ‘Aliens,’ Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 2006, at 
A18.     
478 Wood v. v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (the capital of a corporation “is deemed a 
pledge or trust fund for the payment of debts”).   
479 Risk based capital requirements for insurance companies resulted in a disruption in the hybrid securites 
markets after the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ruled that such instruments were to be 
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prevent scandal in New York. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer thus set off another wave of 
controversy when he began attacking large insurance companies for bid rigging and 
manipulating their accounts to enhance their financial picture and artificially increase 
their reserves. One large firm so targeted, Marsh & McLennan Corp., agreed to pay $850 
million to settle Spitzer’s charges.480 Spitzer also attacked the American International 
Group Inc. and its head, Hank Greenberg, which led to another brawl in the courtroom 
and newspapers over its accounting practices for reserves. The Wall Street Journal 
weighed in with an editorial claiming that business practices attacked by Spitzer were 
normal and customary business practices.481 Once again, the SEC was caught flat-footed 
by Spitzer’s charges that publicly traded companies were manipulating their financial 
statements. It was then forced to join in Spitzer’s actions.482 In the event, after firing 
Greenberg, AIG agreed to pay $1.64 billion to settle charges brought by Spitzer and the 
SEC.483 Four executives were also indicted for their operation of an accounting scheme 
that was alleged to have been used to inflate the reserves of the American International 
Group, Inc. by $500 million.484 
VII 
ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE 
INVESTMENT MECHANISMS 
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Unitary Investment Funds 
There are some alternative collective investment mechanisms available for 
collective investments. One is the unitary investment fund (“UIF”) that is widely 
employed outside the United States. This “is a contract type entity which is not 
independent of its sponsor or manager,” as is the case for the open end mutual fund.485 
The UIF may allow redemption of investments, but “[i]ts design and operation and its 
success or failure is entirely the responsibility of its sponsor-manager.”486 The UIFs have 
an “all in” annual management fees plus transaction costs. “They existed in 1940 and in 
fact were the preferred form in Boston” and were grandfathered by the Investment 
Company Act “with limited corporate democracy imposed by permitting the unit holders 
to remove the trustee by a two-thirds vote.”487 “The benefits of a unitary form are realism 
and the elimination of large amounts of administrative work at the state and federal level 
involved with the corporate governance structure, to say nothing of the internal 
administration and legal work involved.” 488 
In 1978, the SEC staff examined whether the UIF concept was appropriate for 
America. As a part of that study, the use of such entities in England was examined. The 
SEC staff and the Investment Company Institute then sought to draft model legislation 
for UIFs.489 The SEC also sought public comment on the concept in 1982, but “[m]ost 
commentators opposed the UIF, based largely on concerns about the adequacy of investor 
protections for UIF investors and unresolved questions about how the concept work in 
 
485 Stephen K. West, The Investment Company Industry in the 1990s, A Rethinking of the Regulatory 
Structure Appropriate for Investment Companies in the 1990s. 64 (March 1990).   
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practice.”490 That response cooled interest in the UIF for a time but a study conducted for 
the Investment Company Institute by Stephen K. West in 1990 advocated the adoption of 
a UIF structure.491 The SEC staff rejected that recommendation in 1992, concluding that, 
while the UIF approach to fees “generally is sound,” cost savings appeared to be 
“minimal.” The SEC staff further contended that “there is no practical substitute for the 
oversight of boards of directors regarding investment company operations.” 492 The issue 
was revisited in 2005 by the American Enterprise Institute as a part of a series of 
conferences that considered the issue of whether there is a better way to regulate mutual 
funds.493 Stephen West appeared at one of those conferences with a revised proposal that 
would create a UIF with a board of directors.494 
Unit Investment Trusts 
The UIF proposal apparently will not go away. The effort to push it by including a 
board of directors may help gain SEC support but is a board of directors really necessary?   
Such a management form is permitted by the Investment Company Act for unit 
investment trusts (“UITs”). Those entities hold a fixed group of securities in its portfolio 
for investors, providing expertise in the selection of those securities and a degree of 
diversification that reduces default risks. The UIT ownership interests are redeemable but 
 
490 SEC Division of Investment Management, “Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment 
Company Regulation” 282, n. 107 (May 1992).   
491 Stephen K. West, The Investment Company Industry in the 1990s, A Rethinking of the Regulatory 
Structure Appropriate for Investment Companies in the 1990s  (March 1990).   
492 SEC Division of Investment Management, Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company 
Regulation  283 (May 1992) (footnote omitted).   
493 See supra n. -- 
494 Transcript of conference: “Is There a Better Way to Regulate Mutual Funds,” (Sept. 26, 2005) (remarks 
of Stephan K. West) available at http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1149/transcript.asp (visited on 
Feb. 18, 2006). Mr. West also noted that CI Investments Inc., a Canadian mutual fund complex was already 
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usually trade in a secondary market created by its sponsor.495 UITs do not have a board of 
directors or an investment advisor, thereby allowing them to escape most of the onerous 
corporate governance provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Rather, UITs 
are sold under a trust indenture agreement that spells out the rights of the unit holders. 496 
That indenture also defines the obligations of the sponsor and trustee holding the UIT’s 
portfolio securities.497 The Investment Company Act imposes some minimal obligations 
on trustees and sponsors, and it allows the trustee to charge such fees as may be provided 
in the trust indenture agreement.498 
Unlike open end mutual funds, UITs do not trade or manage their portfolios, but 
that distinction should not preclude their use for managed accounts. The fact that 
managed funds have boards of directors did not prevent abuses in the 1920s and did not 
stop the late trading and market timing practices that were the center of the Spitzer 
generated scandals. Indeed, some unit investment trusts were originally formed in the 
1920s because of concerns with abuses by managed investment companies that had 
boards of directors. 499 
Trust Indenture Agreements 
Vast amounts of funds are also invested under a contractual arrangement used for 
corporate bonds that is only lightly regulated, at least as compared to mutual funds. There 
 
495 A third party evaluator is used to price the UIT interests for the sponsor. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. 
Jenner, 10 F. Supp.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 168 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999).  
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are $5 trillion in corporate bonds outstanding.500 Large amounts of that debt are sold as 
“debentures” under “trust indenture agreements” that specify the rights and obligations of 
the debenture holders, the issuer and the trustee that acts as a custodian for principal and 
interest payments. The corporate issuer of those debentures has a board of directors, but 
that board is not there for the protection of corporate debtors. Absent unusual 
circumstances, the fiduciary duties of board members run to equity owners and not 
lenders. A corporate bond “represents a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a debt 
and does not represent an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the 
imposition of a trust relationship with concomitant fiduciary duties.”501 A bond 
bondholder “acquires no equitable interest, and remains a creditor of the corporation 
whose interests are protected by the contractual terms of the indenture.”502 Moreover, 
“[a]n indenture is, of course, a contract. Unless the indenture trustee has deprived the 
debenture holders of a right or benefit specifically provide to them in the indenture, there 
is no violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”503 This also means 
that, “unlike those of an ordinary trustee, the duties of an indenture trustee are generally 
defined by and limited to the terms of the indenture.”504 
There is some federal regulation of corporate bonds. Unless exempted, corporate 
debt offerings to the public must be registered with the SEC under the Securities Act of 
1933, bringing those securities into the SEC’s full disclosure regime. Such offerings are 
also regulated under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.505 The latter statute was the result 
 
500 “What’s News,” Wall St. J., March 3, 2006, at A1.  
501 Simons v. Cogan, 529 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988). 
502 Simons v. Cogan, 529 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988). 
503 Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406 (3d. Cir. 1993). Accord: Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR 
Nabisco Co., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
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of an SEC study in 1936 that found that the indenture trustee was often aligned with the 
issuer and the trustees were often protected from liability through broad exculpatory 
clauses.506 They included “ostrich” clauses that allowed indenture trustees to assume that 
there was no default on the debentures unless it received notice from at least 10 percent 
of the debenture holders who were often widely dispersed and unorganized so that any 
such notice was unlikely.507 “Rather than allow the SEC direct supervision of trustee 
behavior and thereby provide for a more overt intrusion into capital markets, the Act . . . 
is structured so that . . . the indenture . . . must be ‘qualified’ by the SEC.” 508 To be 
qualified, the indenture may not relieve the trustee from liability for negligence in 
carrying out its duties under the indenture and the trustee’s duties, which are normally 
only ministerial, are broadened in the event of a default.509 The SEC has no enforcement 
authority under the Trust Indenture Act once the registration statement becomes effective 
for a trust indenture.510 
Structured Finance  
Another collective investment vehicle is found in structured finance where special 
purpose entities (“SPEs”) are used to “securitize” cash flows from assets placed in the 
SPEs. Ownership interests in the SPEs are sold to investors and the proceeds from that 
sale are paid to the owner that transferred the assets to the SPE. Such entities are formed 
as limited partnerships, limited liability companies, partnerships and business trusts. 
SPEs have no operational role or utilize boards of directors. The SPE’s only function is to 
 
506 Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 
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hold the assets and to collect and make any required payments from the assets’ income 
streams.511 
SPEs were often used to enhance the credit rating on the SPE obligations because 
the assets are isolated from the creditors of the entity transferring the assets to the SPE. 
Such isolation could be achieved, however, only if certain accounting requirements were 
met. Specifically, Financial Accounting Standard 140 (FAS 140) allowed the assets and 
liabilities of a SPE to be removed from a company’s balance sheet only if an outside 
investor controlled, and had a substantial investment in, the SPE. The SEC’s Office of 
Chief Accountant opined that, in order to achieve the required independence, the outside 
investor would have to have at least a three percent substantive equity ownership interest 
in the SPE. Another characteristic common to the securitization of assets was that the 
assets sold to the SPE would produce an income stream that could be used to pay back 
the investors buying interests in the SPE.512 
The SPE was initially used to package and resell mortgages and such investments 
are now a common part of finance.513 The concept then spread to other instruments or 
 
511 The SPE arrangement will often employ various custodians and a “servicer” that acts like an indenture 
trustee in collecting and distributing the cash flow. Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate 
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obligations that created a stream of payments, such as credit card receivables514 and even 
song royalties.515 The use of the SPE was extended beyond limits by the Enron Corp.after 
it began using mark-to-market accounting for certain of its assets. That accounting 
method resulted in an increase in reported income when those assets were appreciating 
but hurt revenue when they began to decline at the end of the last century. To deal with 
that decline, Enron sought to “monetize” those assets by selling them to a SPE. Enron 
created some 3,000 such entities to carry out those sales. However, Enron’s bankruptcy 
examiner found that several Enron SPEs did not have the requisite true sale status 
because Enron retained control of the assets and continued to have liability for decreases 
in their value, as well as control over the ultimate disposition of the assets.516 That 
scandal resulted in an increase by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) in 
the independent investor requirement to 10 percent.517 
Limited Liability Companies 
Another entity that may operate without a board of directors is the limited liability 
company (“LLC”). They were created as the result of the realization that traditional 
corporate governance structures were often too unwieldy for small businesses. Wyoming 
was the first state to enact legislation allowing such entities in 1977, and other states soon 
followed.518 The LLC authorized by those statutes allowed complete flexibility in capital 
structure and management. They are also tax advantaged because the Internal Revenue 
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Service has allowed pass through tax treatment for the owners of LLCs.519 Ownership 
interests in an LLC that are marketed to passive investors may be required to be 
registered under the federal securities laws unless exempted.520 
The interests of the members of the LLC were not represented by traditional stock 
that was governed by the corporate laws of the state of incorporation. Rather, their 
ownership rights are spelled out in an “operating agreement” that governs the operations 
and management of the LLC. The operating agreement may be quite detailed on how the 
affairs of the company were to be managed and may permit management structures 
outside the traditional board of directors.521 The courts are currently wrestling with the 
issue of when fiduciary duties will apply to the managers of an LLC and whether the 
operating agreement may define those duties.522 
VIII 
CONCLUSION--MUTAL FUND ALTERNATIVES 
SHOULD BE EXPLORED 
 
An alternative is needed to the intrusive and expensive regulatory scheme under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 that has failed to protect investors. The SEC’s 
fixation on the use of outside directors to guard against conflicts of interest on the part of 
investment advisers to mutual funds has proved to be ineffective. That obsession is being 
pursued without empirical support for the agency’s claim that increasing outside directors 
has any effect on the efficacy of a mutual fund or any other corporate governance 
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structure. Outside directors did not prevent or detect the scandals uncovered by Spitzer. 
Outside directors have no way in the future to prevent misconduct because the investment 
adviser and sponsor control all information flows. Outside directors, no matter how 
numerous, have no way to gain independent access to that flow. Indeed, it seems strange 
that the SEC and corporate governance advocates would want to place management of 
mutual funds and other corporations into the hands of outside directors who have no day-
to-day knowledge of the business.  
 Hedge funds have become one of the most successful investment mediums in the 
country without SEC regulation.523 The hedge funds have conflicts of interest but have 
dealt with them adequately without a mandated number of outside directors. The hedge 
fund’s cousin, the commodity pool, has operated successfully as limited partnerships that 
have no board of directors. Trust indentures, unit investment trusts, structured finance 
and limited liability companies also operate quite well without boards of outside 
directors. Conflicts of interest are handled by disclosures and contractual restrictions. The 
trust indenture is a good example of how those conflicts can be managed by negative 
covenants and other restrictions. Insurance companies are regulated intensively but have 
no 75 percent outside director requirement such as that imposed by the SEC on mutual 
funds. 
Without intruding too far into the debate of market efficiency propounded by the 
Chicago School of law and economics, there are market disciplines available.524 The trust 
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indenture is negotiated under that discipline. As one court noted, “those indentures are 
often not the product of face-to-face negotiations between the ultimate holders and the 
issuing company. What remains equally true, however, is that underwriters ordinarily 
negotiate the terms of the indentures with the issuers. Since the underwriters must then 
sell or place the bonds, they necessarily negotiate in part with the interests of the buyers 
in mind.”525 The UIF operates abroad without the SEC corporate governance restrictions. 
Its forward looking fee removes many of the conflicts of interest generated by mutual 
funds using a fluctuating backward looking NAV fee. Contractual restrictions can be 
added to reduce other conflicts.  
Of course, there is no such thing as a foolproof regulatory or contractual structure. 
UIF operators will still have incentives to inflate their returns in order to attract investors, 
which could lead to destructive effects when high risk investments are acquired to boost 
those returns. Nevertheless, consumers should be given a choice of a managed investment 
company that does not have a traditional board of directors or one that is staffed by a 
mandatory number of outside directors with little or no knowledge of the day-to-day 
business.        
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